416. Memorandum for the file, October 261
SUBJECT
- Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee, 26 October, 1962 10:00 A.M.
IN ATTENDANCE
- All members plus Governor Stevenson and Mr. McCloy
McCone gave an intelligence briefing which included reading the Watch Committee report of 10/26, distributing and highlighting an Intelligence Agency Memorandum of 10/26, copy of which was distributed; reviewing summary conclusions of GMAIC, JAEIC, NPIC Supplement #6; summarizing Miskovsky’s report on the prisoner exchange (OGC 62–2597); summarized CIA report on non-Bloc ships enroute to [Typeset Page 1225] Cuba 10/26; and pointed out that non-Bloc ships could quite possibly carry Soviet arms and they would be just as secure as Soviet or Bloc ships if engaged on bare-boat charter; reviewed briefly Cuban internal reaction to the U.S. quarantine as contained in report of 10/26.
McCone then posed two operational problems. One, the CIA plan to have ten teams go into Cuba by submarine to gather intelligence on missile bases and other points of interest. McCone stated that CIA was prepared to use its assets to support MONGOOSE operations under Lansdale’s direction; that the objective was to take Cuba from Castro and turn it over to the Cuban people or alternatively to secure intelligence in support of possible military activities and, in this instance, the requirement should be established by SecDef and JCS.
McCone stated there was an organizational problem with Lansdale under current conditions and a meeting had been called for this afternoon to resolve this problem and to establish a course of action on the Lansdale MONGOOSE organization. The President stated that he felt the Lansdale organization should be used and suggested it might serve as a Subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee.
McCone also advised the President that plan for political organization of Cuba in event of an invasion was under study and would be considered at the 2:30 meeting.
[Facsimile Page 2]There followed an extended discussion of operational matters, details of which are covered in the attached notes.
McCone brought up the problem of the USS OXFORD as covered by Blake memorandum of October 25th, Serial N 1623. It was decided that the location and the security of the OXFORD should be part of the responsibility of the blockade operation and therefore should be considered by Admiral Anderson and his staff.
NOTE: In this connection, I wish NSA to keep me currently informed as to whether the OXFORD is being used to maximum advantage for intelligence purposes and is properly protected.
Attachment to original:
DCI’s notes—3 small sheets on White House note paper
- Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee including intelligence briefings and discussion of operational problems. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01258A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.↩