I urge your early attention to the attached memorandum. I fully share the
concerns expressed in it and, in particular, the requirement for great
diplomatic skill required in dealing with a “soft” Soviet reaction.
Attachment
SUBJECT
- Concern over the Course and Outcome of the Cuban Crisis
I am increasingly disturbed over indications that in all of our
planning for the development of the Cuban crisis we have to our
peril neglected one particular contingency: that the Soviets would
react mildly and with great caution. A week ago we were concerned
about strangulation of West Berlin, missile firings and exchanges of
cities within the US and USSR, and
other drastic and dangerous possibilities. Now the danger that looms
large is not exchange of cities, but exchange
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of bases—at the
extreme, the unhinging of our whole overseas base and alliance
structure. It would be a remarkable thing if the Soviets were able
to make substantial gains in achieving their main objective of
weakening the alliances militarily and politically simply by
exhibiting caution and indecision in the face of our initial stand.
I can think of nothing that would more encourage the Soviets to
create new Cuban and now distant military bases and local conflicts
than would a net gain from their Cuban venture.
I am, as you know, in fullest accord with the objectives so
resolutely outlined in the President’s address. Yet I can not escape
the conclusion that unintentionally we may be moving in a direction
which in the eyes of Moscow, the American people, and history could
make mockery of the statement that “further steps” may be necessary;
it was presumed, of course, these would be further steps forward if
they were necessary to achieve the objective of the “withdrawal or
elimination” of the missile bases in Cuba. But a rush to find
concessions that we can offer to achieve this objective could, to
change the arithmetic in Lenin’s phrase, mean “one step forward, two
steps backward.”
Negotiation is vastly to be preferred to direct military action, so
long as it can achieve our objectives. That it is sometimes
necessary to brace our diplomatic stand by resort to carefully
considered military measures is, of course, manifest in the
quarantine action itself. There
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are also still available
means of increasing the pressure which we can bring to bear on the
other side short of direct military action, in particular,
broadening the blockade or commando raids on the missile bases. But
any irresolution in enforcing the present quarantine, or in
accepting a “freeze” on the present situation (thus closing off all
options for intensifying pressure), or premature indications that we
would “trade” other bases, would weaken greatly such strength as we
now have to bring to bear in negotiation.
At the time of the President’s address, and perhaps still today, the
Soviet leaders have probably been quite uncertain as to whether the
“initial step” was in fact only the first of a “one-two punch.”
Their caution to date has been a result of this uncertainty. But
this is a wasting asset, if indeed not already a wasted one. When
they realize the other shoe is not going to drop, they are likely to
be emboldened in their actions and certain to raise their price in
negotiations. If we seem to display a certain fear in our own
actions, Soviet fear of these actions cannot fail to be
lessened.
The terms for eventual negotiation might well include some give by
the United States as well as by the USSR. But unless we are very careful, the business of
letting the Soviets “save face” may come to involve losing our arm.
The Soviets simply will not expect the United States to be offering
concessions at a time when they have brought no
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counterpressure to
bear on us in response to the quarantine. Any such indication (and
the press is already rife with such rumors of trading off bases in
Turkey, etc.) will mean to Moscow only that the United States is not prepared to compel
the retraction of Soviet offensive power from the Western
Hemisphere. One doesn’t buy what is already his. If we concede that
we must purchase the Soviet withdrawal, we undermine our right to
compel it. The longer we haggle over terms, the more this is so.
Moreover, the Soviets may be able to “sell” their missile bases in
Cuba several times over. They can play us along on a deal exchanging
Turkey for Cuba and then insist on broadening it out to include more
and more United States bases—having already achieved most of their
purpose simply by stimulating lack of confidence in the US alliance
commitments. The missile bases in Turkey and Italy are not
militarily important; this is, however, almost irrelevant. The Turks
and Italians have already shown alarm at unofficial indications of
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possible trade-off, and this alarm will both deepen and spread out
to other areas, no matter how we seek to present the case in terms
of suddenly acknowledged obsolescence and of renewed efforts to
provide more modern long-range missile support from other locations
and by multilateral agreements. There is a real danger that some of
our Allies may believe that the United States is not only
excessively concerned about the military threat to itself, but also
that it is prepared to sacrifice some elements of its power and of
its commitment to them in order to allay a selfish concern about a
base near our shores.
I believe that the United States should make very clear that our
objective remains the dismantling of present offensive bases in
Cuba. We should emphasize our continuing readiness to discuss
broader disarmament and other arrangements; and also our willingness
to permit a United Nations presence to monitor the dismantling of
existing offensive bases—but without raising the quarantine before
the patient is cured. Discussions in a Summit meeting or other
appropriate diplomatic interchange would almost certainly have to
involve broad questions such as nuclear non-diffusion. However, it
seems to me that we should approach such negotiations from a
position of strength rather than a feeling of weakness. If we
maintain the original resolve to use whatever means are necessary,
though not more than are necessary, to effect the withdrawal of
Soviet striking power from Cuba, I believe that the Soviets will in
fact recognize that the United States does have the high cards.
CC: G—Mr. Johnson
G/PM—Mr. Kitchen
