382. Telegram from General Norstad to McGeorge Bundy, October 241
TO: DA for SHAPE LN LCOL George.
Please deliver the following message to Mr. McGeorge Bundy and to him only, unless he specifically designates someone else to receive it, after you have advised him that it is a TOP SECRET EYES ONLY letter for the President. No one else should be shown a copy of this message nor should any copy be retained by either the Communications people, by your office, or by any other individual or agency in the Pentagon. Message begins:
“TOP SECRET—EYES ONLY
“Dear Mr. President:
“There are a few points which developed during my visit to London which will be of interest to you. I am using this means to report them to you but because of their sensitivity I will not repeat this letter in writing. I have directed that there be no other distribution of this message and that no copies be retained.
“The most interesting point developed in my final talk with Macmillan, after the luncheon with the Queen yesterday, at which time [Facsimile Page 2] he [Typeset Page 1171] reverted to the subject of possible follow-up action in Cuba should the quarantine involve the use of force or prove ineffective. He had touched on this the night before, but in general terms. I was impressed by the fact that he again raised this point and in such terms that it was clear he had given considerable thought to it and had probably discussed it with the Cabinet and others. In his conversation with me, Macmillan quite definitely accepted the possibility of the United States taking over Cuba by military action. He stated that there might be very substantial European opposition to such action, but if the reason were clear enough this would be overcome by prompt success. He is influenced by two factors: one, the absolute need for success; and the other, the difficulty of negotiating with Khrushchev when he holds two high cards in his hands, Berlin and Cuba. In discussing this subject, he did so against the background of the Suez experience and the errors made by the British at that time.
“The Prime Minister referred many times to the need for unity in the Alliance, emphasizing that Khrushchev must not be permitted to divide us into two or three groups. In this connection he twice stated that he was very favorably impressed with the strong and positive position which de Gaulle had indicated to him in their exchange of messages. On the other side, he stated that there was going to be [Facsimile Page 3] Labor Party opposition in the U.K. and that he was seeing Gaitskell yesterday afternoon at five o’clock on this point.
“I was impressed in all my talks in London, and now also here in Paris, with the strong and general feeling on the need for unity. Even where there may be questions as to what should be done or how it should be done, there appears to be the strongest feeling that nothing must be permitted to divide us. This, I believe, is an important factor in the growing support for your action.
“A high British official asked me whether in negotiating with the Russians we would trade missiles in Turkey for missiles in Cuba, and to this I gave as emphatic a ‘no’ as possible. I believe that he was simply trying to find an answer to a question which has arisen in the U.K., but which I am quite sure does not suggest the trend of official thinking.
“At the risk of being presumptious, may I say that I hope we spare no effort in preparing ourselves for ultimate action in Cuba and that we act promptly in case we are finally forced to resort to such a step. My thinking is conditioned by the fact that I ‘sweat through’ the Suez operation six years ago when mighty words were followed days after the ultimatum had been served by a weak and ineffective effort. Opposition built up, as you know, and even those who sympathized with France and the U.K. lost their taste for the exercise.
[Facsimile Page 4]“To report the private and confidential words of one Head of Government to another is full of danger, but after careful thought I [Typeset Page 1172] felt that I must inform you of the sense of Macmillan’s conversation with me, since it may have a bearing on the great decisions you must make at this critical time. Because of my relationship with the Prime Minister, his talk to me must be considered as an expression of personal rather than official views. I am sure that you will seek directly his opinion should it be a critical factor at any time.
“Faithfully,
- Transmits letter to the President reporting on Norstad’s trip to London. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Subject File, Kennedy, John F.↩