Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

339. Handwritten notes of meeting made by McCone, October 19¹

October 19, 1962

1) 10/19—11:00 AM

All including Dean Acheson, Dean Rusk, Ball, Johnson, Thompson, Meeker

Briefing by Lundahl—

28—launchers

23—SAMs

35—MiG 21 +4 probables

Nitze asked if we had it all

McCone said not all—maybe 30%—or double or triple

Cline reviewed estimate—appendix and generic-fair[?] NPIC esti[mate?]

Exchange of discussion of Appendix A

Conclusions: limited action results were retaliation [unclear] also invasion

Gilpatric[?] remarks—SOV assistance solely defensive—help industry—help agriculture

Note get notes on this

Katzenbach—No problems on establishing blockade except difficulty ratification OAS and taking to UN. Pres needs no more authority—declaration [of] war not necessary and [unclear] to int[ernational] law and U.N. charter

2) Need to justify action on reason [?] other than attack or [unclear] of attack—UNGA action unavailable—under OAS and UN treaties we cannot use force. Arguments of [unclear] require of [unclear] law in the West Hem[isphere?] give US special privilege—This will not stand up. To make our actions legal must have action under Art. 6 & 8 of OAS Treaty. Martin believes we would get 14 votes easily. This would excuse any use of force.—

Acheson If discussion is on a [unclear] of legal steps. [rest of paragraph unclear]

3) [unclear] supports a

Rusk ask[ed] for summary of last night’s meeting. McN[amara] responded w/ 3 [unclear]

1—Political

2—Limited blockade which [2 words unclear]

3—Full strike I–II–III plus threat to [unclear] (300–400 sorties)

Pres tentative decision (2)

Decision to [unclear]—[unclear] on Monday or Tuesday

Bundy says not sure of Pres state of mind—Talked with Pres this AM—not serve him well if use did not offer more than one course of action—

Taylor—JCS strongly favor military action—strike against all known installations

All difficulties of blockade and surveillance

Guantanamo

4) AG—[unclear] please [?] new arguments for 2 and 3. Feels Pres will have difficult time attacking Cuba. [unclear] M/180 M raises special moral problems. And relationships with other countries. ICBs in USSR are just as dangerous as missiles in Cuba. OK to make both scenarios but final decision most difficult.

Thompson favors blockade but feels it will escalate. Gromyko feels we will have showdown and we must choose best time. Killing SOVs in Cuba means possible nuclear war.

Acheson When we get into a showdown we run danger of nuclear war and if we fear this then K will [2 words unclear] of Latin America—Do we know Castro will not someday have status. Blockade will not remove [?] missiles—Therefore they will become operational and we can never again act.

1. Possible courses of action in Cuba. No classification marking. 4 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July–31 December 1962.