318. Notes from transcripts of JCS meeting, October 151
NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)
CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.
CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.
CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.
CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.
CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.
CONAD: Continental Air Defense
DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency
DJS: Director, Joint Staff
NORAD: North American Air Defense
OAS: Organization of American States
RCT: Regimental Combat Team
SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile
TAC: Tactical Air Command[Facsimile Page 2]
Monday, 15 October
JCS met at 1400; SecDef and DepSecDef joined them at 1430; Discussion of JCS 2304/68, contingency planning for Cuba:
CJCS: If CPLAN 316’s requirement for an airborne assault after five days’ preparation is to be met, the Marine RCT must move from Camp Pendleton to the East Coast.
SecDef: President wants no military action within the next three months, but he can’t be sure as he does not control events. For instance, aerial photos made available this morning show 63 boxes on ships that are not believed to be 11–28s and cannot be identified. However, the probabilities are strongly against military action in the next 30 days.
Discussion of JCS 2304/69, which deals with preparations necessary to execute oplans:
SecDef: I suggest we use [1½ lines not declassified]. We can’t do what the British and French did over Suez—say we will take action, then do nothing while a long buildup is completed. We can’t do nothing during the 18-day preparatory period for OPLAN 314 while the enemy [Typeset Page 1035] prepares and world pressure mounts. So I suggest that [1½ lines not declassified].
CNC: A Marine RLT would have to be moved from the West Coast; that requires 20 days’ notice and an 18-day voyage.
SecDef: We would not mobilize reserve air squadrons until air strikes begin. All present agreed.
CSA: The thing about OPLAN 314 that bothers me is that we [less than 1 line not declassified].[Facsimile Page 3]
[text not declassified]
SecDef: We should bring this problem to the President’s attention as soon as possible. [1½ lines not declassified] JCS agreed with him that a briefing should be prepared for the President outlining these two alternatives.
- Contingency planning for Cuba. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.↩