Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

296. Carter diary entry, September 10¹

September 10, 1962

1. Met with Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor and the Attorney General in McGeorge Bundy’s office at approximately 5:45 in a meeting generated by Secretary Rusk’s concern over Cuban overflights and his particular desire to avoid any incidents. (See attachments)

Earlier this day Bundy through Tom Parrott requested information on inquiries posed by Mr. Rusk on the importance of our intelligence objectives necessitating Cuban overflights; how much intelligence would suffer if reconnaissance were limited to peripheral flights; and an engaging question whether anyone in the Community might wish to provoke an incident. (See attachment)

2. Sent Secretary of Defense a memorandum on “Tactical Reconnaissance of Cuba” indicating COMOR’s recommendation and DIA’s request for the following needs:

a. Coverage of Banes as a possible surface-to-air missile site;

b. Need for larger scale coverage of Banes than can be acquired by the U–2; and

c. Recommended Secretary of Defense initiate necessary action for tactical type reconnaissance of Banes or other targets as identified by COMOR. (See attachment)

3. At President’s instruction briefed General Eisenhower on Cuban situation.

4. DCI Cable urging BNE to study motives behind Cuban defense measures which might be designed to hide installation of offensive capability. DD/I notified.

1. Intelligence objectives behind overflights of Cuba. No classification marking. 1 p. CIA Files: Job 80–B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop.