Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

289. Memorandum from William Harvey to McCone, August 8, with attached Operation Plan¹

August 8, 1962

SUBJECT

• Operation MONGOOSE—Future Course of Action

REFERENCES

• A. Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Brigadier General Lansdale dated 25 July 1962, Subject: Review of Operation Mongoose
• B. Agenda for 10 August Meeting, Special Group (Augmented)
• C. Memorandum to the DCI dated 24 July 1962 from C/TFM, Subject: Operation MONGOOSE—End of Phase I
• D. NIE 85–2–62 dated 27 July 1962, Subject: The Situation and Prospects in Cuba

Action: This memorandum sets out a recommended CIA position on the future course of action to be followed in Operation Mongoose, which will be discussed at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on 10 August 1962. Paragraph VII below contains recommendations for your approval. A copy of this memorandum with Attachment A has been forwarded to the Office of National Estimates for the preparation of their separate comments and assessment pursuant to your oral instructions on 2 August 1962.

I. Background:

A. On 16 March 1962, the Special Group (Augmented) approved Phase I of Operation Mongoose authorizing and directing that between that date and 31 July 1962, CIA mount a concentrated operational program to collect intelligence concerning Cuba and to develop, insofar as possible, clandestine resistance cadres inside Cuba. This plan authorized intelligence—political, economic, and covert actions, short of those reasonably calculated to inspire revolt within the target area or otherwise require U.S. armed intervention. The plan required that actions taken during Phase I should be consistent with overt policies of isolating Castro in the Western Hemisphere and be undertaken in such a way as to permit U.S. disengagement with minimum losses of assets and prestige. Major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence have required approval in advance by the Special Group (Augmented).

B. Phase I of Operation Mongoose did not provide for a maximum operational program against Cuba and did not authorize any extensive use of U.S. military personnel, bases, and facilities. No decision was made to undertake a phased operation to provoke a revolt with the commitment that such revolt would be supported by U.S. military forces. You will recall that on 10 April 1962 on your instructions, a reassessment was made of the Mongoose operational plan which pointed out that, if a more intensive effort was to be undertaken, additional use would have to be made of United States military facilities, personnel, and bases. This reassessment concluded that Operation Mongoose as constituted during Phase I was not likely to result in the overthrow of the Castro regime, unless followed by extensive additional preparation and action based on a firm decision to use U.S. military forces as necessary.

C. In his memorandum to the Special Group (Augmented) dated 25 July 1962, General Lansdale recommended that the Group consider in determining the future course of the operation the following four possible courses of action:

“a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it, or

“b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt employment of U.S. military, or

“c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end, or

“d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force.”

D. Preliminary comments concerning the above four courses of action are contained in General Lansdale’s memorandum of 25 July 1962 and the attachment thereto, and in the attachment to the memorandum to you dated 24 July 1962, referred to above.

II. Courses of Action—General:

No detailed comments are being submitted concerning courses of action “a” or “d”. Course of action “a” will not exert any appreciable impact on the Castro regime and will accomplish little beyond continuing long-term intelligence coverage. Course of action “d” is not believed politically feasible, nor is it felt there is any chance that higher authority would approve it unless possibly as a part of and concurrent with the final phase of course of action “c”. The adoption as a future course of action of “b”, “c”, or “d” would require the revision of the present Operation Mongoose Guidelines. Courses of action “b” and “c” are discussed in greater detail below, as is a possible alternative course of action to be considered, particularly if higher authority does not approve course of action “c” or an acceptable variation thereof.

III. Course of Action B:

A. Course of action “b” if fully implemented as now stated would require CIA to undertake a maximum aggressive intelligence and operational program utilizing all available assets without any commitment that the United States would intervene to support or preserve from destruction any Cuban revolt which might occur. A maximum effort under course of action “b” would inflict appreciable damage on the Castro regime, but would not alone result, in all probability, in its overthrow. It is possible that this course of action might incite a revolt in Cuba, but this revolt would be crushed almost immediately unless the United States stepped in with military force.

B. Any such revolt would be clearly attributable in the United States and if we permitted it to be crushed, the United States would, in our opinion, suffer a loss in prestige and face approximating the results of the April 1961 fiasco. Stated another way, a maximum operational program under course of action “b” has inherent in it the possibility of escalation into a situation where the action provided for in course of action “c” would be necessary but under course of action “b” might not have been fully prepared for and therefore would not be feasible. Vital to preserving any revolt in Cuba if one occurs is the speed and timing of military intervention, since the Castro police, security, and military forces are capable of crushing any such revolt in a matter of days. Although token forces from Latin American, particularly Caribbean, nations could and should be solicited to assist in any such military intervention, this offers little practical hope of success unless their assistance is requested as an adjunct to U.S. forces.

C. Among the serious objections to course of action “b” is the fact that it constitutes an open-ended assignment with no clear terminal point and without the willingness to drive the program through to ultimate success by the use of military force if this becomes necessary. This would prevent us from giving to agent personnel and other Cubans the type of motivation, instructions, and training for an ultimate timed revolt which are necessary to fully exploit their potential.

D. Since, to an extent, course of action “b” as now stated is a piecemeal effort with no clear objective goal other than to create the maximum pressures against Castro, inevitably this effort, the longer it progresses would suffer to an ever increasing degree by attrition. This attrition would result not only from Castro counteraction, since the plan would permit him to attack our efforts piecemeal, but from the increasing disillusionment and discouragement of Cubans and other personnel employed. In effect, short of fortuitous circumstances leading to an unanticipated successful revolt without military intervention (which is believed improbable), this course of action would lead to the death and imprisonment of a substantial number of Cubans, to considerable criticism of U.S. motives and actions, and to a steady dissipation of the available assets for use against Cuba.

E. Maximum implementation of course of action “b” would also require a much broader utilization of and dependence on Cuban exiles and exile groups with all of the attendant difficulties of control and security inherent therein.

F. An operational program to carry out course of action “b” could not be unattributable and could not be conducted in any aggressive sense without United States participation therein becoming widely known and probably widely criticized.

G. Course of action “b” would require of CIA a substantially expanded program against the Cubans involving an estimated 600 personnel and a yearly budget of approximately 50,000,000 dollars. There is serious question whether the results to be obtained from course of action “b” alone would be worth this expenditure of funds and manpower.

H. In addition, if CIA is given course of action “b” as a mission as it presently is worded, we would be vulnerable to any and all criticism for lack of success on the theory that we had not done “all possible”.

I. Attached as Attachment A is an operational plan outlining the actions and policy approvals that would be required if CIA is to implement course of action “b” on a maximum aggressive basis. All of the actions outlined are feasible and could be done with greater or lesser success, although in the case of a number of these actions the exact measure of success and the time involved to attain it cannot definitively be ascertained until the actions are undertaken. The feasibility of these actions depends of course upon whether higher authority is willing to grant the necessary policy approvals required and sustain the high noise level and attribution which could result. In preparing this operational plan we are not proposing that it be adopted as such and particular attention is directed to the assumptions therein, specifically assumption “b” which has been inserted to underline the fact that unless this assumption (which we believe is invalid) is made, this operational plan is not valid as a plan which, in end of itself, is likely to succeed in overthrowing the Castro-Communist regime.

IV. Course of Action “C”:

A. Full implementation of course of action “c” would require the bulk of the actions outlined in connection with maximum course of action “b” as set out in Attachment A to this memorandum. The significant difference is that under “c” these actions would be keyed to a phased plan, the termination of which would be the triggering of a planned revolt in Cuba to be supported immediately by United States military forces in order to prevent the revolt being destroyed by Castro counteraction.

B. Under course of action “c” it would be far easier for us to recruit and motivate Cubans, incite resistance, generate widespread opposition to the Castro regime, and organize aggressive action operations against Cuba.

C. It is not contemplated that the Cubans would be advised of the decision to use military force, but they could be told, and this would have a tremendous effect in strengthening our efforts, that if they themselves created a revolt on a timed basis under our direction, the United States would not permit that revolt to be destroyed by Castro police and military counteraction.

D. Course of action “c” fully implemented has an excellent chance of succeeding in organizing such a revolt, with good fortune, by the end of 1963 and resulting in the successful overthrow of the Castro-Communist regime.

E. If course of action “c” is adopted it would require approximately the same, perhaps slightly higher, CIA commitments in manpower and money than would be required by the operational plan in Attachment A. In addition, in the phase after the military intervention, it would require a substantial commitment by CIA inside Cuba principally in the intelligence, counterintelligence, and counter-subversion fields in support of whatever occupying forces were maintained in Cuba, as well as in support of the new Cuban government.

V. Possible Alternate Course of Action:

A. If higher authority does not approve course of action “c” or a workable variation thereof, a possible alternative course of action should be considered. It would be a reduced “b” type operation which, in effect, would remove from the operational plan in Attachment A many of the more aggressive action operations described and would curtail the extent to which other actions in this plan would be undertaken. Such an alternative course of action would be more aggressive than course of action “a” but would have no chance alone of provoking a major revolt and, while it would hurt the Castro regime materially, the damage would not be vital.

B. Such a course of action would require from CIA approximately the current commitment in funds and manpower i.e., $25,000,000 a year, and approximately 500 personnel.

C. Such a course of action would amount to a long term effort playing for fortuitous, hoped-for breaks in the Cuban situation which might be capitalized upon.

D. Such a course of action would not require policy approval from higher authority to the same extent as courses of action “b” or “c”. It would involve a much lower noise level and a much greater possibility of plausible denial of United States sponsorship.

E. In view of the length of this memorandum and the attached operational plan, no separate plan for this possible alternate course of action has been drawn. In summary, this course of action would envisage generally the approach outlined in Attachment A for a maximum type “b” course of action, but with the omission or substantial curtailment of the actions referred to in the following points in Attachment A which have been circled in the attachment for convenient reference.

III.A.5.

III.B.2.

III.C.1,3,6,7

IV.B.

IV.B.1,3,4

IV.C.

IV.C.1,4,5

IV.C.6b,e

V.A.2a,c,e

V.A.3a

V.B.

VI.A,B,D,E,F,G,H,I,J,K

F. If serious consideration is given to this alternate course of action, a separate operational plan will of course be drawn for it.

VI. Conclusions:

A. Course of action “a” will not and should not be adopted as the future course of action for Operation Mongoose.

B. Course of action “d” will not and should not be adopted as the future course of action for Operation Mongoose, unless it is coupled with course of action “c”.

C. Full implementation of course of action “b” will require a major CIA commitment over and above the present commitment in both personnel and money. It will not alone result in the successful overthrow of Castro. It clearly will be attributable to the U.S. and will carry with it a very high “noise level”. In addition, this course of action will in effect leave CIA almost solely responsible for solving the Cuban problem and will leave the Agency in an extremely vulnerable position to criticism.

D. Course of action “c” is feasible and if properly implemented has an excellent chance of successfully overthrowing the Castro government by the end of 1963. Course of action “d” involving a provocation or provocations which could be arranged by CIA could be productively and sensibly coupled with course of action “c” and, if higher authority is willing to undertake this, we would strongly recommend that this be done.

E. Course of action “b” should not be adopted unless higher authority is willing to make the decision now that if it is adopted and a revolt occurs in Cuba, such revolt will be supported by U.S. military force to prevent its rapid destruction by the Castro regime.

F. Effective implementation of either course of action “b” or “c” requires approval, in principle at least, of the policy decisions listed in paragraph VI of Attachment A to this memorandum.

G. Fully effective and efficient implementation of either course of action “b” or “c” requires that the Special Group establish broad policy guidelines and that the current detailed monitoring by the Special Group (Augmented) of operational activities and decisions be substantially relaxed.

H. If course of action “b” is undertaken, it may well result in a spontaneous or other uprising in Cuba which, without proper provision for military support would be crushed. This, in our opinion, would destroy any practical possibility of effective future clandestine operational action against Castro’s regime and as a direct result the United States would, in our opinion, since this would be a “U.S. sponsored revolt”, suffer a loss in prestige and influence approaching the magnitude of that which resulted from the April 1961 fiasco at Playa Giron.

I. If higher authority does not approve either course of action “c” or a workable variation thereof, and does not approve course of action “b” with the understanding that if a revolt occurs it will be supported by military force which will be kept available on a contingency basis, then the alternate course of action discussed in paragraph V above is preferable to “a”, “b” as now worded, or “d”. This alternate course of action in effect would be a watered-down “b” with the “all possible” provision deleted or materially changed.

VII. Recommendations:

It is recommended that, if you concur, you propose to the Special Group (Augmented) the approval by higher authority of proposed course of action “c” or, at the very least, that a preliminary decision be made now to support with U.S. military forces any revolt which occurs or is provoked inside Cuba as a result of, or attributable to, United States action. It is recommended that the maximum course of action “b” as outlined in Attachment A of this memorandum not be adopted unless this commitment to support any revolt with military force is clearly accepted and understood. If higher authority does not approve the above, it is recommended that you take the position that the alternate course of action described in paragraph V above be adopted in principle by higher authority as the future course of action for Operation Mongoose and that appropriate detailed operational plans for implementing this course of action be drawn immediately.

William K. Harvey

C/IFW

Attachment A

OPERATIONAL PLAN

I. Situation:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action which would be required by the Central Intelligence Agency to fully implement course of action “b” in General Lansdale’s memorandum to the Special Group (Augmented) dated 25 July 1962.

B. The intelligence estimate for the period of this plan is contained in the National Intelligence Estimate 85–2–62.

C. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. Conclusion D of the National Intelligence Estimate 85–2–62 is invalid. (This assumption is not in our opinion valid, but this operational plan is not a valid plan for the overthrow of the Castro-Communist government unless this assumption is made.)

2. Soviet troops will not be present in Cuba in force.

3. Passive resistance can be changed to active resistance through aggressive, provocative propaganda plus aggressive small-scale open resistance and through fortuitous circumstances existing at the time. It cannot be manipulated on a “time table” basis.

II. Mission:

“Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment.”

III. Tasks:

A. Political:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and individual Latin American country support for the overthrow of Castro.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Provide covert support to the CHC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.

4. Develop contacts in the “power centers” of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

5. Induce the population to engage in militant uses action such as demonstrations, slow-downs, work stoppages, and sabotage.

B. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.

2. Conduct maximum possible sabotage of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants, and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such. At the present time, and for the predictable future, major sabotage at least in part probably would have to be conducted by raider type teams using hit and run tactics.

3. By aggressive deception and other operations, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes.

4. Induce the population to conduct continuing widespread minor sets of sabotage.

C. Resistance:

1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance and revolt in the general population.

2. Recruit, train, and supply small clandestine resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.

3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in maximum feasible amounts, in areas accessible to the resistance cells and in potential resistance areas.

4. Be prepared to provide covert liaison and communications with leadership elements to any significant internal uprising.

5. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.

6. Harass local elements of the Cuban government by hit and run raids against selected targets such as local G–2 offices, militia posts, telephone centrals, etc.

7. If feasible and authorized, initiate an internal uprising.

D. Psychological:

1. Strengthen, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-Communism.

2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere, and elsewhere.

E. Intelligence:

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:

a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.

b. Activities of Cuban G–2.

c. Soviet activities in Cuba.

d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.

e. Militia morale.

f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the “power centers” in the Cuban government.

IV. Implementation:

To undertake the above listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop and carry out the following program (which constitutes a substantial expansion of the current program, particularly in fields other than intelligence).

A. Intelligence (FY):

The current build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.

2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.

3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information.

4. Expansion of communications intelligence, particularly in the G–2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

B. Psychological Warfare (CA):

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population. It will have to provide aggressive and provocative propaganda as well as the milder themes. Clear authority to engage in “high noise level” types of propaganda operations calling for work stoppages, slowdowns, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance is required.

The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential:

1. The establishment of a sufficiently powerful Radio Free Cuba located in Southern Florida or other appropriate area. When this is in operation, the Swan Island operation will be terminated. Policy approval to establish this is required.

2. A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.

3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet dropping operations using U.S. and other contract crews.

4. Intrusion on live Cuban IV channels with video and audio transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval is required.

5. Continuation and expansion of the “Voice of Cuba” submarine broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy.

6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.

7. Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. Paramilitary:

To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining “black teams” in the target country for an indefinite period, nor has any method yet been devised by which infiltrated “black teams” can be effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the PM program must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and will provide “the spark of hope”. Without this, it will be impossible to recruit and train the necessary legal residents.

To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support is considered essential:

1. Commando/Raider Teams—Ten to fifteen such teams of approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, and hit and run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either as a diversionary effort or for augmentation of selected pockets of resistance. These teams should be trained primarily for hit and run commando raids. It is believed specialized Marine Corps training would be especially appropriate for them. If this is not possible, then Army Ranger type training should be given. It is estimated that ten to fifteen 12 to 15 man teams would be the maximum that could be recruited, trained and utilized during the foresenable period. They should have a minimum of four months training, for which Department of Defense facilities and instructor personnel are required. Policy approval is required for the use of non-Cuban contract personnel and DOD facilities and personnel.

2. Urban Resistance Cells—Two to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small “legal” compartmented resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if endangered or if its continued presence jeopardizes the “legal” residents. Initially these cells should be intelligence producers with the secondary mission [text not declassified]. A third mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of a major uprising. It is estimated that within a year at least twelve urban cells could be established. At least 25% of these probably will be lost due to enemy counteraction or from other causes. [text not declassified]

3. Rural Resistance Cells—Three to five men teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small “legal” compartmented resistance cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are endangered or pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. It is estimated that twelve to fifteen such teams could be in place within a year. Forces lost due to attrition are estimated at 25%. Selection and training of the infiltration teams can be accomplished by Agency facilities, but they should be augmented with DOD Special Forces instructors.

4. Guerrilla—Five in eight man teams equipped with W/T communications would be infiltrated into rural areas to live black, recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) “hit and run” guerrilla bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psychological warfare program in support of this effort must be aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups of guerrillas can be activated. It is not possible to predict what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears probable. The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special Forces instructors. The trainees could be handled in groups of fifty with two groups in training at a given time.

5. Cuban Exile Forces—The recruitment and training of Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed Forces should be pressed to the maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals or groups to permit the formation of a “Cuban Freedom Fight” under responsible exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel should be permitted within the “Cuban Freedom Fighter” groups. Additional Policy approval is required.

6. Infiltration/Exfiltration—The increased Cuban defensive capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/exfiltration tactics as required, including:

a. Present and planned commercial/private maritime capability.

b. Submarines and other naval craft.

c. Aerial overflight with contract or USAF crews and aircraft.

Additional policy approval is required.

V. Support Required From Other Agencies:

A. From Department of Defense:

1. Ground Support: Three separate training facilities including all instruction and support.

a. Site A—commando/raider training

Provide a four month training course on a repetitive basis for approximately 200 men.

b. Site B—Special Forces type training

Provide four month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

c. Site C—Special Forces type training

Provide four month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

2. Naval Support:

a. Submarine infiltration/exfiltration missions. Estimate maximum five per month first three months increasing to ten per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 the requirement could be substantially higher.

b. Submarine radio broadcasts—“Voice of Free Cuba”

c. Naval surface craft support may be required at a later date but cannot be predicted now.

d. Installation CIA supply base at or in proximity in Boca Chica Naval Air Station.

e. Use of Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes, including infiltration and exfiltration of agents, support for clandestine maritime operations, operational reconnaissance, and holding and interrogation of Cuban agents and suspects.

3. Air Support:

a. Use of USAF crews and sterile aircraft in lieu of or to supplement U.S. contract crews, provide crews and aircraft for aerial re-supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could substantially increase.

b. Support for CIA air program per existing arrangements.

4. Personnel:

Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide communications support.

B. From USIA and Federal Communications Commission:

Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter.

VI. Policy Approvals Required:

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing program:

A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant uses action and widespread overt resistance.

B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave transmitted by Radio Free Cuba.

C. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching.

D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping.

E. Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeted against Cuban industry and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.

F. Authority to use, U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.

G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams being infiltrated.

H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using DOD instructors and support facilities.

I. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltrations/exfiltration missions using U.S. contract air crews or USAF crews.

J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored group of “Cuban Freedom Fighters”.

K. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes.

VII. Estimated Cost to CIA:

A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Operation Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600.

B. Estimated Budget:

Fiscal Year 1963—$40,000,000

Fiscal Year 1964—$60,000,000 (exclusive of reimbursement for DOD support which it is felt should be on a non-reimburseable basis.)

1. Operation Mongoose future course of action. Top Secret. 19 pp. CIA Files: Job 84–00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 841, 7 Aug 62–15 Aug 62.