278F. Memorandum from CIA Assistant Deputy Director for Plans Barnes to Deputy Director for Plans Bissell, January 191
SUBJECT
- Survey of Cuban Operation
1. My work in support of your “Analysis of the Cuban Operation” gave me an unusual opportunity to study with care the document which caused the Analysis to be written, namely, the “Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation, October 1961”.
2. My consideration of the Survey has forced me to reach certain conclusions which I feel that I must record. I do so in writing because these conclusions are, in my opinion, of sufficient significance to demand the discipline of a written expression. Moreover, I feel that those who disagree with me should have the opportunity to direct any replies that they may choose to make to specific identifiable comments.
3. I may say that my decision to write this memorandum was reached with considerable reluctance and only after long deliberation. The deciding factor was my belief that the suggestions for action in paragraph 6 below are worthwhile and should be submitted. They would have been meaningless without the reasons set forth in the earlier paragraphs. The views expressed are, needless to say, exclusively mine.
4. In my opinion the I.G. Survey is most unfortunate for three reasons:
a. It is an incompetent job. The authors never understood the problems with which they were dealing and failed to express their views with any precision or proper use of relevant facts.
b. It is biased. Basically relevant evidence on vital issues was not only left out but never even mentioned. The Survey undertook only to present those items which suggested failures or inadequacies. These items, however, were not fully depicted so that a false picture was given. Admittedly, an I.G. must expose fault but it is also his job to do so accurately.
[Facsimile Page 2]c. It is malicious, or, to put it alternatively, it is intentionally biased. Admittedly, this is a serious charge and is, at best, merely a statement of opinion. I can only say that I hold such opinion firmly. In my view it could be supported solely on the basis of the Survey’s total omission [Typeset Page 891] in many places of significantly relevant evidence. Such omissions are so excessive and one-sided as to substantiate the conclusion that they must have been intentional. In addition, however, I would like to mention four other points:
1) The fact that the inspectors, in making their investigation, omitted any discussions of their findings with the senior officers responsible for the project. Although, technically, the I.G. can accurately state that he talked to the DD/P and the then A/DDP/A about the Survey, the fact is that these discussion were exceedingly brief and covered none of the real issues in the Survey. The AC/DPD was not spoken to at all. The Security Officer of WH/4 was not spoken to at all. Other senior officers, such as C/WH and C/WH/4, were never given an opportunity to express their views in relation to statements in the Survey.
2) Some officers with whom the inspectors had discussions felt after they had a chance to see the Survey, that it did not impartially express the information which they had provided and left out much of the relevant information given. Moreover, some officers have reported that the attitude of the inspectors and their line of questioning indicated a desire to obtain facts or views to support judgments already formed. Opinions contrary to these judgments were not only disregarded but resisted.
3) The distribution of the final Survey was so peculiar and contrary to normal practice that it raises an inference of intended partiality. The method of distribution is known and will not be repeated here. It might be added that there [Facsimile Page 3] were other facts with respect to the distribution of the Survey worthy of mention. C/WH/4 was called one day and asked if he wanted to read the Survey. He said that he would like to do so but since both C/WH and DC/WH were away he could not leave since he was Acting Chief of the Division. Particularly, he could not meet the requirements of the offer which were that he would only have an hour from the time of the telephone call to see the Survey (including travel time) since it then had to be sent to the printer. Why the urgency was so great is not clear. As far as is known, only one individual outside of the I.G. Staff saw the Survey in final or substantially final form before it was distributed, namely, an officer who was the Chief of Operations for WH/4 during the project. Why he was selected instead of one of his superiors who was connected with the project is not known.
4) Since this particular operation, without question, involved more political interest and dynamite than any in which the Agency has ever participated, there was every reason for following regular procedures meticulously. In addition to the distribution point mentioned above, it seems relevant to wonder how Dr. Killian and the Attorney General knew of the Survey’s existence so as to request a copy.
5. I should say that, whatever the appearance of the foregoing, I have not been trying to I.G. the I.G. The information reported came to me unsolicited and in the normal course of my work with you and your Analysis. Maybe there is additional evidence of importance, but I have not looked for it and do not plan to do so.
[Typeset Page 892]6. The significance of the foregoing is to provide the reasons for the main purpose of this memorandum, i.e., the submission of the following recommendations for action.
[Facsimile Page 4]a. The DCI should resolve to his own satisfaction the conflicts on major issues between the I.G.’s Survey and your Analysis. Since both these documents are internal to the Agency, there is no Agency position on the Cuban operation unless the conflicts are resolved. In view of the importance of and the continuing interest in the operation at high levels of the Government, an Agency position seems essential. Such a position is also important for the future. The operation is bound to be studied for various reasons and there should be an Agency position at least as to what happened, what were the mistakes and what were the lessons. Moreover, the DCI, having assumed office after the operation was thoroughly finished, has every reason for wanting to have some definitive findings and conclusions.
b. If the DCI agrees with a. above each recipient of the Survey and Analysis (and it is understood that they will only be distributed together) should be advised of the fact that such an Agency position is being sought. This might help to avoid independent conclusions outside of the Agency being reached first.
c. The following requirements should be imposed on all future I.G. surveys at least on any aspects of the DD/P area of responsibility.
1) No survey shall be undertaken without specific written terms of reference approved by the DCI.
2) The DD/P shall be satisfied that in each future survey covering any portion of his area of responsibility the I.G. or his staff will interview at least all officers having had responsibility for any part of the activity inspected by the I.G. and prior to the distribution of the survey the DD/P and each such officer will be given an opportunity to express his views on points included in the Survey. Obviously the I.G. need not accept these views. Such procedure, however, will save an enormous amount of time required to answer [Facsimile Page 5] surveys such as the Cuban one which fail to present a full factual picture regardless of the conclusions reached.
7. I am addressing this memorandum to you as my immediate superior. I hope, however, that you will agree with my request that the memorandum be passed to the DCI for his consideration. I do not, of course, ask that you associate yourself with it or any part of it merely because you transmit it.
- Survey of the Cuban operation. 5 pp. Secret; Eyes Only. CIA, DCI Files, History Staff Files: Job 85–00664R.↩