This Bureau wishes to emphasize particularly its agreement with the types
of minimum paramilitary actions contemplated for
the immediate future while attempts will be made to assist the
consolidation and expansion of opposition political action groups. The
reason for this is that ARA has the
general impression that sabotage or terrorism—which goes beyond the
political objective of annoying the Castro Government and making its
officials appear ridiculous—may have a counter-productive effect until
such time as there has clearly developed a coherent opposition within
Cuba.
Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR
1. SUBJECT: Internal Action
Operations Against Cuba
2. INTERNAL Situation:
a. Agency Assets. Despite the severe
repressive measures instituted by the Castro regime during the April
invasion period, the Agency still has in Cuba:
11 general purpose agents (active) with 3 radios.
2 general purpose agents (inactive at present).
[illegible in the original] trained propaganda agents (could be
used as general purpose)
In addition the Agency has available in the U.S. ready for immediate
dispatch 8 trained radio operators. Based on very recent debriefings
of members of the Cuban underground opposition, we have ascertained
that approximately 17 tons of arms, ammunition and miscellaneous
equipment is still intact and in the hands of resistance elements in
[Typeset Page 663] various
parts of Cuba, mainly in Oriente Province and in Pinar del Rio.
Apparently, there is little or no sabotage equipment (e.g. plastic
detonators) so that the underground is unable to conduct such
operations until some of this matériel is introduced into the
island.
b. Resistant Elements Active in Cuba: A number
of leaders [Facsimile Page 3] of some of the principal internal resistance groups have recently
come to the U.S. either legally or black from Cuba and have
presented their estimates of internal resistance and outlined their
plans. The impression which they gave was that they were being
conservative in their estimates and realistic in their assessment of
the availability of individuals for active work. In fact, although
matters of this sort are always subject to proof, it is our present
impression that they have presented a reasonably accurate picture.
There is only one group of approximately 100 men located in the
Encambray which is operating as a guerrilla force. The remainder of
the individuals are living ostensibly normal lives in their homes
and at their regular employment. They are, however, willing and able
to find time for organization work and, if necessary, for small
sabotage operations. The groups with their estimated militant
strength are:
| MRR (Artime’s old group—left of center) |
150 |
| MRP (Ray’s
party—left) |
150 |
| MDC (Catholic Labor
Group) |
100 |
| DRE (student
organization) |
75 |
| UR (a mixed group covering a broad political area) |
75 |
| 30th of November (Labor group) |
50 |
| Rescate (remnants of Tony Varona’s Authentico
group) |
25 |
|
| TOTAL |
625 |
[Facsimile Page 4]
The plan presented by these leaders was based on the understanding
that a movement to unify the above groups into a single opposition
will, in fact, occur. Apparently, the internal opposition has
recognized that its only possible salvation is unity at least until
the removal of the Castro regime. Internal unity apparently has been
worked out without regard for external Cuban political elements who,
as it might be suspected, are not highly considered on the inside
and who, according to the leaders contacted, have little political
following on the inside. Specifically, the Cuban Revolutionary
Council was mentioned as being unacceptable as a leadership element
and, in addition, Ray was removed as the MRP leader by the MRP
internal executive committee and another individual has been sent to
the U.S. to take his place as the MRP U.S. representative.
Unity having been achieved, the leaders proposed a clandestine
organization program to cover the entire island with the idea of
ulti[Typeset Page 664]mately achieving an organization with a maximum of 3,000 members.
All the leaders asserted that 8,000 is a perfectly feasible maximum
and can be achieved by accepting for membership only solid, stable
members of the opposition. The reason for limiting the numbers is
that it is believed that this is a manageable membership but still
sufficiently large to provide the basis for [Facsimile Page 5] supporting any ultimate moves
that might be attempted. Part of the organization effort will
include the establishment of communications, both internally and
from Cuba to the U.S.
All the leaders were of the opinion that gives the present situation
in Cuba, some outward evidence of opposition is essential for morale
purposes and as an aid to recruitment. In their unanimous opinion,
this evidence is best provided by small acts of sabotage. The type
of actions which they contemplate are disruption of transportation
facilities through insertion of additives in gas tanks and tacks on
highways; small bombings for nuisance value at political rallies and
public meetings (not involving personal injury); harassment of
public figures to make them and the regime appear ridiculous; and
propaganda to exploit and publicize these opposition actions. The
function of the internal organization, in addition to increasing its
membership and forming compartmented note as indicated above, will
be to collect intelligence, carry on propaganda activity, provide
mechanisms for the dispatch and reception of exfiltration and
infiltration of men and matériel; and to achieve the types of
sabotage described above.
Although a central leader has not yet been selected, it is believed
that one of the men with whom we recently had contact has a very
good chance of being the individual chosen. There will, of course,
be a liaison relationship between the internal [Facsimile Page 6] groups and the Cubans
in the U.S. even though the latter are not acceptable for
leadership. They can, however, provide aid and advice. Moreover,
assuming that they wish to infiltrate themselves at some point, it
is quite possible that they can over a period of time attain a more
prominent position.
3. RECOMMENDATIONS:
Based on the foregoing, it is our belief that there is a good chance
of achieving the internal unification of a substantial portion of
the internal Cuban opposition and an equally good chance of helping
the unified party expand its membership. It is not, of course, clear
how successful this expansion can be or to what extent it can evade
the internal security forces. On the other hand, a failure to
provide any support at this stage particularly in the light of
existing specific requests would inevitably be interpreted as an
affirmative decision by the U.S. to the effect that internal
opposition can have no place in U.S. plans. This will surely result
in either a disbanding of existing groups plus [Typeset Page 665] the possibility of many
of them joining the other side. It will surely mean that any future
effort to find opposition will be enormously increased. Since the
organization period, which it is expected must last a minimum of
three months and may well extend over a period of six to eight
months, will be one of minimal overt activity, it will not involve
the U.S. in binding commitments. Consequently, should the
organization fail in its purpose, there will be no real problem in
terminating support. [Facsimile Page 7] If on the other hand, the organization period
succeeds, there is no commitment to undertake further activity
although it will be possible, based on the new facts, to contemplate
the advisability of sterner measures.
There are rumors to the effect that considerable dissatisfaction
exists in Cuba and there has even been one report from Mexico to the
effect that Castro is rather rapidly losing his popular appeal. It
is not our belief that these are accurate conclusions. Assuming,
however, that they are, it could be argued that the U.S. policy
should permit this dissatisfaction to increase on its own and not
take active measures to augment it. Such a course would, it is
believed, be short-sighted since, even if dissatisfaction were
substantially to increase, it would be very much to the advantage of
the U.S. for the future to have some association with the
opposition. Moreover, the U.S. participation during the organization
and build-up period should not be of such a nature as to interfere
with any spontaneous dissatisfaction.
It is, therefore, recommended that:
A. The CIA be authorized to provide
support to the internal opposition particularly with a view to
enabling it to consolidate the proposed unity and to enlarge its
membership. This support will involve money, communications,
transportation (maritime) and sufficient sabotage matériel to enable
the opposition to carry out small operations of the types indicated
above. Authority should also [Facsimile Page 8] be given to provide training
which will undoubtedly be necessary in a number of categories such
as communications, organization and intelligence work and use of
sabotage equipment.
B. The CIA be authorized to continue
to work with such of the Cuban elements outside of Cuba as appear to
have assets available for increasing internal opposition. It is
understood that care must be taken to avoid competition and conflict
which could be damaging to the overall effort. In this connection it
will be important to determine whether any particular movement
begins to emerge as the primary and most forceful leader. If so, it
will be important to decide whether or not support should be focused
more directly to it. Since this is a political issue, CIA will maintain close liaison with
State in analyzing its progress.
C. CIA be authorized to plan more
elaborate sabotage activities as well as potential guerrilla support
activities with the understanding, [Typeset Page 666] however, that these plans are
not to be put into effect prior to their approval by the Special
Group.
As the Special Group is aware, CIA
is presently paying a civilian budget for the Cuban Revolutionary
Council. Nothing has been said in this paper about the future of
this support as it is understood that it is to be considered by the
State Department in the near future. It might be said, however, that
it is the CIA position that these
payments should very soon be reduced in size and very probably
should be terminated soon thereafter.
