Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

24. Memorandum from Achilles to Berle, April 13¹

April 13, 1961

SUBJECT

• Chile

Perhaps the principal cause of the equivocal Chilean attitude toward the Cuban problem is the political fragmentation of the country. You recall that Alessandri, the rightist candidate, was elected with only 32 per cent of the popular vote, and largely due to the number of competing leftist candidates. Of the three parties supporting his Government, the largest (Radicals) has both rightist and leftist factions, and gives the Government only conditional support. Related to this situation is the desire of the Government and Alessandri not to rock the boat by doing anything which would cause avoidable controversy or criticism, particularly from the left. The Chilean government has shown itself not only unwilling to take any stand against Castro, but similarly unwilling to take measures against domestic communists or international communist meetings or visits in Chile.

Alessandri, furthermore, is both extremely stubborn and reluctant to take advice from anyone.

While we should continue, of course, to work on the Chileans along the usual lines in Santiago, here, and in the UN, I doubt that we can expect much improvement in the Chilean attitude except (1) as part of a general improvement in Latin American opinion, or (2) from some development in direct Cuban-Chilean relations, such, for example, as in the discovery of incriminating documents in the Cuban Embassy as happened in Peru and El Salvador.

In the longer run and less directly, we have our assistance in Chilean earthquake reconstruction to work with. The best approach here will be one of flexibility in permitting the Chileans to use our aid along lines which will contribute to social and economic development in the devastated areas rather than simple reconstruction. We will also want to keep urging the Chilean Government to get on with the implementing of the Act of Bogotá. The Government should be receptive, since apparently the principal losses which the rightist parties suffered in the March elections to the Popular Action Front were in areas where the need for land reform is greatest.

Probably the principal group to which we should give attention is the Christian Democratic Party. In the March elections it increased its strength in the Senate from 2 to 5, while it slipped in the Chamber from 25 to 23. Party leaders have recently concluded that while it is gradually gaining strength, the prospects of single-handedly electing a president in the foreseeable future are dim, and that they should therefore develop alliances with other groups, including the Conservatives (largely clerical) and the Radicals (anti-clerical). Party President Eduardo Frei is expected here before long and will be worth cultivating. This will have to be done discretely to avoid ruffling Alessandri.

Two things which are applicable in Chile should be of wider application: One is that the lack of unity and drive on the part of coalitions might well be remedied, with significant concrete political benefits by active political action to implement the Act of Bogotá. The other is that we should presumably include Christian Democratic parties, at least in some countries, among those popular parties whose development we wish to encourage.

1. Chilean attitude toward Cuban problem; aid to Chile Christian Democratic Party. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, Task Force on Latin America Files: Lot 61 D 298, Chile.