Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

223. Memorandum of conversation, August 30, between President Kennedy and Minister of Defense Briceño and other U.S. and Venezuelan Officials¹

Part I (of 2)

August 30, 1962

SUBJECT

• Venezuelan Defense Requirements

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Brigadier General Antonio Briceño Linares, Venezuelan Minister of Defense
• Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin
• Lt. Colonel George Dwyre, (USAF), DOD Escort Officer
• Major Teodoro Thielen, Venezuelan Aide to General Briceño
• Donald F. Parnes, State Department Interpreter

Several related matters were discuss during the conversation including the subject covered in this memorandum.

General Briceño said that on the occasion of the President’s visit to Caracas, he had mentioned the aspirations of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of obtaining special assistance from the United States, above and beyond the aid received under the mutual assistance agreement. He said that he was not optimistic about the outcome of this request, but that he wanted to make a plea that the U.S. Government [illegible in the original] of special additional military [illegible in the original] on a loan or lease basis. He said that the Venezuelan Armed Forces [illegible in the original] requested more funds than they did in the national budget; but that they understood the need for balancing the budget, and limited their requests to the amount recommended by the Finance Minister. He said that the Armed Forces did not want to ask for funds that could better be used for the solution of social problems and for alleviating the living conditions of the working class. He said that he was fully aware that social measures were the best way of counteracting the spread of Communism, rather than a repressive government.

General Briceño said that the Venezuelan military realized that a dictatorship was not the best solution to the problems of the Armed Forces, and that Venezuela had suffered under two dictators that proved this point. General Briceño said that the 27-year Gómez dictatorship had represented a period of no progress for the Armed Forces, since the soldiers in those days were put to work on the dictator’s farms, and the officers were used to [illegible in the original]. During this period, other Latin American [illegible in the original] colleges, which permitted them to have well-trained cadres of reserve officers now.

General Briceño said that under the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship the Armed Forces had been nothing more than a bluff, and that the 10 years of this regime had seen no progress in the organization of the Armed Forces. There had been much discussion as to what units should have the primary combat mission, with no decisions being made. Some equipment had been purchased during those years, on a haphazard basis, with poor maintenance. All of this had contributed nothing to the needs and objectives of national defense.

General Briceño said that under the new Administration, the various [illegible in the original] of the Armed Services had prepared [illegible in the original] organizational plans [illegible in the original], with clear objectives, tailored to the [illegible in the original] of the [illegible in the original], but the country lacked the economic means to develop their plans especially with [illegible in the original] to construction of buildings.

General Briceño said that he knew that the United States had a lot of military equipment that was obsolete by American standards, but that could be put to good use in Venezuela; and that it was knocking on the door [illegible in the original] United States in an appeal for some of this equipment, knowing that the answer could be either a yes or a no.

The President said that the entire quantity of military aid [illegible in the original] to Latin America was under fire in Congress, due particularly to the events in Peru and Argentina. He said that each was being [illegible in the original] over the fact that it [illegible in the original] tank that had knocked down the gates of the Presidential Palace in [illegible in the original], and that a U.S.-trained officer had been the one to arrest the Peruvian [illegible in the original]. He said that these arguments were not valid as far as he was concerned, but that they increased the complexity of the problem. He said that, for example, Senator Wayne Morse, a friend of President Betancourt’s, seriously questioned the wisdom of military assistance to Latin America. He recommended that General Briceño have a talk with Senator Morse. He said that he understood that Venezuela had received 12 million dollars worth of mutual assistance last year, and was scheduled to receive 10 million dollars this year. He asked whether Venezuela needed military assistance over and above this amount.

General Briceño said that Venezuela would like to receive aid for construction projects for its Naval Academy, similar to that received by Uruguay and Colombia.

Mr. Martin said that General Briceño was going to have a meeting with the Acting Secretary of Defense.

General Briceño handed the President a list of requirements. He said that the reconnaissance squadron mentioned in the list was of special importance. He said that Venezuela’s position was very different from that of other Latin American countries, due to its location.

The President said that he was aware of the support given by the Armed Forces to President Betancourt.

General Briceño said that he intended to hold a press conference to refute the allegation that the Armed Forces had exercised pressure on President Betancourt. He referred to a Time magazine article in which this accusation had been made. The President told him not to be concerned about Time article.

The President said that he thought it would be useful if General Briceño talked with Senator Morse, who was opposed to the military assistance program to Latin America. He said that he felt that this program was vital, since the Armed Forces were essential to prevent the radical left or right from taking over.

1. Venezuelan defense requirements. Confidential. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Venezuela, 1962, 000.1–381.