Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

19. Memorandum of conversation, October 23, among Kennedy, President Paz, and U.S. and Bolivian officials¹

Part I (of 4)

October 23, 1963, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting between President Kennedy and President Paz of Bolivia: Cuban Subversion

PARTICIPANTS

• Bolivia

  • President Victor Paz Estenssoro
  • Minister of Foreign Relations José Fellman Velarde
  • Minister of National Economy Alfonso Gumucio Reyes
  • Ambassador Enrique Sanchez de Lozada
  • Dr. Carlos Serrate Reich, Private Secretary to President Paz
  • Under Secretary for Foreign Relations Luis Alberto Alipaz
  • Mr. Jorge Paz, President Paz’ uncle
  • Mr. José Paz, President of Bolivian Oil Enterprise (YPFB)
  • Mr. Raul Vivado (Interpreter)

• United States

  • President Kennedy
  • Under Secretary George W. Ball
  • Mr. Ralph A. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President
  • Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin
  • Ambassador Ben S. Stephansky
  • Ambassador-designate Douglas Henderson
  • Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress
  • Mr. Ragnar Arnesen, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs, AID
  • Mr. Herbert B. Thompson, Acting Director, Office of West Coast Affairs, Department of State
  • Mr. Fernando A. Van Reigersberg (Interpreter)
  • Mr. Donald F. Barnes (Interpreter)

After the Presidents had agreed on the text of the joint communiqué, President Kennedy asked Mr. Martin to discuss the matter of the control of travel to and from Cuba. Mr. Martin described the high priority we give to efforts directed at controlling Cuban subversion in Latin America. A key measure for the control of Cuban subversion is travel control. He noted that many governments have constitutional problems in controlling the travel of their citizens. At the same time, the difficulties have been somewhat lessened by success in isolating Cuba through a reduction in channels of communications. At present, the only regular direct air service between Cuba and other hemisphere countries is Cubana Airlines’ Mexico-Habana flight. The Mexican Government has agreed to cooperate with any hemisphere government which requests Mexico to seek to control the travel to Cuba of the nationals of the other country by requiring such documentation as the other government considers necessary. In the face of this situation, Castro is making every effort to establish alternate means of communications. So far, he has not been successful. It will be recalled that the group of American students who managed to make their way to Cuba earlier this year were obliged to travel by an extremely circuitous route which involved long delays. This is an example of the kind of difficulty Castro is experiencing in this regard. We assign importance to efforts to control this travel because it is clear that people undergoing training in Cuba prior to the missile crisis are now ready to return to their own countries where they can make the kind of violent trouble we now see in Caracas. These people will return with subversive skills such as the manufacture of Molotov cocktails and other explosive devices. We have seen a recent increase in bomb-throwings in Colombia and are now beginning to see some of the same sort of thing in Ecuador.

President Paz said the Bolivian Government was interested in preventing or reducing the movement of students who go to Cuba not for academic study but for subversive training. He said his Government had some proof that training in guerrilla tactics is going on. However, the movement of these trainees goes on not only via Mexico but via Arica. He pointed out that Bolivian citizens do not need travel documents to go to Arica and that Cuban air service exists between Arica and Habana.

Mr. Martin said that it was our understanding that the only regular air service with Cuba is that from Mexico and it would seem likely that irregular flights from Arica would make stops in Mexico because of the difficulties of flying non-stop.

President Paz said Bolivia would take up this matter with Mexico but he believed the Arica air link was of importance. President Kennedy said we would certainly want to look into the Arica problem and be in further touch with the Bolivian Government about it. It would seem, however, that if each government in the hemisphere required its citizens to have passports with visas for Cuba in order to travel there, control would be greatly simplified.

There was some mention of Cuban flights to Brazil. Mr. Martin said we are watching those very carefully and that they have proved to be occasional flights undertaken with some other excuse. So far, there is no regular air service between Cuba and Brazil.

The Foreign Minister emphasized that it is in Bolivia’s own interest to stop the flow of Bolivian youth to Cuba and gave assurances Bolivia would take the measures necessary for this purpose.

President Paz said that the traditional enemies of the MNR have been political rightists. This has changed rapidly. Opposition from the right is being eliminated or reduced to ineffectiveness, whereas increasingly the enemies of the revolution are those of the extreme left. This political development is one reason for Bolivian Government action on this travel problem. While there is no terrorism in Bolivia now, there may be tomorrow.

1. Cuban subversion. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, President’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.