Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

131. Telegram 385 from Guatemala City, December 18¹

Guatemala City, December 18, 1962

Action Department 385, Information POLAD CINCARIB Unnumbered.

FY 1962 MAP included four T–33 aircraft for Guatemala which are now at Kelly Field in Texas ready for delivery. Such delivery had been planned for December, GAF readiness to receive and maintain having been established. Events of November 25, 1962 initially publicly described as attempted Air Force revolt, necessitated suspension of delivery action until those events and results could be assessed. Embassy view is that we should proceed with delivery action at early date, subject only to conditions discussed below.

Appears clear that attempted coup was not (repeat not) a revolt by Air Force, but rather a badly planned, poorly managed, and wholly unsuccessful effort by small group officers probably stimulated and encouraged by other officers (including some Army officers) and by some civilians, to overthrow Ydigoras. Plot well advertised and probably made known in advance by some of its members to President, since he was well prepared to deal with it. Conspirators undoubtedly of rightist political persuasion and not (repeat not) communist nor communist-supported. Some of limited number of Air Force personnel who participated in sorties were under impression that Army in revolt and that Air Force role was to protect government. President told me he now satisfied that only handful of Air Force officers involved.

Motivation for attempt appears to have been combination of concern over economic and fiscal situation, general dissatisfaction with lack government leadership, fear that trend of events and attitude of Ydigoras fore-told advent to power of Arevalo and, of course, the usual ambitions for power. This current of thought not confined in Guatemala to persons active in revolt but extends to substantial group politically right of center. Possible that recurrent rumors of United States sympathy for Arevalo, credibility of which strengthened greatly here by recent reports of Moscoso-Arevalo talks, increased feeling of this group of need for early action preclude his return to power.

While President was clearly informed of plans and was ready to deal with rebels, appears likely that he was not at all certain of extent of movement nor as to backing. An interesting aspect was that President early morning Sunday Nov. 25 telephoned [less than 1 line not declassified] to invite him come at once to Casa Crema for a discussion of no particular urgency. We believe it not unlikely that Ydigoras at this point was not entirely sure whether revolt might not have U.S. backing and that his invitation, which was readily accepted, was to check to see what reaction our people would have at being asked to be present at the scene where armed attack had been planned. Presumably ready and truly innocent acceptance served to dispel his concern. Also possible that vigorous and wholesale action against all of Air Force taken in aftermath of shooting reflected not only natural reaction to being subject of armed attack in rebellion against government, but also reflective of uncertainty as to degree to which Air Force as whole was involved.

Some opinion among U.S. Air Force personnel here, which not without logic, that President saw involvement of Air Force personnel as giving him opportunity effect some adjustments in Air Force, to reduce its growing aggressiveness regarding its wants, and to redress balance in influence with Army which to some degree envious Air Force prestige, better pay and greater emoluments. Friction between Lemus and Batres, numbers one and two in GAF, had been notorious and since both men well known Ydigoras supporters, this presented President with trying problem. Lemus had been increasingly strong in pushing the President for Air Force requirements and Ydigoras not type to enjoy pressure from subordinates. Ydigoras noteworthy for tactics of keeping groups divided and balanced against each other and may well have felt that Air Force getting a little big for its breeches.

In any case initial actions against Air Force were indiscriminate and harsh, perhaps pleasing to Army critics and public who suffered three dead and about a dozen wounded, but certainly resented by loyal and non-involved Air Force personnel. Ydigoras has now decided time has come to distinguish between guilty and non-guilty, and has taken opportunity to deal with command problem at same time. Both Lemus, who it could hardly be expected would retain command after being personally over-powered by rebels and ineffective in dissuading them, and Batres, who was playing golf (even though he reports that he phoned in and was told by Roberto Alejos not to report for duty), have been removed from their command positions and the Air Force has been placed under command of Gen Carrascosa, reputed to be strong on discipline. Air Force prestige is at a low point and it will be a long time before it can regain influence it once had. At same time, it is clear Ydigoras does not want Air Force to become insignificant militarily or politically or in terms its balancing off of army forces, for which reason he is eager to get fresh start with Air Force. His idea is to proceed with delivery of long-wanted jets and on delivery to have an Air Force Day celebration, (previously scheduled event for December 10 having been cancelled in wake Nov. 25 events), and thus improve Air Force morale. It is hard to dispute Ydigoras’ judgment as to wisdom these tactics, even if it seems in retrospect that the spanking given the Air Force will leave resentments not likely to be eradicated readily even by delivery T–33’s.

From our point of view, there is no disputing that we are committed to the delivery to the T–33’s. Not to do so at this point would not only be a breach of contract, but would be deeply resented by both the President and the Air Force to which the T–33’s symbolize being a modern Air Force. The delivery of the aircraft appears to me essential to our policy of supporting the Ydigoras government, as well as essential to maintaining a relationship with the Air Force which would permit flexibility in considering alterations or modifications in our current policy at some future date if that should prove desirable. The political and military justifications for programming and committing ourselves to deliver these planes have not been basically altered by the fact of participation in an unsuccessful coup by a few Air Force officers.

At same time it would appear propitious moment to discuss with President certain measures which would appear necessary or desirable to assure an effective Air Force and conducive to restoration of Air Force morale—and thus to the Air Force becoming a balancing element of the sort Ydigoras is believed to want. While we are not overly concerned by Zea’s previous opportunistic record as in itself constituting any great threat, since his history seems to reflect more of a desire to advance than a political concoction, and since his present post must exceed his past expectations, he is not a very attractive or dependable type. Further, our Air officers believe that his Prussian type ideas of discipline and his lack of flying capacity augur poorly for improvement in Air Force morale. Given the fact of his appointment, it would seem unrealistic to expect the President to change him now, but possibly he could be persuaded to make this a temporary appointment and to plan to change Zea in the not too distant future.

The time also seems propitious to get the President to order the Air Force to clean up its inventory by disposing of old aircraft (T–6 and C–45) which are presently only a burden but to which Air Force has held on in hopes that they could be disposed of in such a way as to assure that the proceeds went into Air Force funds. We will insist as a condition precedent to delivery of the T–33’s that the organization of the GAF squadrons and the assignment of pilots be re-established in accordance with sound practice. We will also require agreement that our Air Mission certification of competence be a prerequisite to permitting GAF pilots to fly the T–33’s. We will also seek to obtain agreement to confining GAF pilots to flying one, or at most two, types of aircraft rather than the hit or miss assignment of any pilot to any aircraft which has prevailed and which prevents the top skill in handling any type to be obtained. The President will also be advised that to accept proposals to reduce Air Force pay and emolument and to require a common uniform of all military would seem inadvisable if the morale of the Air Force is not to be totally destroyed.

The occasion will also be used to discuss some general problems of MAP supply clearance. I think we can make some useful suggestions for more effective liaison arrangements between our military missions and elements of [illegible in the original].

In summary, I propose proceed as above envisaging delivery of aircraft on or about January 6. Would appreciate immediate telegraphic concurrence in this course action since President returning Guatemala mid-week and I will have to tell him something about our views shortly thereafter.

General O’Meara who enroute Washington and with whom foregoing discussed, is in accord that T–33’s should be delivered.

Bell

1. Review of attempted “Air Force” revolt and MAP deliveries. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 714.5622/12–1762.