10. Memorandum from Topping (S/P) to Rostow, July 30, 19621
TO
- Walt W. Rostow, Counselor
THROUGH
- Howard Wriggins, Policy Planning Council
FROM
- J.L. Topping, S/P: SSO
SUBJECT
- Observations Concerning the Alliance for Progress and Bolivia
During the course of my examination of the Bolivian scene and our strategy there, I have noted several factors which handicap or confuse our efforts, which for various reasons have not been included in the paper. They are given in somewhat random fashion below, in the thought that you may find some of them useful.
1. Dealing with Bolivia seems to generate an exceptional amount of emotional heat among the majority of the American officials involved, with consequent reduction of objectivity. Some, from what I believe to be a combination of this emotional bias plus a personal conviction that they must make an emphatic presentation to offset the influence of those with contrary views and overcome inertia, frequently take a stand which might be summarised as a conviction that the United States has committed or promised financial and technical aid, and therefore we must give it to Bolivia regardless of the soundness or completeness of the proposed project, and with little consideration for the course of political developments in Bolivia. This drifts into the [Typeset Page 23] personality cult when it maintains that we must support President Paz at all costs—that only he can control the situation and work well with us.
2. The other extreme, also strongly held and forcefully presented from time to time in the past, now appears more frequently as a personal conviction which influences the officers actions negatively. This holds that in general Bolivian politicians and government functionaries are [1½ lines not declassified] somehow second-rate and undeserving of help because they are lacking in skills. This is the attitude [Facsimile Page 2] which Ambassador Stephansky sometimes refers to as “The Ray Hill approach”.
3) Both (1) and (2) are inaccurate and disappointing. It should be possible to rely on most American officials concerned with Bolivia, and certainly the senior ones, to take an objective, dispassionate approach in their analysis, coupled with a full measure of sympathy for the Bolivians and their situation, without going overboard. Unfortunately, they seem to be scarce both in Washington and the field.
4) I formed the distinct impression that all of the senior members of the staff of our Embassy in La Paz are disturbed about the presentations which the Ambassador makes of the Bolivian situation. They seem to feel that the situation is more delicate and explosive than he indicates, that disorder and violence are always just beneath the surface, that the MNR is now paying only lip service to the ideal of political freedom of expression, and that the leftist extremists are in greater control of the government than he acknowledges. The staff is making every effort to be loyal and to follow the Ambassador’s guidance, and there has been no open and final disagreement that I know of. But there is considerable tension, a great deal of privately expressed worry and concern, and at least one officer has managed his transfer as a result.
5) Particularly in the field, there is the basic problem reported on by Jack Cates as to what the Alliance for Progress really is, and what its terminal goals are.
6) Both in Washington and in the field, there seems to be a lack of appreciation of the extent of U.S. power to affect Bolivian developments, and of the size of our presence there.
7) There is a lack of forward thinking. Many officers involved seem too deeply focused on short-term objectives, without [Facsimile Page 3] realising it. They talk in terms of immediacy, and of projects which have been unnecessarily delayed, when in truth there is virtually no project that is “ready to go”. Engineering and feasibility studies are incomplete, being worked on, or not begun. With our best efforts, it will be many months before we can actually make the dirt fly.
8) There is a remarkable diffusion and confusion of external agencies interested in Bolivia, both American and international. Some of [Typeset Page 24] them now seem working at cross purposes. Pronounced improvement in coordination and cooperation should be possible. As one step, I would suggest that our Economic Counselor undertake that task as a primary responsibility, with an assistant if necessary. We have been perhaps too sensitive about offending the feelings of UN agencies operating in Bolivia, whose work has been spotty. UN representatives in Bolivia expressed dissatisfaction with the state of coordination with American activities, and a desire to improve it. The same situation exists in Washington. There is no central coordination or over-all authority, and our efforts are handicapped thereby.
9) Attitudes and emphasis sometimes seem based on a feeling that we didn’t really mean our commitment to assist Bolivia, and that if things are prolonged it may go away. Not everybody involved in the Bolivian program has the desired drive and determination. There is need for convincing presentation and forceful action.
- Observations concerning the Alliance for Progress and Bolivia. Confidential. 3 pp. DOS, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Bolivia.↩