Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

180. Memorandum From the Special Presidential Envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty (Rumsfeld) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 28, 1982

SUBJECT

• Meetings with Chancellor Kohl, Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand

Observations from meetings with Kohl, Thatcher and Mitterrand, as your emissary, are summarized below.

Kohl stressed the following in an hour-plus meeting:

• The importance of the US-FRG relationship and his determination to do his part to improve it.

• His strong support for the dual-track INF approach. It will be helped by, but is not directly linked to, resolution of the pipeline issue.²

• His hopes for successful INF negotiations, but also his determination to deploy missiles if they do not succeed. He decided to hold national elections in the spring of 1983 so that the decision on missile deployment could come after them.

• Confidence in his political future, noting a recent favorable Gallup poll and a feeling among Germans that “they would buy a used car from Kohl.”

• The critical need to resolve the pipeline issue and the “immensely favorable effect” for the FRG of having it resolved at and announced as a result of his meetings with you on November 15.³ He is discussing this with Thatcher soon and has already done so with Mitterrand, who is “looking to that date as well.” (Kohl is placing great importance on his visit.)

The second half of the meeting was on Law of the Sea (LOS). Following presentation of your strong concerns and the problems in the LOS Treaty, Kohl said the list was impressive, and he would personally consider it carefully. He welcomed your desire to elevate this issue to the highest level and stressed his desire to stay in contact on it before the FRG decision in late November.

Kohl will be faced with different recommendations from key ministers. Foreign Minister Genscher favors the treaty; Economics Minister Lambsdorff and possibly the new Defense Minister Woerner will probably oppose signing it soon. Kohl indicated that the FRG need not be in any hurry to sign the treaty. (Both Genscher and Lambsdorff recalled that the FRG had long questioned the treaty, but the US always pushed for it in the past administrations.)

Thatcher also welcomed your elevating the LOS issues and was receptive to your concerns. She expressed serious concern about the seabed part—including her distaste for its supranational authority for seabed development, the damaging precedents in and “unworkability” of that machinery, and those principles of the New International Economic Order enshrined in the treaty.

She indicated, however, that some of her ministers may support the treaty on grounds that the advantages of other provisions, particularly those on navigation, outweigh the disadvantages of the seabed mining part. She was inclined to accept our argument that we already have the navigation rights as a matter of international law and practice.

Throughout the meeting, her respect, warmth and support for you were abundantly evident. She also had high praise for the way Kohl has started off.

Mitterrand has apparently given little attention to LOS even though his government has announced France will sign the treaty. He listened but did not offer much. He said he will review the matter in light of your concerns, but the French Government seems to have no major problems with the treaty. That is not surprising given their political perspectives and approach to developing countries and North/South issues.

The UK and FRG offer some hope, but the decisions will not be easy for Kohl or Thatcher. Besides the splits among their ministers, the FRG is concerned at the ministerial level that the UK will sign the treaty and leave the FRG little choice. It does not want to be outside with only the US. There may also be a tendency at ministerial and sub-Cabinet levels to see little or no cost in signing the treaty but deferring decision on ratification. We sought to disabuse them of that notion by underlining the costs and the misleading signals of signing.

To have any chance of persuading some key friends not to sign, the US needs to:

• Keep their attention on this. LOS needs to be on the agenda when you, Secretary Shultz, Judge Clark and others meet with heads of government and key ministers—particularly the Spadolini and Kohl visits, the NATO ministerial and the US-EC high-level consultations. (I did not see Spadolini because of the unexpected vote of confidence he faced on the proposed date for our meeting.) If LOS is not included in talking points for all such meetings, they will see LOS as a low priority for you, and there will be no chance of stopping the trend toward signing the treaty.

• Reinvigorate and upgrade our efforts to develop an alternative seabed mining arrangement outside the treaty. Some Allies have to be persuaded that there is an alternative to the treaty. It is our major hope.

• Designate someone at a high level to take charge of the issue and oversee the necessary follow-up effectively.

As for other actions, it would be useful for Secretary Weinberger to let his counterparts in key capitals know our Defense Department’s views on navigation and overflight rights outside the treaty. Also, US embassies need to be used more effectively on LOS.

Additional notes on meetings are attached.⁴ You may find the notes on the talks with Kohl and Thatcher particularly interesting.

I look forward to carrying your LOS message to new Japanese⁵ and Dutch Prime Ministers⁶ and Prime Minister Martens of Belgium⁷ in November.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Guhin, Michael A.: Files, LOS (Law of the Sea) Rumsfeld Mission, Key Allies, October 1982–March 1983 (7). Secret. There is no indication Reagan saw the memorandum.
2. Kohl supported the construction of a Soviet-West German gas pipeline.
3. The memorandum of conversation of the Reagan-Kohl meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VII, Western Europe, 1981–1984.
4. Attached but not printed.
5. See Document 186.
6. See Document 187.
7. In telegram 335711 to Tokyo, December 2, the Department stated, “At this time, we concur with Rumsfeld’s assessments and we believe that no meetings need be scheduled for Rumsfeld with Martens or Fanfani for the following reasons,” citing Martens’ illness and Shultz’s planned trip to Italy in December. (Reagan Library, Guhin, Michael A.: Files, LOS (Law of the Sea) Rumsfeld Mission, Key Allies, October 1982–March 1983)