Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

Washington, December 4, 1982, 2103Z

338589. Subject: Presidential Emissary Rumsfeld Visit.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Presidential Emissary Rumsfeld met with Prime Minister Nakasone December 1 for nearly an hour. DG (North American Affairs) Kitamura, DG (Treaties Bureau) Kuriyama, and Director (Oceans Division) Saito sat in for Japanese. Ambassador Mansfield, Ambassador Adelman, Michael Guhin, and Marc Baas accompanied Rumsfeld.

3. Rumsfeld opened meeting by extending President Reagan’s invitation to meet with Nakasone in Washington on January 18.² Nakasone welcomed the good news and happily accepted the invitation. He appreciated President Reagan’s letter on Law of the Sea Treaty³ and noted that:

—The difficult issues in U.S.–Japan relations can be solved through talks. Quarrels are an indication of the closeness of the U.S.–Japan relationship, like brothers.

—He is committed to further strengthening the relationship, both personally and officially.

—U.S.-Japan tie is key to stability in Asia and world stability generally. If there are shaky aspects in the relationship, policy toward the Soviet Union and China cannot be effectively conducted and ASEAN countries worry as well.

—Discussions at highest level are important.

4. Following Rumsfeld’s presentation of U.S. concerns about the Law of the Sea Treaty and President Reagan’s hopes that Japan will decide not to sign it or at least to delay any signing, Nakasone noted that:

—He has reviewed the matter to some extent already.

—Basic attitude in the GOJ is that Japan has to sign the treaty because of advantages of it as a whole and the situation with the developing countries.

—Rumsfeld and U.S. non-paper,⁴ raise other aspects and problems with the treaty that will be considered before making a final decision on signing.

—U.S. is a leading nation in seabed mining, whereas Japan is a latecomer.

5. In response to Rumsfeld’s query as to whether the GOJ had in effect already made up its mind to sign, Nakasone clarified that the cabinet has not taken a decision yet but he understands the basic direction is toward signing.

6. When Rumsfeld stressed possibility of delaying a decision on signing to see what the Europeans (particularly UK and FRG) are doing and, given the importance of the issue and President Reagan’s concerns, to have a chance of discussing it during his visit to Washington, Nakasone replied that:

—He cannot deny that there is that possibility.

—He wants to consider the issue personally since President Reagan has sent Rumsfeld as an emissary to discuss it.

—They have not had time yet to review matter thoroughly.

7. At subsequent meeting and dinner hosted by Foreign Minister Abe; in response to Rumsfeld presentation Abe noted that:

—Former cabinet’s basic position was that Japan will sign the treaty and present government is still an LDP cabinet, even though Prime Minister has changed.

—GOJ understands U.S. position.

—U.S. and Japan should take concerted steps on all major issues in alliance, but differ on Law of the Sea.

—He will look into the matter and consult with Nakasone to see what can be done. They will bear in mind January visit.

—Nakasone wants to work closely with us to solve outstanding problems and hopes for a successful bilateral summit in January.

8. In private conversation with Rumsfeld after dinner, Abe said that President Reagan’s sending an emissary has signified importance of LOS issues and, as result, he will recommend that the GOJ carefully consider option of delaying signature of treaty.

9. Rumsfeld comment: If Japan decides to delay signature, which is still a long shot, it will do so solely for political reasons vis-a-vis U.S. That makes it all the more important for the President and SecState to include law of the sea in January meetings. It also argues for prompt expert level meetings to begin to develop a rationale in GOJ bureaucracy for not signing LOS that is based on more than simply their desire not to be crossways with USG.

Dam

1. Source: Reagan Library, Guhin, Michael A.: Files, LOS (Law of the Sea) Rumsfeld Mission, Key Allies, October 1982–March 1983. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the NSC Message Center.
2. The memorandum of conversation for the Reagan-Nakasone meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXX, Japan; Korea, 1981–1984.
3. See the attachment to Document 185.
4. Not found.