179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Japan, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands1
285983. For the Ambassador. Subj: Special Presidential Emissary.
1. Confidential—Entire text.
2. The President decided on September 30 to send a special Presidential Emissary to key allied capitals and designated Donald Rumsfeld as the emissary.2 Specific purpose of mission is to underline United States concern about the Law of the Sea Treaty and to try to move our allies away from early commitments to sign or ratify that treaty (or in France’s case to try to keep it from acting early on its stated intention to sign the treaty), in the context of our interest in furthering common understanding of issues of mutual concern in allied relationships. In each capital we propose that Rumsfeld meet with head of government, preferably one-on-one initially, and then with appropriate key ministers that have LOS concerns (e.g., Foreign, Defense, Economic). We expect to follow up on a separate occasion with experts discussions.
3. Ambassadors should deliver following message from President Reagan to heads of government. Greetings and signature for each capital in para 4 below. Modification to letter for Paris, proposed dates for visits and other info provided in paras 5–12 below. You will note that the letter invites discussion on subjects other than the law of the sea. You should advise orally at appropriate level that—questions relating to East-West trade and economic relationships were discussed by Foreign Ministers in New York and Rumsfeld would have nothing to add. Begin qte:
—The Law of the Sea Treaty adopted by the United Nations conference last April raises many fundamental concerns for the United States. In July, as you know, I concluded that signing that treaty will not serve the national interest.3
—I recognize that the treaty deals with a wide variety of areas and issues. Indeed, my July statement noted that most provisions of the treaty are consistent with the interests of the United States and other countries. Based on a review of significant interests, such as those with [Page 515] respect to military and commercial navigation, I am confident that they can be fully protected without signing or ratifying the treaty.
—At the same time, I also believe that the deep seabed mining provisions of the treaty would be detrimental to the interests of a number of countries, including the United States and our close friends and allies. Development of deep seabed resources on an economic basis would be very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve under the treaty. In broader terms, the treaty would create precedents that are contrary to a range of important interests and that would adversely affect the positions of advanced countries in the future development of international institution-building generally.
—These problems are of deep concern to the United States and to me personally. I believe it is very important that we work together to have a clear understanding of the consequences of the Law of the Sea Treaty and to coordinate our efforts in a way that will serve our common interests.
—Finally, let me say that while law of the sea is the issue which has led me to propose Don’s mission, I view it within the context of our broader relationship as allies faced with a number of problems. While each of them has its complexities, I believe deeply that we are capable now, as perhaps never before, of solving them and of demonstrating a degree of allied cohesion unparalleled in the past generation. For this reason, Don will be receptive to listening to other elements of our common agenda. Needless to say, I will value your thoughts greatly and very much look forward to receiving Don’s report.
With warm personal regards,
End quote.
4. Appropriate greetings and signature of letter for each capital are as follows: Tokyo, Mr. Prime Minister/Ronald Reagan; London, Margaret/Ron; Bonn, Mr. Chancellor/Ronald Reagan; Paris, Francis/Ron; Italy, Giovanni/Ron; Brussels and Hague, Mr. Prime Minister/Ronald Reagan.
5. For Paris: The following revised paragraph should be substituted for paragraph beginning “These problems are— . . .”: Begin quote These problems are of deep concern to the United States and to me personally. I understand that your government recently announced its intention to sign the Law of the Sea Treaty.4 Still, I believe it is very important that we work together to have a clear understanding of the consequences of the treaty and to coordinate our efforts in a way that [Page 516] will serve our common interests. End quote. Remaining parts of letter remain the same.
6. For all addresses except Paris: Ambassadors should urge host government not to make any commitments to sign or ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty pending emissary’s visit.
[Omitted here are paragraphs 7–10 which discuss scheduling.]
11. For all addressees: We do not plan to announce Mr. Rumsfeld’s mission. If asked by the press or by other countries, we plan to use the following guidance: Begin quote The President has asked Mr. Rumsfeld to visit certain countries as his personal emissary to further our interest in advancing common understanding of issues of mutual concern among allies. This will include the subject of law of the sea. End quote.
12. For all posts: Mr. Rumsfeld is currently President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of G.D. Searle and Company and Chairman of the Board of Rand Corporation. He is formerly a Member of Congress and has held a number of government positions including US Ambassador to NATO, Chief of Staff for the White House and Secretary of Defense.
13. Details of travel arrangements and person(s) accompanying Rumsfeld will be provided promptly upon confirmation of appointments proposed above.
- Source: Reagan Library, Guhin, Michael A.: Files, LOS (Law of the Sea) Rumsfeld Mission, Key Allies, October 1982–March 1983 (1). Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the NSC Message Center.↩
- See Document 176.↩
- See Document 168.↩
- In telegram 33716 from Paris, October 1, the Embassy reported that France intended to sign the treaty. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820508–0581)↩