186. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the Netherlands and Belgium1
332341. Exdis Brussels for USEC. Subject: Rumsfeld Meeting in Netherlands and with EC.
1. Confidential—Entire text.
2. Rumsfeld met with State Secretary for Economic Affairs Fritz Bolkestein, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Wim F. Van Eekelen and then Prime Minister Lubbers on November 17. Ambassador Dyess, Ambassador Adelman and Michael Guhin participated, Dutch staff members from Economic, Mining and Foreign Ministries sat in on the Bolkestein and Van Eekelen meetings.
3. In all three meetings the Dutch stressed similar themes:
(A) Visit was timely as subject of signing the Law of the Sea Treaty will come up for decision soon in Council of Ministers. GON will give due consideration to US [garble].
(B) GON shares concerns about a few provisions in the seabed part of the treaty—such as mandatory technology transfer and production limits—but years of work and compromises had been accomplished with previous US support and GON believes a comprehensive treaty is necessary. Many parts of the treaty provide an important degree of legal certainty, and the way to influence the process was to be involved in it and a voting member of Preparatory Commission.
(C) GON considers relations with Third World important.
(D) Dutch Shell supports signing the treaty and would be reluctant to invest in seabed mining outside it.
(E) A seabed mining alternative outside treaty is not viable. To defer or delay signature, therefore, Dutch would need tangible goals to reach in terms of changing treaty or developing rules and regulations to lessen impact of adverse provisions.
4. Lubbers noted that Netherlands saw no reason to hold out with US focusing on alternative rather than getting acceptable treaty. Lubbers provided non-paper with GON points (para 5 below).
5. Begin non-paper:
—The Netherlands always held the view that a generally accepted set of rules for the many uses of the sea is of utmost importance both for [Page 529] the international community and for the Netherlands. In comparison to the 1958 treaties,2 the new treaty is clearer as regards the rule for shipping, fisheries, environmental aspects, scientific sea research and the continental shelf.
—The treaty also is the result of a development over several decades; these developments (treaties and case law) are incorporated in the new treaty.
—The Netherlands for instance anticipated the treaty as regards the 200 miles fishing zone and the extension of the territorial waters to 12 sea miles. We also concluded a treaty with Venezuela in this respect.3
—Of course not all separate parts of the treaty can be judged as favourable. The treaty is a compromise. The environmental and shipping sections are more acceptable to us than the section on economic zones, the continental shelf and the sea research.
—From the military point of view the relevant sections of the treaty are considered favourable in NATO discussions.
—The different parts of the treaty are interconnected in this respect. Moreover, new rules are included in the treaty; we do not feel the treaty is no [not?] more than codification of generally accepted rules; quite apart from the rules on deep sea mining.
—Royal Dutch Shell studied the treaty carefully and officially took the view that a speedy conclusion of the treaty is in that company’s interest and asked the UK and the Netherlands to sign the treaty.
—Signing the treaty is a positive contribution to the North-South relationship, in particular in view of our policies vis-a-vis the Third World.
—The Netherlands feels it can fully participate in the further work on the Law of the Sea in the context of the new treaty.
—We hope that the US Government would share our view that there is no real alternative to this treaty. End non-paper.
6. During a later meeting in Strasbourg, EC President Gaston Thorn expressed appreciation of reasons to oppose seabed parts of treaty. The problem at hand is to stop momentum for all European states to sign LOS, which has been generated by 4 of the 10 EC countries having announced intention to sign (France, Ireland, Greece, Denmark). Momentum can only be stopped by a major EC member—UK or FRG—not signing in December and better still, announcing soon that it will not sign.
[Page 530]7. Thorn met with EC–10 Foreign Ministers on Monday, November 22, and planned to discuss LOS over lunch (absent the Foreign Ministers experts being present).
8. EC Commissioner (with responsibility for LOS) Narjes also expressed appreciation for concerns about seabed part of treaty, summarized main country positions on the treaty (which conform to our own estimates) and saw problem in much the same terms as Thorn.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820618–0112. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Guhin; cleared in EUR/RPE, USUN, OES/OLP, S/S, and the NSC; approved by Marshall.↩
- Reference is to the Conventions on the Continental Shelf, High Seas, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, and Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas.↩
- Reference is to the Netherlands-Venezuela Boundary Treaty signed in 1978.↩