153. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice
President Mondale1
Washington, March 13, 1978
SUBJECT
- Panama: Sabotage Planning
[1 line not declassified] there was an item on the
above subject.2 You asked
what are we doing about this.
On March 10, Stan Turner provided
me additional information on the subject. This information is attached.
Also, an additional item [1 line not
declassified] That report3 stated that [less than 1 line not
declassified] called on the Panamanian Intelligence
Chief—Lt. Col. Noriega—on the pretext of seeking
further information concerning the alleged plan of anti-Castro exiles to place bombs in the
Zone. Noriega was told, and
appeared to agree, that any bombing would almost surely be blamed on
Panama with dire effects on ratification prospects.
[Page 394]
I am of the opinion that Noriega
got the message [less than 1 line not
declassified] was sending. Stan
Turner will continue to monitor this situation.
Please let me know if you have additional thoughts on this subject.
Attachment
Memorandum4
Washington, March 10, 1978
SUBJECT
- Panama—Possible Sabotage Planning
1. [1 line not declassified] reports that the
National Guard has been conducting an extensive demolition course at
a Panamanian military base. This would explain at least in part the
recent withdrawal of a large amount of TNT from a Panamanian explosives factory and the
unusual activity of members of the commando sabotage team, who would
be involved in the courses. This information would further incline
us to view the recent activity as a training/contingency effort with
a view toward the possibility of action should the treaties be voted
down.
2. However, some of the information such as [1 line
not declassified] Intelligence Chief Lt. Col. Noriega had hurriedly cancelled an operation
scheduled for the night of 22 February—does not support a
contingency training scenario. This means we cannot rule out that
the Panamanians were considering some action.
3. The Panamanians may be engaging in some of these activities in
order to unsettle the US in the hope
of generating greater US government
efforts in behalf of the treaties.
4. We expect to receive a further report [1 line
not declassified] today and will immediately provide that
information to you.5