Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

36. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 31, 1980

SUBJECT

• U.S. Relations with Eastern Europe in 1980

The attached paper on U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe in the year ahead was reviewed by the Interagency Group on Europe on January 24. The NSC, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, ICA, Defense, CIA, USTR and the Export-Import Bank participated in this review. We have also consulted in a preliminary fashion with our allies at NATO and in Eastern European capitals concerning their future policies toward Eastern Europe.

At the Interagency Group meeting, there was general agreement on the analysis contained in the paper and the central policy recommendation—that we continue an activist policy in Eastern Europe designed to preserve the gains we have made in the last three years and to promote the goals of PD 21—domestic liberalization and/or foreign policy independence. It was generally agreed that we would have to adjust our specific actions and initiatives to take account of the reactions of individual Eastern European countries to the situations in Afghanistan and Iran.

Since the Interagency Group meeting, the Soviets have evidently increased pressures on Eastern European countries to follow Moscow’s foreign policy lead. The Czechoslovaks postponed a planned Genscher visit referring to the “complicated international situation.”² After hearing several times from the Hungarians that they wanted a visit to the U.S. by Parliamentary President Apro to go ahead despite U.S.-Soviet tensions, the Hungarians notified us on January 30 that the visit would have to be postponed because of “pressing parliamentary business at home.³ In both these cases, the Soviets appear to be acting to reign in Eastern European desires to conduct business as usual with the West. This argues for a policy of trying harder to maintain the ground we have gained recently in our relations with Eastern Europe.

The area-wide measures and country-specific measures recommended in the attached paper are designed to implement this goal. The Interagency Group agreed to all of them with the following exceptions which require further consideration or policy guidance.

—Export Controls. ⁴ There was general agreement in the IG that the ability to differentiate between export licensing treatment for the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe would be a valuable foreign policy tool in encouraging ties with Eastern European countries which display independence in foreign and domestic policy. Any foreign policy controls on U.S. exports to the Soviet Union imposed in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan clearly should not automatically be applied to Eastern European countries—particularly those whose support for the Soviet action has been weak or withheld. However, it was recognized that it would be futile to try to decide on the applicability of security controls to Eastern European countries before the nature of these controls has been decided upon.

One possible way of differentiating between the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe would be to maintain existing controls for them while tightening up for the Soviet Union. For some countries in Eastern Europe we might go further and institute a liberal policy of COCOM exceptions for Eastern European countries with appropriate end-user controls. In any case, our ability to gain Western European agreement to more stringent security controls on exports to Eastern Europe is bound to be strongly resisted. This issue might best be dealt with in the SCC discussion of export controls on the Soviet Union once a policy on security controls has been decided upon.

—Yugoslav Military Sales. Steps are being taken to implement “a more forthcoming” military sales policy responsive to Yugoslav requests. DOD is reexamining the systems the Yugoslavs have expressed an interest in with a view to releasing more, but problems of availability and constraints against transfer of sensitive technology limit what we can do. The NSC, State and DOD will have to keep the military sales program under continuing review to insure that we respond as promptly and fully as possible to Yugoslav interests.

—PL 480 for Yugoslavia. We are reviewing with Agriculture and IDCA the possibility of a modest PL 480 program for Yugoslavia which would permit it to acquire U.S. soybeans for cattle feed. Even a small grant or loan would ease Yugoslavia’s balance of payments problem and help to boost private creditor confidence. If it proves impossible to allocate significant PL 480 funds to Yugoslavia within existing allocations, a budget decision might be needed. An alternative might be a small one-time ESF grant of $5–7 million under the proposed ESF Contingency Fund.

—Romanian Access to Hampton Roads. Permitting Romanian vessels to call at Hampton Roads instead of Baltimore for coal would greatly reduce Romanian transport costs and be seen as a significant political gesture at a time when Bucharest fears Soviet economic pressures. There is strong Navy objection to allowing any Warsaw Pact vessel into the Hampton Roads area for security reasons. We are asking Secretary Brown to review Navy’s objections to see if they are of overriding importance.

—Possible Membership in the IMF . This may also need further thought. Given current Soviet pressures on Eastern Europe, we think it highly unlikely that the Polish leadership would take the step of joining the IMF, although this might help bolster shakey creditor confidence. We will be consulting with Poland’s Western creditors to determine whether eventually this or some other steps such as a non-IMF stabilization program is required to correct the deteroriating Polish financial position.

—Cultural Agreement with the GDR . Some IG members questioned the appropriateness of concluding a cultural agreement with the GDR at this time while others argue that such an agreement is inherently in our interest and should be pursued. We will continue to review this question in light of the evolution of Berlin’s position on Afghanistan and Iran. Should the GDR be particularly shrill in its criticism of the U.S., we would not conclude a cultural agreement.

Peter Tarnoff

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• U.S. Relations with Eastern Europe in 1980

Deteriorating US-Soviet relations and Soviet efforts to enforce conformity in Eastern Europe threatened the improving trend in US relations with Eastern Europe in 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raises the question of whether we should continue a policy of trying to strengthen relations with individual Eastern Europe countries which follow Moscow’s foreign policy line.

We do not believe that the invasion of Afghanistan should cause us to revamp our basic policy toward Eastern Europe.⁶

—There is no evidence that Moscow’s Warsaw Pact allies were consulted about Afghanistan or have contributed anything except propaganda support and diplomatic support at the UN.⁷

—No amount of pressure on Eastern Europe—short of military threats or a policy of economic denial which could lead to massive unrest—would induce Moscow to alter its policy elsewhere in the world.

—We have substantial interests of our own in Eastern Europe and abandoning the area as a Soviet sphere of influence would be playing into the Kremlin’s hands.

—Pursuing an activist policy in Eastern Europe is a way of getting at Soviet sensitivities.

—Our allies are determined to continue activist policies in Eastern Europe; a hard-line US policy towards these countries would not be supported by our allies and could lead to increased resistance to steps against the Soviet Union.

—A policy of cutting back our ties with Eastern Europe would ease Soviet efforts to enforce conformity in foreign and domestic policy and leave the Romanians and Yugoslavs further isolated.

—At the same time a policy of business as usual with Eastern European countries regardless of their position on issues of importance to us such as Afghanistan or the US hostages in Iran would undermine our credibility with the governments and peoples concerned.

These factors argue for an activist policy of engagement with Eastern Europe, designed to preserve the gains we have made in the last three years and to promote the goals of PD–21—domestic liberalization and/or foreign policy independence. Such a policy would:

—Respond to the interest of the Eastern Europeans—as already expressed to us in recent days on a number of occasions—in finding ways to prevent U.S.-Soviet differences from adversely affecting their relations with us and with the West as a whole;

—Preserve, to the degree possible, the progress (in trade, claims negotiations, family reunification, etc.) we have achieved in our relations with the Eastern European countries;

—Reassure the West Europeans by demonstrating that we remain sensitive to their special stake in good East-West relations and their desire to continue an activist policy in Eastern Europe;

—Remind Moscow that we do not concede Eastern Europe as their sphere of influence and that we have interests and influence in Eastern Europe that we intend to continue to assert actively.

In following such an overall policy approach, it will be necessary to adjust our specific actions and initiatives, depending on the public and private reactions of the individual Eastern European countries to the situations in Afghanistan and Iran. Our actions should be tailored to move us closer to our longer-term objective of strengthening Eastern European independence from the Soviet Union. Our planned actions are reversible, can be implemented or withheld to match the changing situation and, while pegged to 1980, have meaning for the longer term. We intend to make it plain to the governments of the individual Warsaw Pact countries that we want to pursue a differential policy but our ability to do so will inevitably depend to a considerable degree on their behavior regarding the issues of Iran and Afghanistan and their willingness to improve relations with us despite Soviet pressure to cut back. We have already told the Bulgarians, East Germans, Czechoslovaks, Poles and Hungarians that excessive rhetoric on Afghanistan will have a negative effect on the climate of our bilateral relations.

The area-wide measures we recommend in pursuit of such a policy are:

—Differentiate between U.S. export licensing treatment for the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe. [N.B. A decision on the implementation of such a policy must await a final decision on a new area-wide export control policy.]⁸

—Inform Eastern European governments that any diversion of grain or technology to the Soviet Union would lead us to immediately cut off such exports to them.⁹

—Consult with the West Europeans, as appropriate, in NATO, the OECD, the European Community, and bilaterally, to pursue our shared objectives throughout Eastern Europe and to focus particularly on policies that would support Yugoslav and Romanian independence.

—Reaffirm US policy of encouraging trade and financial ties with CEMA countries other than the USSR in view of the fact that some members of the US banking community are uncertain about our policy.

The country-specific measures we would take in pursuit of this policy would depend to an important degree on the given country’s behavior concerning Afghanistan and Iran. Therefore, a brief discussion of each country’s reaction to these two issues precedes the catalog of measures which might be taken.

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia has strongly and publicly condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and worked with a number of nonaligned countries to obtain a UN General Assembly resolution censuring the Soviets. Tito has publicly opposed the taking of the hostages in Iran, and the Yugoslavs are cooperating quietly in working on the Iranians to secure their release.

We should intensify our efforts to strengthen all aspects of our relations and encourage our NATO allies to do likewise. Over the near term, we should give priority to the following steps:

—Military Sales. Improve our responsiveness to Yugoslav requests for purchases of military hardware.¹⁰

—Political Support. Give visible demonstration of our support for Yugoslavia’s independence via high-level visits and a continuation of Sixth Fleet port calls. The Secretary’s visit should be rescheduled as soon as possible, bearing in mind the factors arising from Tito’s death or prolonged serious incapacitation, and consideration given to an early stop by a ranking Yugoslav official. A possible brief stop by the President in Yugoslavia in conjunction with his participation in the Economic Summit in Venice would be extremely useful. Furthermore, the implications for Yugoslavia of the Afghanistan invasion give even greater weight to our recommendation that the President attend the eventual funeral ceremonies for Tito and that we seek a strong, coordinated allied expression of support for Yugoslavia following Tito’s death. We will strengthen our effort to deter and punish anti-GOY terrorism in the U.S. and abroad.

—Economic Relations. Continue to make clear to the European Community our support for a prompt Yugoslav-EC economic agreement which strengthens Yugoslavia’s ties with the West but which does not require Yugoslavia to grant reverse preferences to the Community.¹¹

—Grant the Yugoslav airline (JAT) landing rights in Chicago and Los Angeles, if a formal request is received.

—Give increased high-level attention to the visit of Foreign Trade Secretary Rotar in mid-March.

—Consider including Yugoslavia in the PL–480 program.

—Continue to seek additional funding for S&T exchanges in accordance with our earlier promise to Yugoslavia.

ROMANIA

Apart from an indirect reference by Ceausescu in his speech to the Romanian Party Congress in November, Romania has issued no public statement condemning the taking of the American hostages. Media coverage has been very sparse and limited to factual reporting. On the other hand, the Foreign Minister has told us that in late November Ceausescu conveyed a message to Khomeini in an effort to bring about a resolution of the hostage problem.¹²

On Afghanistan, Romania has once again played a maverick role within the Warsaw Pact¹³ by issuing public statements indirectly but strongly condemning the Soviet action in Afghanistan, by not speaking out in defense of the Soviets in the UN Security Council debate and not participating in the UN General Assembly vote, and by continuing to refrain from recognizing the new Afghan regime.

We should increase our efforts to support Romania’s independent actions by strengthening our relations on bilateral and international issues, and encourage our NATO allies to do the same. Romania’s status within the Warsaw Pact and CEMA creates both problems and opportunities.

—Reschedule the Secretary’s visit.

—Invite Foreign Minister Andrei for an official return visit to Washington within the following six months.

—Give special attention to the CSCE bilateral discussions, including the Special Experts’ Group on military security. The U.S. side should be led by a senior Department official since Romanian delegation will be headed by a Deputy Foreign Minister. We should arrange high-level meetings for the Deputy Minister on non-CSCE issues as well.

—Show our interest in and, when possible, give our support to Romanian initiatives in international organizations, especially those that relate to peaceful settlement of disputes and good neighborliness.

—If there is any supplemental allocation of CCC credits, high priority should be given to Romania’s outstanding request.

—Encourage visits by a group from DOD’s Army War College as well as a visit by White House Fellows (in conjunction with visits to other countries in the area).

—Reallocate unused FY 80 fisheries allocation by drawing on fishing quotas previously reserved for the Soviet Union.

—Reexamine Romania’s request for commercial access to Hampton Roads. [N.B. While this would be desirable for foreign policy reasons, JCS objects strongly on security grounds. This question should be reviewed by OSD.]

—Grant approval for Romanian government trade offices in Atlanta and Houston.

—Provided the Romanians properly implement the current cultural agreement, expand ICA exchanges with Romania using funds reprogrammed from the Soviet Union.

POLAND

Poland has been modestly helpful on the hostage issue through private demarches to the Iranians and public statements on the primacy of diplomatic immunity and inviolability. On Afghanistan, its apparent efforts to get by with the minimum acceptable to the Soviet Union were overshadowed by its defense of Soviet action in the General Assembly debate.

Consistent with Poland’s exhibition of some restraint on Iran and with our general policy objectives in Eastern Europe, we should, over the near term, give consideration to the following steps with Poland:

—Proceed with the next round of CSCE discussions tentatively scheduled for Washington in March.

—Invite higher-level participation in the U.S.-Polish Roundtable, also planned for Washington in April, perhaps making explicit our desire for a Frelek visit.

—Propose a visit to Poland and another Eastern European country by DOD’s National Defense University.

—Propose a visit to Poland and another Eastern European country by the White House Fellows, whose trip to the Soviet Union has just been cancelled.

—Should further P.L. 480 funds become available, consider including Poland in the program. [N.B. This will require a country-specific Presidential Decision.]

—Ensure continuation of U.S.-Polish S&T exchanges by seeking new Congressionally-authorized funding for FY–1982.

—Expand modestly ICA exchanges with Poland using funds reprogrammed from the Soviet Union.

—Increase Poland’s fishing allocation by using quotas previously reserved for the Soviet Union.

—Depending upon the reaction of the Western Europeans we are consulting with, encourage Poland to join the IMF/IBRD. [N.B. This requires further discussion within the government and consultation with allies.]

—Encourage private U.S.-Polish cooperation in health, particularly the Project Hope involvement in the Lodz Hospital project.

HUNGARY

Hungary has coupled expressions of understanding for Iran’s alleged historical grievances against the U.S. with lower-key denunciations of the holding of diplomatic hostages as a violation of international law.

After initially reacting to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan with some restraint, the Hungarians have joined the chorus of those supporting it.

Depending upon the evolution of the Hungarian position, we should consider the following steps:

—If and when the Hungarians are able to do so, reschedule the visit of the Hungarian Parliamentary delegation headed by Parliament President Apro.

—Utilize reprogrammed funds from exchanges with the USSR to expand exchanges modestly with particular emphasis on academic and cultural exchanges.

—Go ahead with the CSCE Consultations slated for this spring.

—Propose a visit to Hungary and another Eastern European country of a National Defense University group.

—Signal our continued receptivity to high-level visits (below Kadar) and consider sending a senior official(S) to Hungary.

—Propose a visit to Hungary and another Eastern European country by the White House Fellows, whose trip to the USSR has just been cancelled.

—Send a VIP to open the “American Now” exhibit provided that the Hungarian position on Iran/Afghanistan does not get worse.

—Assure State and Commerce participation at the Assistant Secretary level in the second annual governmental U.S.-Hungarian Joint Economic Committee meeting in Washington this spring.

BULGARIA

The Bulgarians were among the least forthcoming of the Eastern Europeans on the question of the hostages in Tehran and the treatment of the issue in the media has been slanted and objectionable. The Bulgarian Government and media jumped on the Soviet Afghan bandwagon early and have faithfully defended the Soviet actions. At the same time, the Bulgarians have continued to stress their interest in improving bilateral relations.

With Bulgaria, we should

—Consider supporting initiatives by Bulgaria to join the GATT.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Czechoslovak UN representative made some positive statements in voting for the initial Security Council resolution on Iran. Otherwise, the media treatment has been slanted and unsympathetic. The statements of the Czechoslovak Government and media treatment of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have been vigorously supportive of the Soviets.

On January 24, the Czechoslovaks postponed the late February visit of FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, citing the international situation created by the NATO TNF decision and by the “unconcealed threats” contained in the President’s State of the Union speech.

—We should keep under active review the tabling of a new proposal on a claims settlement with Czechoslovakia which would also result in the return to Czechoslovakia of 18.4 million metric tons of Nazi-looted gold. This would finally compensate the American claimants and also open avenues to increase U.S. access to Czechoslovakia. (There are indications that Czechoslovakia may want to resolve this issue quickly, and the present price of gold could enable us to obtain a significantly higher settlement. Because of recent repressive actions by the Czechoslovak Government in the area of human rights and their position on Afghanistan, however, it is currently not possible for us to proceed on this issue.)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The GDR position on Iran has been one of non-demonstrative support for the observance of international law while its media has sympathized with anti-US sentiment in Iran and warned of US military retaliation. Concerning Afghanistan, the GDR has praised the Soviet invasion as necessary in light of CIA-backed counterrevolutionary activity based in Pakistan. As a new member of the UN Security Council, the GDR joined the Soviet Union in voting against the resolution condemning the invasion of Afghanistan.

The GDR’s position on Iran and Afghanistan should be balanced against our stake in maintaining the progress made recently in important areas of bilateral relations (e.g., humanitarian cases and US claims). Depending on future GDR steps in these areas, it would seem appropriate to continue our current deliberate pace toward handling GDR issues, with final actions on all individual issues being reviewed in light of the conditions at that time. We should

—Continue to send diplomatic and protocolary signals of displeasure with GDR support for the Soviets.

—Proceed with CSCE consultations at a lower level.

—Fulfill our promise to permit a GDR Embassy branch commercial office in New York City in return for a reciprocal option for a U.S. office.

—Depending upon the outcome of the export licensing policy review, continue US participation in the Leipzig Fair in 1981.

—Proceed with the negotiation of a cultural agreement. [N.B. Some IG members feel that negotiation of a cultural agreement with the GDR at this time would conflict with our aim of signalling to the GDR our displeasure over its support for the Soviets in Afghanistan. Others however, feel that such an agreement is inherently in our interest and should be pursued.]

We will continue to monitor carefully the public statements and actions of the Eastern European countries concerning Afghanistan and Iran, modulating our implementation of the steps suggested above in accordance with these statements and actions.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 22, Europe: 1/79–1/81. Secret.
2. In telegram 309 from Prague, January 24, the Embassy reported that the Czechoslovak Government had postponed the Genscher visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800041–1098)
3. In telegram 461 from Budapest, January 30, the Embassy reported that Antal Apro was postponing his visit to the United States for “unforeseen domestic political duties.” Noting that the Foreign Ministry and Parliament were given only short notice of the cancellation, the Embassy concluded: “We can only assume with a high degree of certainty that Hungary only reluctantly postponed the visit” and that “the Russian lid on Eastern Europe is being screwed tighter.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800053–0746)
4. See Document 13.
5. Secret. A version of this paper was sent to all European posts in telegram 34197, February 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800066–0951)
6. In telegram 9408 to USNATO and Bonn, January 12, the Department informed European posts that U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was under review, but that the Department was leaning toward continuing a policy of differentiation among the Eastern European countries. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800021–0454) In telegram 419 from Prague, February 1, the Embassy recommended that the policy of differentiation should be based on “realistic criteria and a judgment of how much each country can resist Soviet pressure” since “the effects of Soviet pressure will be to force another downturn in relations with EE.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800057–0015)
7. In telegram 29487 to all diplomatic and consular posts, February 2, the Department provided guidance on how to respond to the ongoing Soviet propaganda campaign justifying their invasion of Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800058–0925)
8. All brackets are in the original.
9. On January 4, 1980, President Carter cancelled the sale of 17 million tons of grain to the Soviet Union in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Faced with a projected shortage of grain, the Soviet Union sought to obtain replacement grain from the world market. As sales of U.S. grain to Eastern Europe were not affected, the administration stressed to Eastern European Governments that any diversion, transshipment, or replacement of grain to the Soviet Union would be dimly viewed in Washington.
10. See Document 285.
11. In telegram 12675 from Brussels, July 13, 1979, the Embassy reported the text of the Haferkamp-Cooper exchange related to the EC/Yugoslavia trade agreement. Wilhelm Haferkamp, the Commissioner for External Relations and Vice President of the European Commission, wrote that he noted “with satisfaction that the United States recognizes the great importance of strengthening Yugoslavia’s relationships with the West and that you welcome the prospect of an EEC/Yugoslavia economic agreement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790322–0304) In telegram 18781 from Brussels, October 23, the Embassy reported: “Yugoslavs showed an unexpectedly urgent desire to conclude new economic cooperation agreement with EC, apparently because of fear of Soviets and less concern with non-aligned image” during discussions with the EC negotiating team visiting Belgrade earlier that month. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790489–0909). The agreement came into force July 1, 1980.
12. See Document 219. See also telegram 8127 from Bucharest, December 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–2001)
13. See Document 221.