285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia1
65034. Military addees handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Steps the USG Could Take in Support of Post-Tito Yugoslavia Military Relations. (S) Ref: Belgrade 1264.2 From Nimetz for Eagleburger.
1. Secret (entire text)
2. Since the receipt of reftel we have been engaged in extensive interagency consideration of your thought provoking ideas. We have a preliminary consensus on a number of your proposals. You may draw on the following in talking to Gen. Ljubicic and other Yugoslav officials.
A. Weapon system “samples”; we are prepared to provide the GOY LOA’s for small amounts of missiles (50 each) and a single set of related ground equipment of TOW and Dragon. In addition, we now are willing to provide LOA’s for 50 Redeye air defense missiles and related equipment. These are systems we currently can actually draw on to support Yugoslavia in a crisis. We are also examining other defense items which might interest the GOY for this type program. We need more details about Yugoslav ideas on this approach, e.g., quantities of missiles, when they would wish to begin etc. In order to explore this further we propose sending an Army team to Belgrade at an early date to discuss Yugoslav requirements with the aim of developing effective training packages for these systems, developing specific components of support packages to be included with missiles, and determining [Page 930] delivery times.3 These issues, to include availability and condition of support equipment need to be addressed prior to proceeding beyond this conceptual agreement. Items of support equipment must be identified and screened, resulting in uncertainties at this time in requirements for calibration and repair, and delivery dates.
B. Since Stinger is only now entering the U.S. inventory and Viper and other systems are not yet in production, it is premature to consider transfer of these systems. We will give Yugoslav requests for samples priority attention as soon as it becomes possible to consider transfer of these systems.
C. With regard to Roland, since Yugoslavia is in the Franco-German sales territory, the GOY should discuss such purchases with the French and Germans. We have broached the subject of Roland for Yugoslavia to the French and believe it possible that a sale of limited numbers would be approved. Obviously, we will support such a Yugoslav approach.4
3. We will find an additional $30,000 in IMET funds and can make room at Leavenworth, Maxwell, Newport or certain other schools (excluding the US Army War College) if the Yugoslavs are interested in expanded attendance either in FY 80 or 1981. In previous informal discussions on this subject the Yugoslavs have cited problems with making available the right kind of officer and completing his English language training. If the Yugoslavs desire courses in FY 80, we would have to take reprogramming action soon including congressional notifi[Page 931]cation.5 This might attract limited public attention, but we do not believe it will be at all controversial.
4. Unfortunately we cannot sell military equipment for local currency—we will explore other ideas to provide useful materiel at lower prices, but cannot hold out much hope at this point.
5. Drawing on the above, please tell Gen. Ljubicic that:
—We are intrigued with his idea of training “samples” of weapon systems and are prepared to send an Army team to Belgrade with the aim of working out a mutually acceptable program.
—We now are prepared to include Redeye air defense missiles in addition to TOW and Dragon in such a training program.
—We have informally discussed with the French the possibility of the sale of Roland to Yugoslavia and would support such a sale.
—We will provide additional funds for tuition of Yugoslav officers at selected Service schools if the Yugoslavs are interested.
6. Defense concurs.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800126–0074. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Pfeifle (PM/SAS); cleared by Barry (EUR), Farber (PM/SAS) and McGiffert (DOD) and in ACDA, T, D/CT, and M; approved by Nimetz. Sent for information to the Secretary of Defense.↩
- In telegram 1264 from Belgrade, February 18, Eagleburger made three recommendations concerning military cooperation with Yugoslavia following Tito’s death: 1) strong consideration of the “sample sales” of advanced weapons systems to Yugoslavia for training purposes; 2) an expansion of the IMET program to include Yugoslavia; and 3) the possibility of selling weapons systems in Yugoslav dinars rather than U.S. dollars. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800086–0391) The Embassy revised the IMET proposal in telegram 1274 from Belgrade, February 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800086–0715) The proposals stemmed from the discussions between Graves and Ljubicic, February 11. See footnote 6, Document 280.↩
- Siena met with Yugoslav officials on January 10 to discuss the U.S.-Yugoslav military supply relationship in preparation for Graves’s visit. In a January 19 memorandum, he reported that the Yugoslav Government attached primary importance to receiving information on the availability of the Viper, Stinger, and Harpoon weapons systems. Siena recommended that the Department of Defense complete a study on the availability of weapons systems previously denied the Yugoslavs. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: Military: 1/79–1/80) On March 13, Vujatovic told Eagleburger that the Yugoslav Government would welcome an Army team to Yugoslavia to discuss Yugoslav requirements. (Telegram 2049 from Belgrade, March 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800129–0341) On March 15, Larrabee reported the Yugoslav position to Brzezinski. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, East/West, Larrabee Subject Files, Box 69, Yugoslavia: Military, 2–3/80)↩
- In a March 28 memorandum, Larrabee informed Brzezinski and Aaron of Bowman’s discussions within the Four Powers group with respect to supplying weapons to Yugoslavia. While some weapons systems were considered too sensitive to provide to Yugoslavia, the Quad agreed to provide some of the systems Belgrade requested while more advance systems could be provided at a later date. Regarding the bilateral U.S.-Yugoslav military cooperation, Larrabee wrote that Defense was prepared to offer the Yugoslav Government small numbers of more advanced systems for training purposes. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 3–4/80)↩
- In telegram 3856 from Belgrade, May 15, the Embassy reported the Yugoslav request for two IMET slots for the 1980 Command and General Staff College class at Ft. Leavenworth. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800240–0228)↩