219. Editorial Note
On October 12, 1979, the Department of State informed the Embassies in Romania and Yugoslavia that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was happy to accept the standing invitation to visit the two countries and planned to do so in December. (Telegram 267704 to Bucharest and Belgrade, October 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790469–0222) Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei had transmitted the invitation through Counselor of the Department of State Matthew Nimetz during their May meeting in Bucharest. In a June 5 memorandum to Vance, Nimetz recommended a visit, suggesting it “could be very useful in coaxing the Romanians to reform some of the bureaucratic practices that lead to continuing human rights difficulties.” Vance approved the recommendation on June 7 and wrote “OK. In the fall” in the margin. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, S/S Memoranda for 1979, Lot 81D117, Box 1, Principal Memo File, Apr–May–Jun)
In the early morning of November 4, Iranian supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini occupied the grounds of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took U.S. citizens there hostage. Initially organized as a protest against the Carter administration’s decision to allow the Shah of Iran to enter the United States for cancer treatment, the protest quickly evolved into a political tool used by Khomeini to secure and expand his control over the revolution. Vance, convinced that the release could be secured via diplomacy, focused on coordinating the diplomatic efforts to secure the release of the hostages.
Official reaction in Romania to the taking of the hostages was initially muted. According to Embassy reports, the government-controlled press ran only two stories in November on the hostage situation. The low-key statements, the Embassy suggested, were typical of Romania’s way of dealing with difficult issues in the press. (Telegram 7719 from Bucharest, November 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790537–0083) In telegram 302493 to Bucharest, November 22, the Department reported on the November 20 meeting between Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Robert Barry and Romanian Deputy Chief of Mission Boris Ranghet. Barry told Ranghet that given Romania’s desire to continue to improve relations with the United States, “it was difficult to understand why Romania had not taken any steps to express publicly its condemnation of the events in Iran.” Barry also stressed that “this was a case in which Romania would be expected by the US public and US Government to take a stand.” Failure to do so, Barry told Ranghet, “would be interpreted by the United States as inconsistent with the GOR’s oft-[Page 698]expressed desire to improve bilateral relations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790537–0054)
On December 1, U.S. Ambassador to Romania Rudolf Aggrey met with Andrei at his request to deliver two démarches on the Iranian situation and repeat Washington’s request for immediate, public action. In telegram 8080 from Bucharest, December 1, Aggrey reported his meeting with the Romanian Foreign Minister. Andrei, Aggrey wrote, answered that “it was not true that Romania had not been ‘vigorous’ in this instance.” Although he had no authorization to provide details, Andrei noted, “President Ceausescu was proceeding not just in the sense of Romania’s respect for international law and the Vienna Convention, but in the spirit of the Joint Statement he and President Carter had signed.” The Foreign Minister assured the U.S. Ambassador that he would seek authorization from Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu to brief Aggrey on Romanian activities. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790554–0100) On December 3, Andrei described for Aggrey “in the strictest confidence” the Romanian efforts in Tehran on behalf of the hostages. On Ceausescu’s initiative, Andrei had passed to Ayatollah Khomeini, through Romanian contacts with Arab States and organizations, the Romanian Government’s appeal to release the hostages without any delay. Asked if the Iranians had listened to the Romanian message, Andrei told Aggrey that “it is our understanding that things are moving toward a solution, but we do not know what compromise might be the key and we have no assurances.” (Telegram 8127 from Bucharest, December 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–2001)
The ongoing hostage crisis caused the postponement of Vance’s trip to Bucharest and Belgrade, and Ambassador Aggrey informed Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister Cornel Pacoste on December 4 of the postponement. In telegram 312957 to Bucharest, December 5, Vance instructed Aggrey to seek an appointment with Andrei and find out more information as to the impact the secret Romanian message had in Tehran. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–2006) Aggrey reported on his December 10 meeting with Andrei in telegram 8401 from Bucharest, December 11. After informing Andrei of President Carter and the Secretary of State’s appreciation for Romanian efforts on behalf of the hostages, Aggrey, “speaking personally” added that “the fact of the confidential Romanian demarche was not generally known within our government [meant that] Romania’s efforts could not be appreciated by all of the influential people in Washington who were assessing what our friends were doing to help.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–1998)
Almost two months into the crisis in Iran, the Soviet leadership approved the introduction of Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan. The [Page 699] Soviet Army and special KGB combat units were airlifted to Kabul on December 25. Soviet ground troops crossed the Afghan border on December 27. The invasion, ostensibly at the request of the Afghan Government, resulted in the assassination of Afghan President Hafizullah Amin, and the installation of a new regime led by Babrak Karmal. Writing in his diary on December 28, Carter noted that he was “determined to make this action as politically costly [to the Soviets] as possible. I sent messages to our allies, key nonaligned leaders, plus all the Muslim countries—urging them to speak out strongly against the Soviet action.” Carter added: “I also sent on the Hot Line the sharpest message I have ever sent to Brezhnev, telling him that the invasion of Afghanistan would seriously and adversely affect the relationship between our two countries.” (Carter, White House Diary, December 28, 1979, page 382) Over the next few months the President recalled the U.S. Ambassador from Moscow, asked the Senate to suspend consideration of the SALT II Treaty, imposed a embargo on new grain sales and transfers of technology to the Soviet Union, announced the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow, and increased the Defense budget request to Congress.
In telegram 333360 to multiple posts, December 28, the Department requested that a Presidential message be delivered to each head of state concerning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Embassy in Bucharest, the telegram instructed, was to stress that Soviet actions were in direct “violation of the sovereignty of an independent country” and that they were in “direct conflict with Romania’s strong commitment to the right of all nations to full independence, sovereignty, and non-intervention in internal affairs.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–1258) On December 29, during the New Year’s reception for the Diplomatic Corps, Ceausescu told U.S. Chargé d’Affairs a.i. Herbert Kaiser that Romania would “do whatever it can to help resolve peacefully the Afghan problem and to obtain the withdrawal of Soviet troops.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–2293) On December 31, Carter sent a letter to Ceausescu detailing the decision taken at the December 12–14 NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels, including the reasons behind the decision to modernize long-range theater nuclear forces. The letter also thanked Ceausescu for his government’s involvement in attempts to release the hostages in Iran. In a handwritten postscript, Carter added “I am sure you share our deep concern about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Please keep me informed on your views regarding this matter.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 16, Romania: President Nicolae Ceausescu, 1/79–6/80) The text of the letter was delivered by the Embassy on January 2 to the Ministry of Foreign [Page 700] Affairs in Bucharest. (Telegram 13 from Bucharest, January 2, 1980; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800006–0006)
In telegram 75 from Bucharest, January 4, the Embassy reported the public pronouncements of Ceausescu and the government-controlled media in Romania. While seeking to avoid explicit condemnation of one or more of the parties involved, the Embassy wrote, the reaction to the Soviet invasion was “sharp and pronounced. President Ceausescu’s initial public reaction on December 29 was unusually rapid and his reference to Afghanistan unusually pointed.” The Embassy concluded: “The continued priority given the same theme in his New Year’s message and the lengthy, authoritative editorial underline the high degree of Romanian concern.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800009–0653) In telegram 173 from Bucharest, January 9, the Embassy offered an analysis of the pressure likely faced by Bucharest. Noting that Romania was the only Warsaw Pact member not to endorse the Soviet invasion or recognize the Karmal regime, the Embassy wrote that “the pressure from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact is likely to intensify as international tensions grow. And yet, for Ceausescu and his colleagues, closer allegiance to the Soviet Union conflicts directly with their objective to achieve and maintain Romania’s relative independence and would undermine an important basis of Ceausescu’s acceptance by the vast majority of Romanians.” The Embassy concluded that although “Ceausescu has demonstrated an almost surprising willingness to continue to nurture publicly relations with the United States” he might be forced toward “more circumspect behavior” or “some gestures towards the Soviet Union. But all may not be what it seems.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800015–0843)