Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

35. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, August 6, 1979

SUBJECT

• Summary of Memorandum Entitled “Preconditions for Instability Begin to Accumulate in Eastern Europe” [classification not declassified]

A veteran analyst of East European affairs at CIA takes a look at recent developments in the area, speculating on whether the conditions preceding past crises are being recreated. [classification not declassified]

On the economic front, the conditions that have allowed the East European regimes to give their publics steadily rising standards of living no longer exist. The regimes will thus soon be deprived on one of the principal arguments in support of their legitimacy. With growth rates falling, investment plans cut back, and prices rising, it probably will not be long before economic expectations are dashed, with all that implies for increased public restiveness. [classification not declassified]

All the East European members of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance are aware that their systems of economic management are inadequate, and all are talking about, experimenting with, or actually implementing changes. Experimentation of this sort inevitably leads to greater tensions between those within these regimes who are convinced of the need for change and those who feel threatened by it. [classification not declassified]

Some East European leaders have indicated that they do not believe Soviet economic leadership is sufficiently sensitive to their needs. Nor do they believe that their international organizations are facilitating the pursuit of solutions to their economic problems. One consequence, therefore, of their economic problems has been the encouragement of peculiarly national solutions and the strengthening of centrifugal tendencies. [classification not declassified]

For a model, the East European CEMA regimes may be looking to Hungary, which has the most advanced program of economic reform. They do not appear to be looking to the independent national Communist states of the Balkans, though they may envy the political ability of these states to seek solutions without subordinating their interests to those of the USSR. Relations between the independent Communist states and the USSR are, at best, not improving. [classification not declassified]

Nationalism, which probably remains the strongest motive force in Eastern Europe, received a boost from the visit of John Paul II to Poland.² The visit will have convinced the Soviets that their position in Eastern Europe remains dependent of the willingness to enforce their writ militarily. The visit will also have strengthened the hands of those in Eastern Europe and the USSR who, already concerned about ideological contamination through detente, urge more vigorous vigilance and repression of non-conformists. A heavier air of renewed repression has already arrived in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The people’s political expectations, which had been raised by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, may soon also be dashed. [classification not declassified]

At the same time that conditions in Eastern Europe are becoming more tense, Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev nears the end of his gradual decline. The Soviet succession process has probably begun; given the advanced age of Eastern Europe’s leaders, succession processes there could coincide. (U)

In sum, then, the author argues that the classic pre-conditions for a crisis are either in place or can be seen on the horizon. Major demonstrations of popular dissatisfaction could occur in the not too far distant future. But because many of the preconditions have just begun to develop, the situation is probably not yet quite ripe for the next major turn of events. [classification not declassified]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 12, Europe: 1979. Secret. Brement forwarded the memorandum to Brzezinski under an August 6 covering memorandum noting it was prepared at his request and that Brzezinski should read it. A stamped notation on the first page of the covering memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it.
2. June 2–10, 1979.