282. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- President’s Attendance at Tito’s Funeral
I understand that you feel that the President should not go to Tito’s funeral. While I appreciate the difficulties his attendance might pose—especially in regard to any meeting with Brezhnev—in my view the primary consideration should not be how to handle a meeting with Brezhnev (who may well not attend the funeral) but the type of signal the President’s attendance—or failure to attend—would convey to the Soviets, to the Allies, and above all to the Yugoslavs. From this perspective, there are strong and compelling reasons why I believe the President should lead the funeral delegation:
1. The Impact on the Yugoslavs. Despite the outward calm and all the preparations for Tito’s death, the Yugoslavs still remain nervous about what the future portends and suspicious of the depth and the sincerity of U.S. support. As Ambassador Eagleburger has rightly stressed, what we do in the first few days and weeks after Tito’s death will have a major psychological and political impact on the Yugoslav leadership and on future Yugoslav attitudes. Nothing would do more to reassure the new leadership and underscore our support for Yugoslavia’s independence and nonaligned position than for the President to go to the funeral. His attendance would also be a clear signal to others, who in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are concerned about Soviet intentions, that the U.S. is firmly committed to supporting Yugoslavia. (C)
2. The Danger of Ambiguity. Conversely, if the President does not go, and other major European leaders do (Thatcher already plans to go, and it is almost certain that Schmidt and Giscard will go), it will appear as if the U.S. is less concerned about Yugoslavia than are our allies, and the credibility of our past statements of support will be weakened. Many people will undoubtedly recall the President’s ambiguous campaign statement on Yugoslavia,2 and he will be criticized by [Page 921] some of his opponents, as well as some journalists, for passing up an important chance to concretely underscore U.S. support for Yugoslavia at a critical moment. (C)
3. Consultation with the Allies. The trip provides a valuable opportunity for the President to consult with the allies (especially Schmidt, Thatcher and Giscard) and to coordinate policy on a broad range of issues at a moment when allied solidarity is—or at least is perceived to be—beginning to unravel. A meeting with the major allies could serve to shore up this solidarity and give it a shot in the arm. But this will require leadership that only the President can provide. In lieu of that, as Bob Blackwill has pointed out, East-West detente will be left in the hands of Schmidt and Giscard, who may succumb to attempts by the Soviets to exploit fissures in the Alliance. (C)
4. Domestic Political Considerations. The trip could help the President domestically. He would capture the headlines, be seen meeting with world leaders and providing international leadership while the Vice President campaigns in New Hampshire—and he could be back in the White House in 48 hours. (C)
5. The Soviet Angle. Because of Brezhnev’s health, and with Kosygin incapacitated, it is far from certain that he will attend the funeral. (The Soviets only sent their Ambassador to Kardelj’s funeral—a point not lost on the Yugoslavs.) If Brezhnev does not go—and my guess is that he won’t—then there is no problem. Vance could meet quietly with Gromyko or you could meet with Alexandrov.3 If Brezhnev does go, then the President can hardly avoid meeting with him. While any such meeting is unlikely to result in any dramatic change in Soviet policy or a major improvement in bilateral relations, it need not turn into a shouting match. At the very least it would provide an opportunity for the President to:
- —make clear to the Soviets at the highest level in a firm nonpolemical manner the nature of our concerns over Afghanistan and the reasons for our actions;
- —reaffirm his belief in the need to dampen military competition and move forward in areas such as MBFR, SALT and CSCE;
- —project an image of firmness and determination to defend vital U.S. interest;
- —keep open the lines of communication and leave the door ajar for any Soviet initiatives at a later date. (C)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–2/80. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.”↩
- See footnote 2, Document 235, for Carter’s 1976 statement on Yugoslavia during the Presidential debate with President Ford.↩
- Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, a member of the Secretariat of the General Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Brezhnev’s foreign policy adviser.↩