281. Memorandum From the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to Secretary of State Vance1
SUBJECT
- Your Breakfast with the President Friday, February 15, 1980
1. Yugoslavia.
A. Current State of Play.
Tito’s condition remains “very grave,” according to the latest Yugoslav medical bulletin. While Tito could die at any moment, [less than 1 line not declassified] he could last another day or two.
A proposed public statement by the President and condolence messages for the President and Vice President are at the White House. You also will issue a brief statement and send a condolence message to the Yugoslav Foreign Secretary. We will brief key members of Congress, stressing our confidence in Yugoslavia’s ability to manage its own affairs successfully during the coming months.
Although we have no indication as yet from the Yugoslavs, we expect there will be a State funeral or memorial service approximately six days after Tito’s death. Ambassador Eagleburger has been informed by the U.K. in Belgrade that a “firm” decision has already been made that Prince Phillip, Thatcher and Carrington will attend. We expect heavy, high-level attendance by Third World, Western and at least some Eastern leaders. Embassy Belgrade’s tentative list of participants includes Presidents Ceausescu and Pertini, Schmidt, Genscher and Brandt, and Clark of Canada.
A proposed funeral delegation list has been sent to the White House by Ben Read’s office (Tab 1).2 Ambassador Eagleburger has asked us to bear in mind, especially regarding accompanying staff, that there will be a flood of delegations and that Belgrade is a small city with severely limited hotel space. Briefing materials are being prepared for use with the Yugoslavs and for anticipated bilaterals.
We can expect the Soviets to field a high-level delegation and will inevitably have to deal with the question of a possible bilateral. We would not expect much of substantive value from such a meeting and [Page 919] would probably want to convey this view publicly. In the interest of allied solidarity, however, we would not want to be seen as avoiding a bilateral. A meeting would also give us a chance to express directly to the Soviets our views on SALT, TNF and other issues which will remain of mutual concern despite Afghanistan. A memo from Marshall on the meeting is at Tab 2.3
B. Outlook for Post-Tito/Yugoslav Relations.
Bilateral relations have been strengthened significantly during the past three years in all fields including political, economic and military. Our problems are minor in comparison to what has been achieved.
On Tito’s death, we will want to demonstrate through actions and public statements, our confidence in Yugoslavia’s new leadership and in its ability to manage the country’s economy and its defense.
We will need to: continue intensified efforts to prevent anti-Yugoslav terrorism; encourage U.S. banks and businessmen to continue business as usual; and see if we can be more forthcoming regarding Yugoslav arms sales requests.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Yugoslavia.]
- Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 3, President’s Breakfast—1–3/80. Secret; Sensitive.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- In the attached February 14 memorandum to Vance, Marshall Shulman suggested that the Soviet leadership was likely to: 1) send a top-level delegation to the funeral in order to gain influence with the emerging Yugoslav leadership; 2) meet with Western European leaders to weaken allied support for the U.S. position on Afghanistan; and 3) lobby non-aligned leaders in attendance. A bilateral meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union, Shulman suggested, would be inevitable. While he had little expectation of a breakthrough, such a meeting would, among other things, help avoid miscalculations on the Soviet side by stressing U.S. Government positions with regard to Yugoslavia, Cuba, etc.↩