283. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State1
1248. Dept pls pass to OSD/ASD/ISA. Subj: Yugoslavia After Tito: The Short Term.
1. (S-entire text).
2. This cable summarizes my views on the short-term prospects (immediately following the death and for some 6 months thereafter) for a smooth transition to the post-Tito era. A second cable will consider the longer term.2
3. Outwardly the Yugoslavs, and their government, will remain calm. There will be some military alert measures taken; the police will increase surveillance of known or suspected internal opponents, and may even take a few into custody; there will be a host of public statements about Yugoslavia’s internal stability and its willingness and capability to defend itself from external threat; the collective presidency will ostentatiously take decisions; there will be a real effort to show that business is going on “as usual.”
4. To a great degree the perceived picture will be the real one. There will be no panic; the decision-making process will function smoothly; the Croats will not rise up against the Serbs, or vice versa. There will, in fact, be an extraordinary effort to compromise differences (of which there are many) and to avoid any hint of controversy.
5. But the collective presidency will not be—even at this early stage—a collegium of equals, all of whom have similar weight in the making of decisions. The evidence during Tito’s earlier illness was clear (even if the identity of all the players was not) that there will be an inner group (drawn from the State and Party Presidencies) that will decide most questions. Bakaric’s role can probably best be described as chairman of the board. He will oversee the system and his colleagues, [Page 923] coordinate activities between agencies, and determine agendas. He will not be Generalissimo, but he will be the ranking General. Milos Minic, long-term Tito associate and former Foreign Secretary, will be in charge of foreign policy; General Ljubicic, Defense Minister, will run national defense and be involved in broader political decisions. The central role that these three have played, and will play, is clear.
6. Other participants are less easily discernible. Prime Minister Djuranovic is probably the key figure on all matters economic and, as such, inevitably will be a part of—or on the edges of—the inner circle. Kolisevski, the new but temporary Chief of State, and Doronski, Chairman of the Party Presidium (also only temporarily), will, because they are where they are, carry some weight. But both are eminently dull and forgettable fellows and will probably not survive as significant factors after their terms expire. Dolanc and Mikulic are important figures now, and may become more so as time goes on. Dragosavac also bears watching, both from the Croatian perspective and because he is a leading “conservative” who could play an important role should things turn sour.
7. But beneath the calm exterior there will lie a degree of uncertainty and disquiet which will not soon or easily be put aside. First and foremost will be overwhelming fact that the father figure, the man above the battle who resolved disputes when no one else could, the only true Yugoslav, is gone. For a while, until they are accustomed to doing without him, the fact that Tito is no longer there to turn to will be a massive if subliminal psychological problem for people and government alike.
8. Then, of course, there is the Soviet threat, which is never far from the mind of any Yugoslav. Relations with Moscow have been bad and getting worse for the past two years, which adds to the disquiet. And Afghanistan has hardly been a reassuring event.
9. How the Soviets play the first few weeks after Tito’s death can make some difference. If Brezhnev comes to the funeral (assuming he is up to it), and if he behaves himself, it will somewhat relieve concerns. If, on the other hand, the Soviets treat Tito’s death as they did Kardelj’s (they virtually ignored it), the level of nervousness will skyrocket. But in any event, I am persuaded that Yugoslav and Soviet interests are so widely divergent that no real relaxation over the long term is likely. This is not to say that a less confident Yugoslav leadership will deal as forcefully with Moscow as Tito did. On the contrary, faced with problems at home and vulnerable to Soviet economic pressures, the new leaders will probably—at least in the short term—feel compelled to accommodate Soviet interests to a greater degree than in the past (e.g., by adopting a lower profile on issues such as Afghanistan).
[Page 924]10. And while the Yugoslavs ponder Soviets motives they will also recognize that with Tito’s death their leadership role in NAM, already sharply challenged by Castro as a Soviet surrogate, will be instantly diminished. If they suffered any illusions before Afghanistan and while Tito was still alive that NAM could be an effective bulwark against Soviet pressures, they will soon have to conclude that this is no longer so much the case.
11. And finally, Tito’s death comes at a time of substantial economic disquiet which will not soon diminish. Terms of trade in 1979 were worse than for many years and will not improve much this year; an inflation rate of some 30 percent will not be brought to more acceptable levels for sometime to come; and devolution to the republics of substantial economic powers means that the central government probably cannot move rapidly—and perhaps not effectively—to correct the deterioration. Yet act it must, and soon, or 1980 will be even worse than 1979 and the eventual cure more painful. The government knows this; the question is whether it will have the courage and clout to pursue the corrective actions begun late last year and early in 1980. In fact, the best early test of the post-Tito collective leadership will be how effectively it moves to take stiff economic measures at a time of transition and possible external pressures.
12. In sum, there will be no collapse. The transition will be smooth and with a minimum of turbulence. But there will be substantial if hidden tension, and a lack of self-confidence that will diminish as and if the government is able to cope. Those who govern will be sensitive, nervous, and tough in the extreme—at least at first. They will know, and they will be right, that how well they do in the first six months after Tito’s death will have a substantial impact on the future viability and permanence of the collective leadership concept.
13. In these circumstances the opportunities for the USG are enormous. The Carter administration has spent some three years preparing for this moment. Our political relations are at least as good as they have ever been; our international differences, while still substantial, have been greatly reduced, both in scope and decibel level; and we have become an important and valued economic partner. If we act with wisdom, understanding, and restraint over the course of the critical next six months the pay-off for both our countries can be substantial. What the Yugoslavs need now is reassurance that they do not stand alone. They need to be shown that we, with the West following our lead, stand ready to help where we can and take risks on their behalf when we must.
14. Milovan Djilas believes that post-Tito Yugoslavia will, inevitably, reshape its political and economic institutions in ways we in the West will find appealing. I share the hope, but am less confident of [Page 925] the inevitability. Yet the odds favor liberalization; what we and our Western Allies do, beginning now, will have a great deal to do with whether that present hope can be turned into future reality.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800082–0524. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Sent for information to Zagreb, Moscow, USCINCEUR, and USNMRSHAPE.↩
- In telegram 1258 from Belgrade, February 16, Eagleburger analyzed the prospects of stability in Yugoslavia over the longer term. The conventional analysis on Yugoslavia, Eagleburger wrote, ranged “from mild to extreme pessimism.” Disagreeing with that interpretation, Eagleburger wrote that, over the next five years, “Yugoslavia will remain stable, the collective leadership concept will work,” its foreign policy will “remain committed to non-alignment,” and that “so long as the Soviet Union continues its current policies, basic Yugoslav interests will be in conflict with those of Moscow, with little chance for much more than a cosmetic accommodation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800084–0050)↩