Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

276. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, January 17, 1980

SUBJECT

• Mini-SCC on Yugoslavia, Friday, January 18, 11:00 a.m. (C)

The main purpose of this mini-SCC on Yugoslavia should be to ensure that the USG is well-organized and prepared in case Tito should die in the near future. There are three main papers which should be reviewed:

1. State’s revised contingency plan to be implemented on Tito’s death (Tab A).² It contains a checklist of important steps to be taken in the immediate aftermath of Tito’s death, a list of the delegation to the funeral, and condolence messages, public statements, etc. I have checked it over and I think it touches all the important bases. You need only review the checklist. (The messages have been cleared with the speechwriters.)

2. A State paper on short-term policy goals (the first two-three months after Tito’s death) and steps we are taking in terms of contingency planning (Tab B).³ You should glance over the parts underlined in red and ask George Vest to briefly summarize the paper and the steps.

In addition to the State paper on short-term policy goals:⁴

—the Department has prepared and updated during the past 10 years a USG Contingency Study which addresses scenarios for internal disintegration and Soviet/WP threats and/or invasion. This study is a useful reference but is too long and unwieldy to be a useful policy-making tool;

—EUR has formed an interagency group to review these plans, bring them fully up-to-date, and prepare necessary decision documents;

—under the aegis of this group PM is preparing a more detailed analysis of military options for the US and NATO which will be ready by January 25. (S)

3. The Quad paper on military contingencies in case of Soviet pressure (Tab C).⁵ You should ask General Bowman (DOD/ISA) to briefly review the status of this paper and DOD contingency plans for supplying Yugoslavia in the first weeks of any crisis. (C)

As you know, the Political Directors’ meeting will be on January 24–25. To date the other three Allies have not provided a very useful list of equipment which they could supply Yugoslavia. Our objective at the Political Directors’ meeting should be to get agreement on what each ally would supply in the first week of a crisis and to push the other three to do more. You should stress that we want to be in a good position to respond to any Yugoslav request for aid. However, while we need to be able to respond quickly to any Yugoslav request for aid, we should also be mindful of strong Yugoslav sensitivities about NATO discussions of contingency plans, which they fear will stimulate Warsaw Pact pressures. (See in particular the cable at Tab D.)⁶ (S)

Three final points:

—You should task DOD to look into any changes in legislation that might be necessary in order to respond to Yugoslavia’s requests quickly and effectively. Otherwise, we may find that the Yugoslavs turn to us with a request for a certain type of advanced equipment, i.e., The Dragon, and we may not be able to supply it in time due to legislative restrictions.⁷

—State should be tasked to look at the signaling process. The Yugoslavs are very sensitive about external involvement in their affairs and do not want us to take any action that might provoke the Soviets. At the same time they want to feel confident that they can rely on us if they need to. We need to have a better idea of how we can signal our willingness to help the Yugoslavs without getting too far out in front.

—CIA should be tasked to do a concise analysis of Soviet goals, tactics and scenarios for intervention. To some extent they have done this in the latest NIO but we need a separate policy-related study which focuses solely on the Soviet angle.⁸ (S)

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–021, SMC 106, Mini SCC 1/18/80, Yugoslavia. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the first page reads: “DA has seen.”
2. Attached at Tab A is a January 16 memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski which included: a preliminary checklist in the eventuality of Tito’s death, suggested members of the funeral delegation (to be led by the President); draft condolence messages; a draft memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and the DCI drawing attention to the danger of anti-Yugoslav terrorism; and a draft letter to Brezhnev cautioning against interference in Yugoslav internal affairs. In a January 25 memorandum to Brzezinski, Brement and Larrabee argued that the letter to Brezhnev be dropped from the Yugoslav contingency plan; Brzezinski agreed. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 69, [Yugoslavia: Tito]: 1–2/80)
3. Vest submitted the paper the following day to the Vance. See Document 277.
4. Aaron wrote in the margin next to the following three points: “What is actionable?”
5. Tab C is not attached. Tarnoff forwarded the final paper, dated March 3, to Brzezinski on March 6. See Document 284.
6. Tab D is not attached.
7. Aaron circled “Dragon,” and wrote in the margin “what do they want that we can’t supply?”
8. Aaron underlined “the Soviet angle” and drew a question mark under. He also wrote after this point: “Soviet reaction to P[resident] visit.”