275. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Yugoslavia: Contingency Planning (S)
In addition to our own contingency plans to be implemented upon Tito’s death, at the quadripartite meetings the Political Directors of the FRG, France, Britain and the US, together with the Military Officers of these countries associated with the quadripartite meetings, have been engaged in an ongoing study of assistance to Yugoslavia in the event of Soviet pressure on or intervention in Yugoslavia. (S)
A basic contingency document has been worked out. Recent work has concentrated on two problems:
—The resupply situation. Our studies show this to be very problematic.
—The coordination of supplies of new systems to Yugoslavia. It is clear from our studies that internal bureaucracies in all countries, including the US, are inhibiting coordination. (S)
The Political Directors have been working hard to overcome the difficulties. At the next quadripartite meeting, to be held January 31, a report will be made on progress in cutting through this red tape. The Military Officers will also report to the Political Directors what aid could be offered to Yugoslavia in the first weeks of any pressure, and by whom.2 Their study is focusing on three questions in particular: (1) what aid could be offered in toto; (2) which countries could offer which items; (3) how best to divide the pie. (S)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 86, Yugoslavia: 1/80. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the document indicating he saw it.↩
- In telegram 9542 to Bonn, London, and Paris, January 12, the Department of State informed the military officers at the quadripartite meetings of Major General Bowman’s assessment of immediate and long-term Yugoslav military needs in case of a crisis. Bowman wrote to his counterparts: “If in the near future a crisis should ensue in Yugoslavia, it might be necessary to demonstrate to Yugoslav leaders in some concrete way that the West supports Yugoslav independence. One way to do that would be to ship some high priority military equipment in the first week or two.” Bowman went on to suggest that “if the crisis were bad enough and the Yugoslavs requested” the United States could provide Stinger, Dragon, and TOW missiles, as well as “tie US AWACS radar downlink into the Yugoslav air defense net.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870104–0252)↩