Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

284. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, March 3, 1980

Yugoslavia: US Politico-Military Strategy Executive Summary

This paper examines four major post-Tito scenarios in Yugoslavia, and Soviet policies for each. It then sets forth the politico-military steps the US should take over the near term to prepare for these scenarios, and the policies we should pursue when one or more of them develops. The issue of direct US military action in Yugoslavia in response to steps the Soviets might take is beyond the scope of this paper.

The US and NATO have important interests in a stable, independent, and nonaligned Yugoslavia. Were it allied or more cooperative with the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia could support expanded Soviet naval and air operations in the Mediterranean. The occupation of Yugoslavia by Warsaw Pact forces would present a threat to Greece, Italy, and Austria. In addition, a Soviet takeover of Yugoslavia would deal a profound psychological blow to NATO.

At the same time, Yugoslavia remains a communist state, albeit nonaligned with extensive but still limited ties to the West. The US and its NATO Allies have no military commitment to Yugoslavia’s security. The Yugoslavs now expect to rely mainly on their own resources to blunt any Soviet attack, but they would want some Western support, e.g., logistic. In the face of an actual attack, they might change their present expectation and request more direct Western military engagement.

This paper sets forth a number of policy areas for US action. Perhaps the most important at this time is to strengthen the US military supply relationship with Yugoslavia. In recent years it has been limited. The Yugoslavs strongly complain that prices of US equipment are too high, and they are extremely wary of publicity. Nevertheless, there are prospects for sales of some systems the Yugoslavs want, such as air defense radars. Even though the Yugoslavs have not bought much from the US, they remain seriously interested in developing the arms transfer relationship.

Post-Tito Scenarios

In the initial post-Tito period Yugoslavia is likely to remain united and the Soviets to exercise a certain caution. The scenarios set forth below address the situations we could face over the mid-to-longer term. These scenarios are illustrative.

Scenario 1: Cohesion: Yugoslav leadership demonstrates unity and basic consensus, achieves broad popular support, continues nonalignment. The Soviets might attempt to both woo and pressure the Yugoslav leadership, presenting it with an ambiguous, but not openly threatening Soviet stance. If the Soviets were willing to pursue riskier policies, they could seek to weaken the new leadership and to generate ethnic and regional tensions.

Scenario 2: Cohesion with Liberalization and/or Westward Shift: Internal cohesion as in Scenario 1, but accompanied by political liberalization or a decided shift westward in Yugoslav foreign policy. The Soviets would intensify pressures on Yugoslavia to eschew such trends. Depending on how pronounced were the trends, the Soviets might even use military pressure. But the greater the cohesiveness in Yugoslavia, the less likely the Soviets would intervene with force.

Scenario 3: Disunity: Early post-Tito unity and consensus of federal leadership begins to break down as regional disputes and pressures on leadership mount. If disunity were limited, the Soviets would urge decisive recentralization steps. If the situation deteriorated further, regional constituencies could seek active Soviet backing. There would be an active prospect of Soviet military intervention. Soviet perceptions of potential Western responses would be critical.

Scenario 4: Soviet Military Intervention: If the USSR saw disunity in Yugoslavia as very serious, it might decide to intervene militarily. Were Yugoslavia’s armed forces cohesive and strong, the USSR might need to assemble 40–50 divisions to launch a full-scale assault. Alternatively, if Yugoslavia were weakened by internal conflict, the Soviets might decide to use a smaller force, perhaps 20–25 divisions. The USSR would worry about NATO or Chinese counteractions on other fronts. While at present there is no evidence of Soviet intention to intervene in Yugoslavia, Soviet actions must be viewed as uncertain and changeable, and dependent on Yugoslav military and political strength as well as on opportunities presented and commitments elsewhere.

Strategy

Over the near term the US can take steps to reassure the Yugoslavs and to keep the Soviets on the defensive. As post-Tito scenarios emerge, the US can take additional steps, as necessary and generally after consultations with the Yugoslavs and our key allies (recognizing Yugoslav sensitivity to NATO actions). The politico-military measures suggested below would complement economic and other political instruments of US diplomacy.

Decision Point 1: Near Term Objective: indicate a high level of political interest in Yugoslavia’s independence and unity, and continue to strengthen Yugoslav political and military ties with the US and the West, through small and nonprovocative, but cumulatively important steps. US actions could include:

• —at the time of Tito’s death, US and allied statements of support for Yugoslavia,
• —visits by Secretary Vance and top military officials,
• —intensified consultations with key allies,
• —implementation of more forthcoming US arms sales policy, and expanded IMET,
• —possibly intelligence cooperation on terrorism.

Decision Point 2: Cohesion (Post-Tito Scenario 1) Objective: continue to demonstrate a high level of political interest. If the Soviets pursued divisive tactics, the US should take a tougher stance toward USSR. If the Yugoslavs showed signs of succumbing to Soviet pressures (e.g., for greater naval or overflight rights), the US should make countervailing efforts to reassure and dissuade the Yugoslavs. Specific US policies to counter divisive Soviet tactics might include:

• —warnings to the USSR, and encouragement of allies and others to do the same,
• —provision to Yugoslavs of information on Warsaw Pact military activities,
• —if necessary to signal the USSR, carry out selected US and allied force redeployments, exercises, or augmentations.

Decision Point 3: Cohesion with Liberalization and/or Westward Shift (Post-Tito Scenario 2) Objective: measured political support for Yugoslavs (complementing economic steps, such as strengthening EC ties). Our policies would remain those at Decision Point 2, intensified as necessary. We could face difficult choices if events in Yugoslavia moved too fast.

Decision Point 4: Disunity (Post-Tito Scenario 3) Objective: support policies that help the new leadership rebuild consensus and national unity, and resist Soviet intimidation and subversion. Specifically, the US could provide [less than 1 line not declassified] specialized equipment needed by the government. If the Soviets aggressively exploited the situation, the US and European allies could escalate responses, by:

• —making tougher warnings to the USSR,
• —expanding force redeployment, augmentation, and exercise measures (e.g., involving the Sixth fleet, land-based tactical air power, AWACS, the ACE Mobile Force, the NATO Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean),
• —raising the general alert status or increasing the deployability of US/NATO forces,
• —providing US and allied logistics support packages for quick upgrading of Yugoslav defense capabilities,²
• —taking measures to guarantee and protect the air, sea and land lines of communication to Yugoslavia, and to ensure enroute access.

These steps should be undertaken in ways that show resolve, yet avoid an all-out confrontation with the Soviets or the impression that the West is seeking base rights in Yugoslavia.

Decision Point 5: Soviet Military Intervention (Post-Tito Scenario 4) Objective: support Yugoslav resistance to Soviet aggression, in ways consistent with Yugoslav desires, with our larger security interests in NATO’s Southern Region and in Europe generally, and with US military posture and requirements worldwide. The US could:

• —augment measures listed at Decision Point 4,
• —with allied cooperation, undertake airlift of arms and equipment to Yugoslav forces in secure areas,
• —if necessary, undertake a partial mobilization of US reserve forces, and other steps to enhance US and allied force readiness,
• —institute stronger measures, if necessary, to protect air and sea lines of communication to Yugoslavia.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 69, Yugoslavia: Military: 4–9/80. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent under a March 6 covering memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski. Tarnoff explained the paper was “developed by an interagency group chaired by State. A mini-SCC on January 18, 1980, requested such a study. We recommend that another mini-SCC be held to consider the post-Tito security framework and scenarios which the paper sets forth and the adequacy of present policies in the politico-military field to prepare for them.”
2. Following consultations with the Allies in the Quadripartite Military Group, January 25, 1980, General Bowen drew up a list of equipment NATO could offer the Yugoslav military in case of low-, mid-, and high-level crises. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 3–4/80)