Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

277. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest), the Director of Policy Planning (Lake), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Bartholomew) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, January 18, 1980

SUBJECT

• Yugoslavia, the Tito Succession, and the Afghan Crisis

The short-term prospects for an orderly transition following Tito’s death are good—but we cannot be certain. A collective Presidency will take over power, rotating jobs on an annual basis.

With their current preoccupation with Southwest Asia, the Soviets may, particularly if they pursue an active Euro-detente policy, take a reasonable, hands-off posture toward Yugoslavia.

However, the Soviets will view the post-Tito period as a singular opportunity to influence Yugoslav policies in their favor. They will pay special attention, through inducements and threats, to interest groups within the government, party, and military establishments, and may provide covert support to divisive elements.

The overriding Soviet objective will be to keep the Yugoslav Communist Party in power, preferably with a leadership group more friendly to Soviet interests than Tito has been. They would like to do this without force or any appearance of Soviet intervention so that any countermeasures by the U.S. and its NATO allies would appear interventionist.

Afghanistan has united the Yugoslavs against the Soviet threat as never before. This mood may relax in time, but, barring unforeseen chaos, the Yugoslavs themselves will in the foreseeable future pose a formidable obstacle to Soviet aspirations. Thus the immediate prospect is for the country to hold together.

But we’re not certain how long this relatively stable situation will prevail, and we’re concerned that none of the potential successors has much stature. Tito set up a mechanism supposedly to help with the succession, but he refused to let a single strong leader emerge. The regime’s efforts to control, monitor, and eliminate opposition betray its nervousness about separatists and Cominformists. Moreover, several factors such as emigre activity and national separatism may foster some uncertainty and instability in the post-Tito period.

While the Yugoslavs will want our support, they will not welcome a US or allied over-reaction. This would have the effect of undermining Yugoslav confidence in their own ability to cope with the post-Tito period and could provide the Soviets with pretexts to react in unhelpful ways. They will even suspect that our expressions of concern are designed to destabilize the country, perhaps to get the Communist Party out of power. They will be particularly watchful about our will to control any Yugoslav emigre activities in the West. Therefore, a primary goal of US policy will be to ensure a calm US and allied response, reflecting confidence in Yugoslavia’s stability and political maturity.

U.S. Commitments, Plans, Studies, and Decisions

1. Neither we nor any other NATO members have made any direct commitments to provide either men or material to Yugoslavia in the event of a crisis or threats from the Soviets.

We have expressed “support” for Yugoslav independence and territorial integrity during Tito’s 1978 visit to the U.S. Initially U.S. support would come in the form of close political and economic ties and stepping up our modest military supply relationship if the Yugoslavs want this. As the situation develops, we will want to consult closely with our allies bilaterally, through the Quadripartite mechanism, and possibly in NATO. However, we should bear in mind Yugoslav sensitivities about NATO discussions focused on them, which they see as stimulating compensatory Warsaw Pact pressures. We should not undertake detailed contingency planning in NATO, but confine ourselves to general and confidential exchanges.

2. The Department has prepared and updated during the past ten years a USG Contingency Study for Yugoslavia, which addresses scenarios for internal disintegration and Soviet/WP threats and/or invasion. This study is a useful reference but not a policymakers tool. EUR has formed an interagency group to review these plans, bring them fully up-to-date, and prepare necessary decision documents. Under the aegis of this group, PM is preparing a more detailed analysis of military options for the U.S. and NATO which will be ready by January 25.

3. DOD is working on contingency plans to meet a situation in which the Yugoslavs might ask us to provide increased military supplies, logistical support. These plans will be ready shortly. (In a crisis, the Yugoslavs can muster three million men in the field and another three million auxiliaries.) They are less likely to look to the U.S. or the NATO allies for a direct commitment of military forces, than for the type of assistance mentioned above.

4. We have sent to the White House statements to be made and actions to be taken immediately following Tito’s death, including a possible message from the President to Brezhnev. We are seeking the urgent views of Embassies Moscow and Belgrade on this latter issue and will send you a separate memo on the considerations involved as soon as possible.² One of our recommendations is for a Presidential statement, to be issued upon Tito’s death, which reaffirms in clear terms our support for the independence, sovereignty, and unity of Yugoslavia.

5. In the absence of a threat of Soviet intervention, we should quietly encourage the post-Tito succession process to produce a new unifying authority, while working with the Yugoslavs to support their independence. We assume that if any crisis or Soviet threat develops, the Yugoslavs will take the lead in telling us what they need and want, and that we should not press U.S. assistance or guarantees beyond what the Yugoslavs feel is useful.

At a mini-SCC meeting today chaired by Aaron there was strong interagency endorsement for the general policy line set forth in this memorandum. A number of specific tasks were assigned to ensure that we are well prepared. We will keep you closely informed as this work proceeds.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Official Working Papers, S/P Director Anthony Lake, 1977–Jan 1981, Lot 82D298, Box 6, TL 1/16–31/80. Secret. Drafted by McCormack, Barry, and Palmer on January 17; cleared by Harrison and Kamman.
2. In telegram 13982 to Moscow and Belgrade, January 18, the Department requested Embassy views on whether a letter from Carter to Brezhnev following Tito’s death would be useful. The letter would stress the importance the U.S. Government attached to Yugoslav non-alignment, independence, and territorial integrity, and stress U.S. Government expectations of Soviet actions. The draft language reads in part: “You should understand that any effort to exploit President Tito’s death to weaken Yugoslavia’s internal cohesion or undermine Yugoslavia’s traditionally independent foreign policy would be regarded by the United States as an unfriendly act, toward which we would feel compelled to respond accordingly.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870123–0524) In telegram 1002 from Moscow, January 19, the Embassy cautioned against sending a letter before any Soviet threat to Yugoslavia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0685) From Belgrade, Eagleburger welcomed the idea of a letter sent immediately following Tito’s death, but suggested clarification of what constituted troublesome Soviet moves toward Yugoslavia. (Telegram 429 from Belgrade, January 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870123–0521)