The attached memorandum provides the information which you have requested
on U.S.-Libyan relations.2 To put the subject in
proper perspective the memorandum covers the full period from the Libyan
Revolution on September 1, 1969 to the present.
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of
State4
Washington, undated
SUBJECT
- United States-Libyan Relations During the Qadhafi Era
Relations with Libya Following the Revolution.
Relations between the United States and Libya have been uneven and
troubled since the current Libyan Government came to power on
September 1, 1969. Relations got off to a shaky start because of the
close identification between the United States and the government of
King Idris. In late 1969 and early 1970, Ambassador Joseph Palmer
saw Qadhafi and Prime
Minister Abd as-Salam Ahmad Jallud on several occasions but, after
the forced closure of Wheelus Air Force Base in June 1970, the
Embassy found it virtually impossible to get appointments with
anyone except middle-level Foreign Ministry officials.
The 1970–1972 Period. Throughout the period
1970–1972, Ambassador Palmer made it clear to the Libyan Government
that the key to good relations was reciprocity—and a dialogue and
negotiations—on all points. With reference to the issue of U.S.
support for Israel and U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East,
Ambassador Palmer told the Libyans that the United States was making
genuine efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of which Israeli
withdrawal from Arab lands was a part. Palmer was told by Libyan
officials that, if there were a change in U.S. Middle Eastern policy
or general improvement in the Middle East situation, relations could
improve.
In addition to Libya’s strident and disruptive Middle East policy and
the difficulty of establishing effective communication with the
Libyan Government, other significant factors had a negative effect
on U.S.-Libyan relations: (1) almost continuous high-level Libyan
attacks and denunciations of U.S. policies; (2) Libyan support for
Palestinian guerrillas and terrorists through the provision of arms,
funds, and training; (3) Libyan support for subversion or insurgency
against countries which, in Libya’s view, were not sufficiently
militant on the Arab-Israeli issue, were tolerant of U.S. or Soviet
influence, or were engaged in suppressing armed Palestinian or
Muslim movements within their territories; (4) the termination in
February 1972 of nine bilateral agree
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ments between the United States and Libya;5 (5) the Libyan-directed reduction
in July 1972, despite U.S. protests, in the number of personnel on
the U.S. Embassy staff;6 and
(6) the Libyan announcement in October 1972 that, effective January
1, 1973, Libya would not recognize passports of any foreign
government unless, in addition to the official language of the
specific country, the pertinent information was written in
Arabic.7
As regards the reduction in the Embassy staff, the Libyans said that
it was an effort to curtail and to control what the Libyans referred
to as “non-diplomatic activities” of the Embassy staff and also
because of Libyan dissatisfaction over the 1972 U.S. refusals to
allow the export to Libya of C–130 aircraft contracted and paid for
by the Libyan Government or the purchase of F–5 fighter
aircraft.8
1972–1973 Assessments. In late 1972,
Ambassador Palmer concluded that there was no utility in remaining,
and Washington agreed. Following his departure, other negative
developments took place, including: an attempt to shoot down an
unarmed USAF C–130 reconnaissance
plane;9 the
partial nationalization of American oil companies; the refusal by
the Libyan Government to allow the Embassy’s Economic Officer back
into Libya because his passport was not translated into Arabic; and
declaring persona non grata the Political
Officer who protested the exclusion of the Economic Officer. These
events led to a high-level U.S. assessment of U.S. relations with
Libya, an evaluation of prospects for their improvement, and a
review of options available to protect U.S. interests in Libya.10
In early 1973, we decided to maintain diplomatic relations with Libya
and to maintain an official presence in Tripoli headed by a Charge;
but not to appoint an Ambassador. Our reasons were based on the
following policy concerns: (1) to endeavor to remain in
communication with governments with which the United States had
serious disagreements; (2) to be in a position to help counter
Libya’s disruptive political activism in the Middle East, Africa,
and elsewhere, while
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encouraging any possible constructive role that oil-rich Libya might
be able to play on the international scene; (3) to help protect the
large remaining private U.S. stake in the Libyan oil industry and
the contribution which that investment made to the U.S. balance of
payments; (4) to help ensure continued U.S. and Western European
access to Libyan oil; (5) to be able to assist approximately 2,800
American citizens living in Libya; (6) to maintain some contact with
the Libyan populace; (7) to retain the ability to gather
intelligence on Libya; and (8) to be in a position to exploit any
change in the Libyan Government.
Relations in the Wake of the Downgrading of
Representation. Relations following Ambassador Palmer’s
departure did not improve. For almost two years they were marked by
additional nationalizations of American oil companies and attendant
unsettled claims, refusal to pay compensation for nationalized and
damaged U.S. Government property, difficulties with the passport and
governmental access problems, opposition to U.S. Middle East peace
efforts, support for terrorism, and the 1973–1974 oil embargo.
A Turning Point (1974–1975). In late 1974 the
Libyans began to profess a desire for improved relations in an
effort to lessen dependence on the Soviet Union, to obtain access to
U.S. military goods and technology (in particular, to gain release
of the C–130s), and to regain international status and
respectability. In April 1975 the Libyan Government informed the
United States that it wished to post an Ambassador in Washington and
that it had lifted the ceiling on U.S. Embassy personnel in
Tripoli.11
We decided in May to accept Libya’s proposal to send an Ambassador to
Washington and to raise the ceiling on our respective personnel in
Washington and Tripoli pending consultations with Egyptian President
Sadat, but not to send an
Ambassador to Tripoli. The reaction by President Sadat and Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister Fahmy was
negative. Sadat said that the
proposed action would vitiate the positive reaction to his meeting
at Salzburg with President Ford.12 (Qadhafi had criticized Sadat for attending.) It would be
viewed in Egypt and the Arab world as a slap at him and as a lack of
concern about Qadhafi’s
attacks against Sadat and
against the opening of the Suez Canal and about Qadhafi’s subversive activities in
Egypt. Fahmy expressed
concern that it would be viewed in the Arab world as a U.S.
endorsement of Libya’s recent arms deal with the Soviet Union.
In July 1975, we informed the Libyan Chargé in Washington that the
United States reciprocated the Libyan desire for better official
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relations but better
relations required a common understanding about the dialogue we
might conduct.13 The U.S. did not ask other countries
to agree with all of its policies as a condition for good relations.
The problem was not that Libya disagreed with U.S. policy but that
it actively opposed and sought to undermine U.S. efforts toward a
peace settlement in the Middle East and that Libya criticized other
countries in the region who were cooperating with the United States.
Because Libya had continued to undermine the search for peace and to
give assistance and refuge to terrorists, relations at the
Ambassadorial level would have to await a general improvement in
relations.
The 1976–1978 Period. In the period from 1976
to 1978, our Chargé established a relationship with Col. Qadhafi’s immediate staff and was
able, from time to time, to make representations to senior officials
on various issues. Nonetheless, Libyan support for terrorist groups
continued and the relationship with Egypt—already poor—was
completely broken. Qadhafi’s
Government was directly implicated in an attempt to assassinate
President Sadat in early 1977
and this, plus a series of incidents along the already troubled
Libyan-Egyptian border, led to a brief border war in July of
1977.14
Sadat’s 1977 visit to
Jerusalem completed the breakdown and by early 1978 Libyan policy
and propaganda had become virulently anti-Sadat.
Aircraft Policies. Although we had
consistently blocked the sale of such military aircraft as C–130s
and F–5s, we had, since the early 1970s, permitted the sale of
non-military commercial aircraft such as Boeing 727s and 707s. In
early 1978, however, we opposed the sale of two additional Boeing
727s to Libya (nine previous sales had been approved since
1973).15 This action was taken because of
our concern over Libyan support for terrorist groups as well as over
the extent to which Libya had become embroiled in confrontations
with neighboring states such as Chad and Egypt. This decision
greatly increased tensions. In the months following this decision,
however, there was at least the impression that Libya was “cleaning
up its act.” The style of Libyan support for terrorist groups had
been changed. Financial support and training continued, but Libya
stretched out the period in which it avoided direct involvement in
the planning or execution of international terrorist incidents. In
October of 1978, Libya ratified the Hague Convention, the most
important of the three international conventions on hijacking (Libya
had ratified the Montreal Convention in 1974 and the Tokyo
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Convention in 1976). These
and other factors, coupled with a well argued economic case by the
Commerce Department in June 1978, led to a reversal of the
Department’s position on the 727s in November of 1978, after we had
secured written Libyan assurances that these aircraft would be
strictly for civil use.16
Other 1978 Developments. On the political
front, U.S. contacts with Libya became more frequent. U.S.
representatives were received at senior levels both at the Foreign
Ministry and at the newly-created Foreign Liaison Office, headed by
Shahati. Under Secretary Newsom, in a meeting on October 18, 1978 with Libyan
Foreign Secretary Ali ’Abd al-Salam
al-Turayki, said that the Administration recognized
that there had been positive developments, such as the accession to
the hijacking convention and the settlement of nationalization
cases.17 He said that the Congress was
being kept informed of these matters and that the Administration
would keep in mind the possibility of normalizing relations. The
Under Secretary said, however, that Libya’s image with the Congress
and the U.S. public as a supporter for terrorists and a meddler in
the affairs of other nations would have to improve before this could
take place.
Thereafter we explored possibilities of persuading Libya to take a
public stance against international terrorism.
The 1979 Turning Point. In early 1979 we were
cautiously optimistic that some improvement in relations with Libya
was at last possible. In January Ahmed Shahati, head of the Libyan
Foreign Liaison Office, came to the United States as head of a
Libyan People-to-People delegation with the expressed purpose of
working to improve Libya’s image in the United States and eventually
to establish better relations between Washington and Tripoli. On
January 11, 1979 he told Under Secretary Newsom prior to his U.S. tour that
he hoped that 1979 could be the “turning point” in relations between
the two countries.18 During
the week prior to that meeting, as an extension of its decision to
allow the resumption of commercial aircraft sales to Libya, the
Department had informed Commerce that it would have no objection to
the sale of three Boeing 747s to Libyan Arab Airlines (with the same
specific proscriptions against military use as were applied to the
two 727s).
The 747 decision, however, attracted Congressional criticism. The
revelation in March of 1979 that Libya had used a part of its Boeing
727 fleet (there is no evidence that the two 727s under specific
restric
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tions were ever
used) to ferry troops and military supplies to support the Idi Amin
regime greatly increased Congressional opposition to the export of
747 aircraft.
Our policy since the early 1970s was to prevent the sale to Libya of
any U.S. manufactured items with direct or significant military
value. Once commercial civil aviation aircraft had been used for
military purposes, we believed that we had no alternative but to
apply that policy to the 747 aircraft. Accordingly, in May of 1979,
we recommended to the Commerce Department that the export of these
aircraft not be allowed. The Libyans were furious.19
Shortly after the decision on the 747s, Under Secretary Newsom in Tripoli met in June with
Major Jallud.20 (At that point Jallud had no
definable position in the Libyan Government, but he was regarded as
second only to Qadhafi in the
Libyan hierarchy). The talks with Jallud were frank, but promising;
both sides expressed an interest in finding a way to work out a modus vivendi in which we could “agree to
disagree” on some of these issues and look for points of similarity
on others.
The results of this meeting, though inconclusive, were sufficiently
promising so that a decision was made to arrange a similar meeting
between Secretary Vance and
Libyan Foreign Minister Turayki during the UN General Assembly sessions in October of 1979.21 As with the meeting between Newsom and Jallud, many points of
disagreement were discussed. A specific decision, however, was
reached to formalize the dialogue between the United States and
Libya and to arrange a series of meetings in which both points of
disagreement and areas for cooperation could be identified and
discussed. To this end Turayki designated Libyan U.N. Ambassador
Kikhia as his representative for these discussions and Secretary
Vance appointed Under
Secretary Newsom as the U.S.
representative.
The first meeting between Newsom and Kikhia occurred on November 8, 1979.22 It was agreed that a series of
meetings between Libyan and American representatives would be held
to discuss trade and cultural exchanges as well as political issues.
Newsom particularly
thanked Kikhia for his helpful position in the UN on the question of the U.S. hostages
in Iran and the Libyan Ambassador’s message to Secretary General
Waldheim calling for the
release of the hostages.23
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(Note: Libya did not at
that point have diplomatic relations with Iran. The Iranians
believed that Libya had been responsible for the death of the
Iranian-born Lebanese Shii’a leader, Imam Musa Sadr; an earlier
fence-mending visit to Tehran by Major Jallud had been cut short and
Jallud reportedly had been ordered out of the country at the
instructions of the Ayatollah Khomeini.)
The Embassy Burning. Momentum generated by
Ambassador Kikhia’s helpful position on the hostages, strengthened
by a November 22 Libyan Foreign Ministry statement also calling for
the release of the hostages, began to be off-set by Qadhafi’s overriding identification
with the Iranians in their confrontations with the U.S. The
ambivalence came to a halt on December 2, 1979.24 On that day, a Tripoli mob demonstrating in
support of the Iranian revolution attacked and badly damaged the
United States Embassy in Tripoli. Reports in the aftermath of the
attack indicated that it had been carried out with the full
knowledge and consent of the highest levels of the Libyan
Government, and suggested that it was part of an ongoing (though
still unsuccessful) attempt to curry favor with the Iranians.
Immediately after this attack, our efforts concentrated on getting
the Libyans inter alia: to accept
responsibility for failing to provide adequate security for the
Embassy; to agree to compensation for damages; and, most important,
to give assurances about the security of official and non-official
U.S. citizens in Libya.25 Though extracted
slowly, by early January 1980 such assurances were in hand and
attention was then given to next steps.
In mid-January 1980, our Chargé returned to Tripoli, taking with him
a message from President Carter which made it clear inter
alia that the United States expected the Libyan Government
to provide security for our personnel—but also held the door open
for a resumption of the dialogue we had tried to foster in
1979.26 He was instructed to seek an appointment with
Qadhafi, so as to assure
future access to senior Libyan levels.
While our Chargé awaited unsuccessfully for an appointment with
Qadhafi, it became
apparent that the January 27, 1980 commando attack on Gafsa in
Tunisia had been planned and financed by the Libyans. Tripoli
reacted to French and U.S. aid to Tunisia in the wake of that attack
with a violent propaganda barrage directed against both countries.
On February 4, 1980, both the French Embassy in Tripoli and the
French Consulate General in Benghazi were attacked by officially
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inspired mobs. In light of
that attack it was decided to withdraw our Chargé from Tripoli; he
departed on February 8.27
Confrontations. In March of 1980, a Libyan
campaign of intimidation and assassination—directed against Libyan
students and dissidents abroad—began (thus far nine Libyans have
been murdered in Europe). In the U.S., there has been extensive
evidence of intimidation, but thus far no murders. In early May, at
the time the Libyans were notified we were expelling four members of
the staff of their People’s Bureau (which replaced their embassy on
September 1, 1979), the Department withdrew the last two American
officers from Tripoli and closed the Embassy.28 (Six Libyan diplomats in all were expelled in
this period.)
After the expulsion of the People’s Bureau members, which came close
to producing a total rupture in relations, we were able to come to a
mutually acceptable arrangement with the Libyan Mission and its
status has now been effectively regularized. We have, however,
informed the Libyan Government that—while their People’s Bureau in
Washington need not be affected—we do not at this point plan to send
American personnel back to Tripoli. The Libyans have been told that
we have asked the Belgians to represent our interests in Tripoli for
the time being.29 The Department and the Belgian Embassy in Tripoli
now await Libyan concurrence for this arrangement to become
effective. We have, however, told the Libyans that this need only be
a short term arrangement and that, depending on Libyan actions over
the coming period, we remain prepared eventually to reopen the
Embassy in Tripoli.
Summation of U.S. Contacts with Libya. In the
early period of the Libyan Revolution, United States contacts with
Libyan officials were at such low levels that this became a major
factor in the decision to not appoint a successor to Ambassador
Palmer in early 1973. By the mid-70s, however, though operating at
the Chargé level both in Washington and Tripoli, contacts had
stabilized at the working level and both Libyan and U.S. diplomats
were routinely meeting at the Country Director and Deputy Assistant
Secretary level.
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The October 1978 meeting between Under Secretary Newsom and Libyan Foreign Minister
Turayki was the highest level meeting between U.S. and Libyan
officials to that point, and set the stage for subsequent meetings.
High ranking Libyan officials met with Mr. Newsom and—in the specific case of
the second meeting with Turayki—with Secretary Vance. Contacts with the Embassy
continued normally at the Country Director and Deputy Assistant
Secretary level.
With the creation of the People’s Bureau in September 1979, contacts
between the Department and the new People’s Committee Secretary
continued on the same basis as that which had existed with the
Embassy. The Bureau was told, however, that such contacts would be
“informal” and “unofficial” until the diplomatic status of People’s
Bureau members was resolved (their diplomatic status was determined
in an April 24, 1980 Department of State Diplomatic Note).30
