Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

101. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Tripoli, June 17, 1979

PARTICIPANTS

• Major Abd al-Salam Jallud, No. 2 to Colonel Qadhafi
• Ali Abd al-Salam al-Turayki, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Taj al-Din Jarbi, Director of American Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Mr. Zaghar, Chef de Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Under Secretary David B. Newsom
• Charge William Eagleton
• Richard L. Jackson

SUBJECT

• 1. Libyan-U.S. Relations
• 2. Middle East

Jallud welcomed Under Secretary Newsom’s mission because of his knowledge of Libya and the opportunity this presents for relations between the two countries.

Newsom noted evidence of progress and change in the decade since his departure,² particularly in the airport, port, and new roads. Newsom commented on his travels within Libya as Ambassador and congratulated Qadhafi and Jallud on the progress made.

Jallud expressed thanks to President Carter for the creative initiative of the Newsom visit. As a result, Libya immediately welcomed the request for a mission. Libya believes in dialogue and contacts in a small and interdependent world. If we do not face the problems of the world as one united family, we cannot overcome them. Although we may laugh at propaganda against Libya in the United States media, Newsom can see for himself the progress that has been made. As he can see, the U.S. media does not reflect the true picture. Although he is satisfied that Newsom as a former U.S. Ambassador to Libya will help the mission, he would also welcome other converts to the Libyan side. In the Arab tradition, he welcomed his guests and asked to hear Newsom’s views.

Newsom acknowledged Jallud’s welcome to him personally and to the mission. As explained earlier to Turayki, the Jamahiriyah has conveyed in various ways its desire for better relations with the U.S. via Turayki’s visit, the Shahati trip, and other visits.³ Most recently, Marshall Tito, after his visit to Tripoli, conveyed to the President Qadhafi’s comments about lack of sufficient contact with the U.S.⁴ The President, therefore, thought it would be useful to have this visit and explore Libya’s views. We are very appreciative of such a quick response through Charge d’Affaires Madfai and hope that it will be possible to see Colonel Qadhafi. Looking at the recent history of our relations, it has been nearly nine years since a senior U.S. official had the opportunity to speak with Qadhafi and hear his views on Libyan policy. That is too long a time.

We have many important bilateral interests. Our people have worked closely with Libyans for many years in the development of Libya. We have appreciated its continuing hospitality to our citizens in Libya. We have important trade relations and support the development of Libya. We also genuinely support the continued independence of Arab nations. We have differences, however, and I am here to discuss these candidly. As Major Jallud said, the impression of Libya conveyed by the media may not be fully accurate, such as the impression of its support for movements around the world which some regard as linked to terrorism. There is certainly some exaggeration in this, and many do not understand Libya’s commitment to the Palestinian and liberation movements. It would help to know how Major Jallud sees Libya’s role in this part of the world and relations with Egypt and the Palestinians in the context of its active policies in both the Middle East and Africa.

Jallud interjected that, as far as he knew from a prior briefing by Secretary-General Turayki and what he had heard, he concluded that Newsom wanted only to hear his views and discuss possibilities of dialogue. Newsom carried no concrete proposal.

Newsom replied that his mission was to continue the dialogue and to explore problems on the basis of his knowledge of Libya. Jallud’s comments would be helpful, and he would report to the President the Major’s expression of current Libyan policies and concerns. They would be most helpful in reaching decisions to be made in our bilateral and broader relations. Foreign Secretary Turayki has visited us in Washington, Charge Eagleton is in touch with Foreign Ministry officials, and we have read many declarations by Libya’s leadership. He could also convey from his experience here the deep emotions of Libya’s people on Palestine and their deep sensitivities on questions of sovereignty and liberty, but there is no substitute for direct expression by Libya’s leaders to someone in touch with the President and Secretary. The whole question of efforts to bring peace in the Middle East rests on the rights of the Palestinians and the role of countries of the area in this process. It is of utmost importance to President Carter. While we can keep bilateral and other issues separate, a clear understanding of Libya’s policies is necessary in order to deal with a variety of attitudes, some hostile toward Libya, in Washington.

Jallud commented that, although dialogue is desirable, he would like to express regret, since he had expected to hear concrete proposals from President Carter. Libya should have been in the position of a listener. Since the mission is to have a dialogue and exchange ideas, he would, however, express his views. In spite of big differences between us, since 1969 Libya has never said no to a dialogue. While we cannot separate bilateral from general relations involving the destiny of Arab nations and Libya, we believe that improvement in bilateral relations would be a desirable step.

He clarified that recent discussions with Tito in Tripoli focused on non-alignment in general, rather than relations with the U.S. Libyans believe, however, that opposition by the U.S. does not help their position of non-alignment. Since Tito’s visit preceded the Havana Summit,⁵ they discussed non-alignment and the NAM in general. They informed Tito that present U.S. policies do not help Libya to continue its non-aligned position. In fact, to the extent that the U.S. has bilateral relations with smaller non-aligned countries, it will affect their overall position of non-alignment. Libyans believe that third-world countries all desire to be non-aligned. In the final analysis, when you have a strong enemy pushing you to the wall and cannot withstand the pressure, it will force you to be aligned in order to fight for your own survival. This is not particular to Libya, but is a general principle. The question Libyans ask is what the U.S. wants vis-a-vis bilateral relations. Libyans are not the kind of people to be affected by pressure.

During the last ten years of the revolution, Libya was the underdog in relations with the U.S. while the latter continued a favorable commercial exchange. Libya was subjected to a situation which was not to its advantage. Now, it must take a stand and start to think. It must review the situation and state that it cannot continue as the underdog with U.S. interests safeguarded and Libya’s interests victimized. It is essential that relations be on a reciprocal basis. Libya does not care about profit and loss. It is a matter of principle and dignity. After the revolution, when Libya nationalized some oil, it ran the risk of a boycott and loss of markets for what it believed was the correct position.

The Libyans feel that the U.S. people, the President, Cy Vance, Newsom, and all assistants will understand that the Libyan people will not allow this situation to continue and will pressure the government to change its attitude to the U.S. when they see the simple fact that transport aircraft, already paid for and with Libyan markings, have been undelivered since 1972 and commercial Boeing aircraft have been embargoed.⁶ On one hand, Libyans see constant provocation by the U.S. and, on the other, a lenient stand by Libya which denigrates its national revolutionary stand. Libyans are not traders and bargainers. As politicians, they assign their treatment by the U.S. its moral, not material, value. It seems as if Libyans always offer smiles to the U.S.

We would like to seize this opportunity to convey to President Carter and responsible people in the U.S. that the time has come for the U.S. to end its boycott and respect commitments and signed agreements. If the U.S. had rejected the sale before signature of a contract it would be different. We cannot stand by while you put an embargo on the Boeings.

In approaching this question, we look to the U.S. government, not Congress. It is obvious that when Americans and Congress were against Vietnam, the number of troops there reached one million and aircraft 1,000. Tomorrow Carter will sign the SALT treaty. The President has already acted on Rhodesia. Nixon acted on Vietnam. We think after Newsom’s visit the U.S. should release the C–130s and Boeings. Then we can think of improving relations. It cannot be one sided.

Newsom explained that, even though Congress is deeply involved and the American public has definite opinions, he represented the President’s own special concerns and would be very frank. There are very few things today of such overriding importance to the President as peace in the Middle East with recognition and restoration of Palestinian rights in the West Bank and Gaza. The President has decided on pursuing this and means it. There are two routes to a solution. The Rejectionist States see a solution only through armed struggle. We find serious dangers in this approach and cannot foresee success by any of the parties involved. It would be a grave risk to peace. The only other route is through negotiations, and Camp David is based on two phases. The first was the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the second is self-determination for the Palestinians. We are now involved in the second stage. We do not link this to the question of aircraft but from the President’s standpoint the attitude of states toward the peace process is an important element in his considerations. As we told Turayki, we have had messages from other states participating at Baghdad.⁷ While they oppose Camp David, they have acknowledged that they would take another look and not actively oppose American methods if through the negotiations we can achieve benefits for the Palestinians.

The impression of the President and of Congress about Libya is that it actively opposes the efforts of Camp David and is seeking to undermine Sadat. In so doing, Libya is actively opposing something of great importance to President Carter. If Major Jallud or Colonel Qadhafi were in a position to provide an expression of understanding for what President Carter is attempting to do, even if they do not agree with it, this would be helpful in our overall relations with Libya.

Jallud responded that U.S. policy would make a big mistake if it believed that Libya would link small bilateral problems with general policy in the Arab world. If Libya engaged in a dialogue, linking bilateral relations with its general position regarding the Middle East, it would be lost in a sea of sand. It is impossible for Libya to change its attitude or policies in regard to the U.S. stand on the Palestinian issue and non-friendly attitude toward the Arab nation. The Newsom mission immediately follows a Palestinian meeting in Tripoli concerning the Palestinian revolution.⁸ During that conference, the Palestinians and Arab countries rejected any idea of others having a mandate to act for them. The Palestinian issue cannot be considered in the absence of the Palestinians themselves.

Newsom asked if the conference communique represented Palestinian policy or was also the Libyan view. If it represented Libya’s policy, it would be very difficult to explain paragraph 23 of the communique calling for liquidation of all American economic and political interests in the Arab world. Such a statement comes at a time when President Carter has risked his political position and made greater efforts than any previous U.S. president to help the Palestinians.

Jallud responded that the communique was both Palestinian and Libyan policy. What did the U.S. expect from people victimized in both bilateral and multilateral issues? Did we expect that when one party drops a bomb the other offers sweets to eat?

Newsom pointed out that the President is presently being attacked for statements he has made on behalf of the Palestinians and for efforts he is making to restrict Jewish resettlement and bombing attacks in southern Lebanon.

We have considered the sale of C–130 and 747 aircraft with cargo configurations to a country which has already used two American commercial aircraft to support military operations in Uganda and has now subscribed to a declaration on liquidation of American interests in the Arab and Islamic world. The President must consider if it is in our interest to provide additional capacity to a country which seems dedicated to erasing American interests in this part of the world.

Jallud responded that, after ten years of attempting not to change its policy, Libya might be forced to do so in response to the U.S. position. Did the U.S. expect to be saluted after placing an embargo on civilian aircraft? Interest in improving relations should come from both sides. We are, however, far apart on this issue. We did not expect the U.S. to change its position.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 1–12/79. Secret; Nodis. Approved by Jackson on June 21. The meeting took place in Major Jallud’s office.
2. Newsom served as Ambassador to Libya from 1965 until 1969.
3. For Turayki’s October 21, 1978, meeting with Newsom in New York, see Document 96. In telegram 43325 to Tripoli, February 21, the Department provided a detailed account of Saunders’s February 10 meeting with Shahati. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790081–0037)
4. Telegram 4413 from Belgrade, June 14, transmitted the text of Tito’s letter to Carter in which he summarized his visits to Algeria and Libya: “On the occasion of (my) recent visit to Libya, Col. Qadhafi acquainted me about the state of American-Libyan relations. On that occasion Col. Qadhafi expressed desire and readiness for improvement of relations with the United States of America and he told me that his previous efforts in this direction have not met with a corresponding response.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790268–0977) Vance transmitted Carter’s response in telegram Secto 5019 to Belgrade, June 18. Carter wrote: “I would like better relations with Libya although there are many constraints on our ability to improve our relationship with President Qadhafi because of the policies he has adopted in Africa and the Middle East.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790279–0730)
5. The Sixth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Havana September 3–9.
6. The Deparment instructed the Embassy in telegram 133068 to Tripoli, May 24, to inform the Libyan Government that Vance had decided to ask the Commerce Department not to approve the export of the 747s. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880110–1195, D790237–0275) Eagleton reported the Libyan response in telegram 840 from Tripoli, May 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790241–0213)
7. Foreign Ministers from 18 Arab states and PLO representatives, meeting in Baghdad March 27–31 after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, resolved to suspend diplomatic relations with Egypt, impose an extensive diplomatic and economic boycott on Egypt, suspend Egyptian membership in the Arab League, and move the Arab League headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. The text of the Baghdad resolutions is printed in Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1979, pp. 29952–29953. For more information on the meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document 236.
8. In telegram 154537 to multiple posts, June 15, the Department summarized the June 14 meeting in Tripoli. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790272–0467)