203. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State1
16228. Subject: Under Secretary Newsom’s Meeting With Tunisian Prime Minister: Libya, Arab League, Peace Process.
1. (C–Entire text)
2. Summary: Under Secretary Newsom and Prime Minister Nouira met June 18 in Tunis for review of Newsom’s visit to Tripoli and exchange of views on bilateral relations with Libya, intra-Arab dynamics including Tunisia’s augmented role in Arab League, and status and prospects for peace process—especially on Palestinian issue. Under Secretary was accompanied by Ambassador Bosworth; Prime Minister by Acting Foreign Minister Sahbani, Presidential Counselor Habib Bourguiba, Jr., and Ambassador Hedda. Responding to Under Secre [Page 490] tary’s exposition, Nouira emphasized coolness in GOT-Libyan relations and indicated both support for U.S. export ban on aircraft for Libya and skepticism that Qadhafi would embargo oil exports to USA. He said GOT had not sought Arab League headquarters and assured Under Secretary that GOT would not let it affect U.S.-Tunisian relations. Under Secretary stressed even-handed USG approach to Arab-Israeli dispute and hope that moderate Arabs would avoid positions exacerbating relations with Egypt and rendering difficult positive response to progress in peace process. Nouira reiterated suggestion for formula to meet Palestinian requests for participation in process. Under Secretary expressed appreciation for GOT role as “bridge” within and outside world. Both stressed value of continuing frank exchanges between the two governments. End summary.
2. Under Secretary explained that President Carter and Secretary Vance had asked him to visit Tripoli to discuss U.S.-Libyan relations following GOL messages conveyed in various ways and most recently through Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia.2 Under Secretary had been asked to take opportunity also to visit Rome for general discussions with Italian Government and Vatican. He was happy also to visit Tunis, this being first such opportunity since 1976. Under Secretary said U.S. was conscious of Tunisia’s more central position now in Arab world and confident that U.S.-Tunisian relations would remain close.
4. Prime Minister responded that Tunisia finds it difficult to communicate with Libya even on bilateral matters. He supposed Libyans would have suggested to Under Secretary that if USG will not sell Boeing 747’s to Libya, Libya might withhold petroleum sales to United States. He expressed skepticism Libya in fact would take such action. He noted that in context of erratic Libyan policy one could observe two constants. Qadhafi had not as yet interfered with petroleum or banks. Apparently he realized these two sectors were essential to his purposes. Nouira suggested Libya had no legitimate need for 747 aircraft for commercial service. Given importance of U.S. oil market to Libya, he doubted Qadhafi would embargo exports to the United States.
5. Nouira added that for first time one could note organized opposition to Qadhafi, centered in a European country abroad. Opposition was beginning to act; Qadhafi faced trouble ahead.
6. In respect to Tunisia’s role in Arab League, Nouira said, Under Secretary should be reassured that relations with United States remained constant; they would not be affected by Tunisia’s host of Arab League. In fact, GOT had not sought this role. It had only reluc [Page 491] tantly been persuaded by other Arab states to accept it. Baghdad decision to exclude Egypt from all Arab organizations was being implemented, but not precisely as reported in Egyptian press. There were distortions in reporting, for instance in respect to recent OAU agricultural meeting in Tunisia. In any event, USG should rest assured that Tunisia was and would remain the same both geographically and politically.
7. Under Secretary reviewed his conversations in Libya with Foreign Minister Turayki and Major Jallud. Perhaps because he did not carry a more specific response on the 747 question, Qadhafi remained unavailable. He was said to be in Sirte. Newsom said primary Libyan desire appeared to be to discuss aircraft export ban. He explained that ban resulted from Libyan use of commercial aircraft in support of military operations in Uganda. Libyans made clear their own perception that U.S. action was “punishment”. They in turn were considering reprisals, possibly affecting petroleum exports to the USA.
8. Newsom explained to Libyans that their support for Amin and for militant groups from Northern Ireland to South Africa led the U.S. Government, backed by the Congress, to believe U.S. should take no action—such as aircraft exports—that would enhance Libyan ability to intervene abroad. Jallud indicated support for “liberation movements” abroad remained integral part of Libya’s foreign policy. Under Secretary gave Libyans no hope for a change in U.S. decision on aircraft export. Nevertheless, Libyans indicated they still attribute importance to relations with the U.S. It was not yet clear whether they would take reprisal action and, if so, what type of action.
9. Libyans also raised question of U.S. military sales to Egypt; Under Secretary explained these were not unusual or alarming under present circumstances. He made clear to Libyans that USG would favor neither Egyptian military action against Libya nor Libyan action against Egypt.
10. Re peace process, Under Secretary said he found GOL attitude uncompromising. Jallud voiced Libyan attitude toward PLO, emphasizing PLO must include all factions and indicating Libyan support of Arafat as mainstream Palestinian voice was assured only as long as he remained representative of various Palestinian factions and “true interests of the Palestinian people.” Prime Minister Nouira commented that Arafat and Libya were not closely aligned and that Arafat—certainly not the only possibility for Palestinian leadership—represents moderate sentiment compared with other factional leaders such as Jelil and Hawatma (Sahbani also mentioned Habash).
11. Prime Minister felt USG, in deploying diplomatic resources, should devote more attention to working with the Arab moderates—the agnostics on peace process that was promisingly launched at Camp [Page 492] David. He said GOT had the benefit of the personal interpretations of Presidents Carter and Sadat, for instance in respect to Palestinian autonomy question. These, however, appeared to be at complete variance with that of Prime Minster Begin, which, he said, was completely out of line with international law. Begin apparently wished to exploit fact that U.S. was moving into election year.
12. Under Secretary responded that it was a tragedy that Arab opposition inhibited Palestinian participation in negotiations. This may well lead Israelis to believe that, since Egypt stood alone, they need make no concessions. He suggested Palestinians and moderate Arabs could change face of peace process by showing willingness to participate in negotiations. Whether or not it was politically realistic, it was a fact. Prime Minister acknowledged Under Secretary’s logic, though it was only an assumption.
13. Under Secretary spoke of negotiations getting under way in Alexandria and Haifa which, so far, had been caught up mainly in procedural questions. One of these, however, was not unimportant. Israelis were asking for better definition of U.S. role as “full partner” in the talks. It seemed Israelis wished to diminish U.S. role, while Egyptians and U.S. thought it important that we remain a principal player. Under Secretary commented it was hard to credit the charge of some Arab states that USG is allied with Israel when in fact latter resists U.S. role in negotiations.
14. Under Secretary proceeded to outline issues USG realizes are essential to make formula on Palestinian autonomy acceptable to Arabs. These include settlements, land and water rights, Palestinian participation, and ultimately, Jerusalem. He acknowledged USG had heavy responsibility in negotiations and wants Arab world to know we accept this responsibility.
15. We know attitudes of Arab governments and difficulty of their giving open support for our efforts. However, we do want these governments (a) to understand what we are trying to do, (b) to have confidence in the genuineness of our efforts, and (c) to recognize our real interest in the rights of Palestinian people. We want them to be ready and able to join with us in peace process when we show we can produce results.
16. We also hope to minimize intra-Arab tensions. We hope Arab-Egyptian relations will not be made intolerable, that Egyptian-Saudi relations will be stabilized. We hope intra-Arab relations will not so deteriorate as to bar acceptance of negotiations when they show results. We will make every effort to keep Tunisian Government informed and, as always, will value Tunisia’s advice and counsel. We know Tunisia has long been important as a bridge between factions in Arab world, as well as a means of interface and articulation of Arab views to other peoples. Nouira expressed appreciation of Under Secretary’s exposition and his concern with Tunisian views.
[Page 493]17. Under Secretary asked if Prime Minister saw a nuance in Syrian position—especially that of President Assad—which would distinguish it from those of Iraq and Libya. Nouira agreed such a nuance existed even though President Assad had little room to maneuver. Re question of U.S. relations with PLO, Newsom said U.S. aware from indirect contacts of position of PLO. U.S. continued to require that PLO accept existence of Israel and 2423 as condition for direct talks. Recent PLO positions have been equivocal. Nouira said that despite his close PLO contacts he could not define PLO position. Much of problem seemed to center on PLO acceptance of Resolution 242. He thought an answer might lie with recognition of Israel with its implied, modified or amended language going beyond 242’s reference to Palestinians as mere refugees to recognition of their rights as people. Prime Minister suggested USG might meet political requirements of PLO by combining essence of Resolution 242 with elements of declarations made jointly with Tunisian, Japanese and Soviet Governments. These declarations, he said, had been tacitly accepted—or better—by PLO leaders.
18. Under Secretary expressed interest in views and ideas articulated by Prime Minister and said he would transmit these to Secy of State Vance. Close contact would be maintained with Tunisian Government through the American Ambassador in Tunis. Prime Minister agreed on value of continuing contact and asked Under Secretary to convey his best regards to President Carter and Secretary of State Vance.
19. Department repeat as desired.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790279–0109. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Tunis.↩
- For Newsom’s discussion with Jallud and Turayki in Tripoli, see Document 101. For Tito’s June 13 letter to Carter, see footnote 4, Document 101.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 198.↩