96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya1
267504. Subject: Acting Secretary Newsom’s Meeting With Libyan Foreign Secretary Turayki.
1. Summary. Luncheon meeting focused primarily on bilateral relations. Issue of a joint statement on terrorism, which earlier had been discussed informally as a possible precondition for movement toward normalization of relations, did not arise, as each side restated familiar positions on terrorism. Newsom told Turayki frankly that Libya’s image with Congress and public as supporter of terrorists and meddler in affairs of other nations would have to improve before political relations could become more normal. Turayki reiterated desire for better relations without holding out any promise that Libya would change its policies to facilitate this process. Exchanges on Middle East and Africa broke little new ground. Despite sharp disagreements, meeting was cordial. Discussion on Western Sahara reported septel.2 End summary.
2. Meeting was held as a result of an earlier discussion between Newsom and Libyan PermRep Kikhya.3 At the request of the Libyans, who were fearful that press would describe them as coming cap in hand to Washington to seek an improvement in relations, no public announcement was made of the meeting. In response to Libyans’ request for an informal exchange, meeting was conducted over lunch, and Newsom spent almost two hours with Turayki, who was accompanied by Charge Madfa’i and a notetaker from the Embassy. Although there had been previous discussion with the Libyans about the possibility that a joint statement on terrorism might be published as a step toward more normal bilateral political relations, it quickly became apparent this was not in the cards, and the subject was not raised.
[Page 236]3. Discussion opened rather slowly with an exchange on Southern Africa focused largely on press accounts. When Newsom asked about Libya’s relations with Chad, Turayki said problems remain but his government is in touch with the Sudanese and Nigerians. After more rather general remarks about South Asia and the state of King Khalid’s health, Newsom engaged Turayki on bilateral relations by commenting that recent Arab-American Dialogue in Tripoli served a particularly useful function, given the limits on what could be accomplished on a government to government basis. Elaborating, he explained that Libya’s image with the Congress as a supporter of terrorist groups inevitably puts restrictions on what the US Government will do vis a vis Libya.
4. Turayki responded that his government wanted “at least” normal relations with the US and felt the US emphasis on terrorism was an attempt to make Libya a scapegoat for its Middle East policies. When he suggested distinction between terrorists and liberation fighters, Newsom said that impression exists in US that Libya supplies funds and arms to groups which engage for whatever motive in acts which result in loss of innocent lives. Moreover, Libyans, or individuals trained in Libya, had been involved in incidents such as those at Orly and Istanbul airports, and in the assassination of US diplomats, which had no direct relation with the attainment of national liberation. Turayki responded that some liberation fighters trained in Libya might misuse their training, but Americans trained by US Army sometimes use their military skills to commit crimes. Libya is not responsible for everything done by those trained in Libya and agrees that some of these activities are not related to liberation and deserve condemnation. Newsom replied that while US realizes and has informed interested members of the Congress that Libya has acceded to the international conventions on hijacking, he did not remember Libya ever having condemned a terrorist attack at an airport.
5. Shifting ground, Turayki said that while his government is interested in dialogue with the US, it would not respond to pressure. He characterized US decisions on trucks and planes as pressure, stating these decisions had been made by the administration, not the Congress. Newsom pointed out that decisions made by the administration must recognize attitudes within the Congress, or the Congress will impose its will by legislation. He said he understood acceptable guarantees had been provided regarding the Oshkosh trucks and that the Department should be able to recommend the sale of the 727s, if the assurances we had in mind could be provided. He cautioned Turayki that US would have to look at question of spares and support for 727s if the aircraft [Page 237] were used for conditions other than those in the assurances.4 When Turayki protested that US would find some reason to cut off spares, Newsom replied that US would respect its agreements with Libya. Turayki then repeated argument that real basis for US trade restrictions against Libya is disagreement on Middle East policy and threatened that Libya would buy admittedly inferior aircraft from alternate sources. Without using term Soviets, he suggested Libya would move closer to them “if backed into a corner” by US. Newsom insisted US decision regarding 727s unrelated to Middle East policy differences and based entirely on planes’ use. If US is satisfied how planes will be used, they will be sold, he said.
6. Returning to terrorism, Newsom said hand of Libya seen in many acts of violence which do not seem related to the Arab cause, mentioning the Philippines, and talk of Libyan involvement in Northern Ireland and elsewhere in Europe. The impression that Libya is prepared to support acts of violence against governments all over the world makes it difficult to improve bilateral relations. US realizes Libya can purchase aircraft elsewhere, he concluded, but discussion was based on Libya’s desire for American planes.
7. When Newsom asked for clarification of Libya’s general policy regarding the supply of arms to dissident groups, Turayki replied he had come to discuss bilateral relations not Libyan policy. He accused US of supporting terrorism by furnishing Israel with weapons. At this point Newsom commented that he had read Turayki’s General Assembly address, and, returning to this subject a few minutes later, said Turayki’s characterization of American policy represented rhetoric ten years out of date.5
8. When discussion again focused on bilateral relations, Newsom said he hoped Charge Eagleton, a senior US diplomat, would have access to Turayki and other Libyan officials. Administration recognizes there have been positive developments, such as accession to hijacking conventions and settlement of nationalization cases. Congress is kept informed of these matters, and the administration would keep in mind [Page 238] the possibility of normalizing relations. When Turayki objected that trade restrictions would be an impediment to this process, Newsom reminded him that Libya’s image in the US also is an obstacle.
9. Raising the Camp David Accords, Newsom stressed importance US attaches to implementation of both agreements, emphasizing benefits for Palestinians. Turayki responded that all Arabs except Sadat oppose the Accords and Sadat had signed them when his position was weak. Sadat is within his rights signing a Sinai agreement, Turayki said, but he has no right to be discussing Palestinian problems. If US wants a real and permanent peace it should reconsider its position regarding PLO.
10. Rejecting Turayki’s description of Arab reaction to the Camp David Accords, Newsom said he saw no realistic alternative which would allow Palestinians to regain homeland. When Turayki suggested US put more pressure on Israel, Newsom commented that as proud and independent state Libya could understand how Israelis would resent pressure. He pointed out that President Carter had put unprecedented pressure on Israel already. Any contact with PLO would provoke a congressional prohibition on such meetings. By accepting responsibility for violent acts not directly related to the Palestinian struggle, PLO and Fatah have earned a poor image in US. Turayki countered that US has a bad image among people of Arab world. While America might have good relations with leaders of weak reactionary regimes, the Arab people do not accept American professions of neutrality.
11. Despite evident differences, meeting ended cordially, with Turayki suggesting that Newsom or Secretary visit Tripoli. It was agreed that should there be any press inquiries about the meeting each side would state that it had been arranged to take advantage of Turayki’s presence in the US for the UNGA and was one in a series of exchanges with foreign diplomats conducted by State Department during UNGA.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780432–0438. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Tunis, Cairo, London, Khartoum, Algiers, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Ndjamena, and USUN. Drafted by Bishop; cleared in M/CT, H, and NEA; approved by Newsom.↩
- Telegram 267505 to Tripoli, October 21, summarized the discussion on the Western Sahara: “Turayki said Libya feels Morocco and Mauritania must comply with the resolutions of the UNGA and OAU and that the consultation conducted with the Jemaa did not do this. Libya had tried to facilitate negotiations between the Moroccans and Algerians but without success.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780432–1070)↩
- See Document 95.↩
- Regarding Libyan assurances, see footnote 4, Document 94. In a November 2 memorandum to Carter, Vance wrote: “Libya has provided the assurances we requested that two Boeing 727’s it wishes to buy for its commercial airline will not be used for military purposes. The Department of Commerce will now license the sale, subject to a written condition that spare parts will be denied if these assurances are violated. We have had no strong Congressional opposition to the sale except from Javits.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State): 11/78)↩
- Turayki addressed the General Assembly on October 10. Telegram 4268 from USUN, October 10, characterized his statement as a “vitriolic attack on ‛imperialists’ and ‛colonialists’, naming the United States several times.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780420–0424)↩