106. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State1
Secto 9008. Subject: Secretary’s Discussion With Libyan Foreign Minister.
1. (S–Entire text)
2. Summary: Basic elements of US-Libyan bilateral relationship rather than specific current problems were central features of Secretary’s forty-five minute discussion with Libyan Foreign Minister Turayki on Oct. 3. General Tone was frank and direct but cordial and constructive on both sides. Secretary stated USG had no desire to undermine Libyan Government and would neither encourage nor condone such efforts by others. Main causes of US-Libyan differences were Libyan support for movements espousing violence and terrorism, and hostile Libyan attitude toward those involved in efforts to achieve [Page 269] Middle East peace. Turayki stated his government opposed terrorism but reaffirmed Libyan support for PLO and certain unspecified African movements. On Middle East he said Sadat could not speak for Palestinians but conceded that Libya would not oppose an eventual settlement if the Palestinians themselves agreed. On bilateral US-Libyan relations generally, Turayki said Libyans wanted to improve relations and implied that an exchange of Ambassadors would be helpful but he was not in a hurry. Libyans, he continued, did not understand why U.S. holding up aircraft sales or what good USG thought it would do. Secretary said exchange of Ambassadors not possible at this time. He noted, however, that other steps were feasible and desirable, e.g., more access at highest levels for existing reps, high level visits and stepped-up efforts to promote cultural exchange. Turayki suggested that some joint group, perhaps in Tripoli, be charged with working out specific proposals to implement such measures. End summary.
3. Secretary’s Oct. 3 bilateral with Libyan Foreign Minister Turayki was attended by Libya’s UN PermRep Kikhia and a notetaker on Libyan side, and by Deputy Under Secretary Newsom, Assistant Secretary Saunders and Country Director Coon. Secretary opened discussion by saying he was pleased with the opportunity to start a discussion with Libyan Government at this level. Turayki reciprocated these sentiments. The Secretary said he wanted to make two points at outset: First, USG had no desire in any way to undermine Government of Libya, it would give no encouragement to any other government seeking to do this, nor indeed would it condone such an effort. Second, U.S. and Libya did, however, have significant differences which should be fully discussed with the objective of reducing them over time. Turayki agreed, noting U.S. and Libya had enjoyed excellent economic and cultural relations for a long time and that Libya has continued to be interested in further improving relations with the U.S.
4. Secretary stated one of the major causes of differences was widespread U.S. perception that Libya supported movements which had as guiding principle the use of violence and terrorism. A second major area of difference was the apparently hostile attitude Libya took to U.S. effort to achieve Middle East peace. At present U.S. agrees to disagree with many Arab countries regarding best course to follow in order to achieve universally shared goal of a peaceful settlement. But Libya goes beyond that in terms its hostility to the whole process and its punitive attitude to the other parties principally engaged in the peace negotiations.
5. Turayki said that as far as terrorism is concerned, his government was against it, although of course it supported PLO and certain movements in Africa. He did not think his government should be held accountable for individual terrorist acts committed by such groups any [Page 270] more than USG should be for acts of mercenary soldiers who might previously have had training in U.S. Army. As for Middle East, he acknowledged difficulties administration faces in its present effort but questioned correctness of US approach. Libya particularly objects to Sadat putting himself in position of speaking for Palestinians. Despite all this, if a settlement could ultimately be achieved which the Palestinians themselves would be willing to accept, “Libya would not be more royal than the King.”
6. Secretary acknowledged that Libya had taken positive steps such as subscribing to anti-hijacking convention,2 but reiterated US concern at continued Libyan support for organizations engaged in terrorist acts, some of which have been directed against our own personnel. On the Middle East, Secretary stressed importance of understanding the nature of our step-by-step approach, which is not at all inconsistent with the conviction we share with others that any lasting solution will have to deal effectively with the Palestinian issue. He wanted to be sure that while we might differ on tactics, Libya did not misunderstand us on this point.
7. Turayki said Libyans were disturbed by use of the word “autonomy” in describing plans for political evolution of West Bank, since term usually referred to a particular condition within a sovereign country, in this case, presumably, Israel. Secretary explained that language in CDA was “full autonomy”, meaning Israel would hold its claims in abeyance while West Bank leaders participated in discussions of longer term future of area with other interested parties; thus use of term did not imply US repudiation of principle of opposing occupation of territory by force. Turayki did not dispute this explanation but suggested a need for a specific timetable for Israeli withdrawal, and a need for USG to bring PLO into the peace process. Secretary said USG foresaw Palestinian participation in peace process and welcomed this prospect—once necessary formulation (PLO recognition for Israel’s right to exist) had been agreed on. This had almost been achieved in 1977 but PLO was not quite able to agree within itself at that time. USG was still trying. Turayki said it was necessary not only for PLO to recognize Israeli’s right to exist, but also for the reverse to happen. Turayki, responding to a question, said he believed that there were still differing points of view within PLO but that a decision on this issue taken by the top level would be upheld.
8. Turayki said we should not link multilateral and bilateral issues. On bilateral issues, speaking frankly, he thought US-Libyan relations as a whole were far more important than the question of a couple of [Page 271] Boeings or C–130s. Libya could if it needed get them or their equivalent elsewhere, but could not understand why US was creating the problem. Was Libya serving as a scapegoat in the region? Secretary replied that US had problems with two Arab countries on the terrorism question, Libya and Iraq, and was following the policy of not selling them equipment that could significantly add to military capabilities. This position might change later on but there was no prospect of a change in the immediate future. Turayki reiterated Libya’s desire for better relations with US and noted that Libya was a genuinely non-aligned state. He asked how US felt the sanctions against Libya helped, whether a couple of Boeings would change the regional balance. Libya has a small population but needs to defend itself, and fortunately has the money to pay for it. USSR knows Libya is not Communist and still supplies arms. Why then the US policy? Secretary replied that to answer the question one had to go back to basics and referred to his earlier remarks regarding Libyan support for terrorist groups, and hositility to the peace process. He added that recent Libyan use of Boeing 727’s in Uganda had not helped either, though USG recognized that these were not the specific aircraft legally constrained from such use. Turayki said he still thought Libya was being discriminated against. Secretary noted that USG does not sell arms to many countries, and does sell other type of equipment to Libya. Turayki questioned practicality of constraints US places on arms sales to countries like Saudi Arabia, saying that if war broke out in region they would certainly use the arms as they chose. Secretary pointed out that if these arms were used offensively rather than for defensive purposes for which they were sold, we would be legally required to cut off spares.
9. Turayki suggested Libya would like to upgrade diplomatic relations with US, i.e., exchange Ambassadors. Secretary said this was not possible now though we agreed in principle it might be desirable later on. Meanwhile, each side could increase access at high levels of its government to the other’s diplomatic representatives. This should be started at once. There followed a brief discussion of the new People’s Committee which has taken over the Libyan Embassy in Washington. Secretary said this should not create problems as long as all agreed that it continued to act as a diplomatic mission. He asked whether the chairman of the Peoples Bureau would be the head of the Mission. Turayki said his government would let us know about that in a formal note.
10. Secretary proposed certain additional steps to improve relations: First, an exchange of visits by high level officials. He hoped that Mr. Saunders or Mr. Newsom or someone of similar rank could visit Tripoli in the near future. Second, he thought the two countries could work more effectively to develop specific areas of cooperation, [Page 272] in particular by stimulating broadly-based cultural and educational exchanges.
11. Turayki, seconded by Libyan PermRep Kikhia, reacted favorably to the foregoing suggestions. Turayki felt that there was a need for more discussion between the two governments on the terrorism issue. Kikhia felt the US media were heavily biased against Libya and welcomed advice on what Libya could do about it. Turayki noted that Charge Eagleton was doing a very good job to strengthen US/Libya relations in Tripoli. He suggested the formation of something like a committee, perhaps involving Eagleton and based in Tripoli, to review bilateral relations and work systematically on what needed to be done. The Secretary expressed interest in this idea as the meeting closed.3
12. Comment: While it is difficult to predict what Qaddhafi’s reaction to meeting will be, we had impression meeting effectively carried forward dialogue. Differences remain profound, but if Turayki attitude is any judge they may be sufficiently manageable to avoid major break.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 1–12/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Tripoli. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Tunis. Vance was in New York for the United Nations General Assembly. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 95.↩
- In telegram 294915 to Tripoli, November 11, the Department reported on a November 8 meeting between Newsom and Kikhia in New York to discuss topics for the proposed U.S.-Libyan dialogue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790520–1127)↩