133. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- Meeting in ZB’s Office
PARTICIPANTS
- ZB, David Aaron, Madeleine Albright, Gary Sick, Robert Kimmitt, Les Denend, Trudy Werner
ZB: Preparation for likely hearings.2 I will be pressed to provide information on (1) nature of my contact with Billy Carter in general. Will need full chronology. I don’t think there was much—occasionally at a State Dinner or something like that. (2) full chronology of November 20 initiative,3 November 27 meeting,4 any subsequent meetings with Libyans in January, February, March; the letter from Qadhafi;5 what was happening here at the time. Gary to get record of when the Libyans first reacted, and how, to the taking of the hostages. Did they publicly endorse? condemn? Need date of letter or message from Qadhafi to Khomeini. Also chronology of public events in US-Libyan relationship. Go back through NID, PDB, State INR summary. Get texts of our public comments on the interview by Qadhafi to the effect that our relations would change.6 As I recall we immediately tried to neutralize it.
[Page 317]Bob Kimmitt to check when there was a phone call from ZB to Billy Carter by checking phone bills—sometime between March 26 and April 2, 1980.
Vance took his phone records with him. The State legal adviser has anything else there is. We have asked them to elaborate on Vance’s statement.7
ZB feels confident that he consulted Vance. ZB recalls talking with Vance about the contact and Vance saying that it was worth a try. ZB knows he (Vance) was briefed on all of the meetings with Houdari.
Kimmitt to get documentation on the planes. What was the position of the various departments on the planes? What position did we take? How were we involved in it? Were there any calls to anyone here from Billy Carter or Coleman? Also about the trucks.8
Gary Sick: State is also working on a very detailed chronology.9
ZB wants to know NSC/White House role.
Alfred: Use a filibuster technique by detailing how cool the relationship was.
Gary Sick to give ZB a paper on status of the relationship in general and particularly at the time of the hostage crisis.10 We did not have an ambassador there. Since when? Since when have they not had an ambassador here? What did we have there? What did they have here? Some people were expelled by them? When? We know that on December 12 the relationship was very fragile indeed.11
Kimmitt: We should stay within the President’s mandate as expressed in the statement yesterday12 and not get involved in any discussion of the full US-Libyan relationship. Wider questions should be referred to State. ZB to stick to the narrow charge given by the President.
ZB: will address myself to the two matters in which I was involved: the initiative to engage the Libyans in this effort and then the March call. Also talk about the atmosphere prevailing at the time. How the [Page 318] suggestion was made. How it was transmitted from Rosalynn to ZB. Will then discuss the call in late March,13 indicate why I said what I said, and then will say I had no further dealings with the guy and no further knowledge of the issues.
Alfred: You will be asked a lot of the questions that could have been asked if the Zorinsky bill had gone through. Questions such as “how often did you see people like Houdairi?”
ZB: To the extent it is germane I will reply. But I am going there to discuss a specific case.
Madeleine: Atmospherics are important. Lance disarmed the committee at the beginning by the length and detail of his statement. He provided everything. They did not have to drag any information out. Any information dragged out leaves the impression that there is more information to be dragged out. While the people there are your friends, they are up for election—Leahy, Mathias, Bayh are all up for election—so it is not a friendly operation. You also have to be prepared for questions that are totally off the wall.
DA: Your attitude cannot be one of saying, “that is not the reason I am here.”
ZB: I don’t intend to antagonize them and will keep my cool even if I am abused.
DA: On handling questions, I strongly recommend that you be as professorial as possible in your choice of language. Don’t give them your good one-liners.
Alfred: Whether it is Christopher or ZB who gives the overview of the Libyan relationship should be decided.
ZB: It has not been my primary responsibility and I am not in a position to give a thorough detailed review of this matter.
Alfred: You should have from State a detailed overview including the number of times Roy, Newsom, Saunders would have been talking to officials from the Libyan bureau here.
ZB will dictate a preliminary statement dealing with the three encounters—November 20 and 27 phone calls and meeting; subsequent meetings with Houdairi, and the March phone call; and the meeting in July.14 Put in context. Will ask Alfred to to rewrite it and will give Gary a crack at providing externalities.
What should be covered in the statement:
[Page 319]1. Simple facts and chronology pertaining to Billy Carter;
2. The context of the initiative;
3. Then some comments on US-Libya relations.
There should also be some comments on ZB/JC family relations. It just so happens ZB has not had much contact, but has seen Mrs. Stapleton, Miss Lillian prior to trips abroad. Specific examples?
DA: What prompted you to make the March phone call. Will you give them the piece of paper that you had?15 Why didn’t you give the piece of paper to somebody else? You knew that Billy was being investigated. What made you assume the law enforcement agencies had that piece of paper? Get into the dissemination thing because all of that stuff automatically goes to Justice. Who would have seen it? This should be done from the standpoint of the system that provides privacy. David to prepare this part of the statement.
ZB: In addition to briefing the President on it I knew, because of the established system, that this paper would reach the following agencies for the following reasons. David to write this. My own judgment was that it was important for me to make certain that Billy not engage in anything embarrassing or unethical—on the face of it I saw nothing illegal. Why didn’t it get to Justice? I will take position that when I saw the report I acted on it by phoning Billy Carter and telling him not to do anything embarrassing to the Administration or to the President personally. I do not feel I should comment on the relationship between the two brothers, which is difficult and sensitive.
Alfred: Didn’t it occur to you all in November that the one thing that this would do is make the Libyans think that Billy Carter was very important?
ZB: That is hindsight. We didn’t know. Besides, they already knew that he was the President’s brother and we knew that they already had a high estimate of him. We were trying to exploit that. What if it had resulted in the release of the hostages? Who would have complained?
Alfred: With all of the history between Billy Carter and the Libyans how could you have ignored the possibility that this gesture would have enhanced him greatly?
ZB. We didn’t think it would enhance him over and above the fact that he was the President’s brother. All he did was introduce me to the Libyan official. We wanted to convey to the charge that this was a matter of high importance and that the President was personally interested. This was not just a routine approach.
When were the 13 released?
[Page 320]Alfred: The press is playing up the coincidence that you used Billy in November and in March they gave him a down payment.
We should try to get together a chronology of public statements made about Billy and Libya. One of the things that staffers will do is go through what is available and jump at it.
Why didn’t you make it clear that Billy Carter was not speaking for the US Government? Why didn’t you tell the Libyans to treat him like anybody else?
ZB: For one thing I certainly had no knowledge that he was on a retainer or that he was about to get a loan from them.
DA: One of the magazines had a piece about Billy’s Libya connection. It was quite extensive and made his contacts clear.16
Les: I will start a file and as everybody develops information we will compile it for future reference. Any questions you need to get answers to will be here.
Bob Kimmitt should try to work out what NSC policy is on briefing people. How do outsiders get briefings? Do you give secure information to uncleared people? This should be taken up at the Staff meeting. What are the instinctive rules that people follow in talking with people.
Madeleine: Try to find out what State has in a way that they can’t wave a piece of paper in the middle of this that we are not aware of.
DA: We should ask State for every single message during this period. I would get all traffic, all desk memos. What you want to look out for is a little memo that says, “Well, Billy Carter is doing all of this but we should stay out of it because he is the President’s brother.”
Les: To get it we are going to have to go through Christopher or Owen. Then they will, when asked, say that they provided all of this to NSC or to ZB.
Madeleine: How do we avoid the danger of something that is floated out?
Les: Lloyd Cutler said this morning that State would let us know through him everything that they are doing, all requests they have responded to.
Madeleine: We should dovetail with Cutler. Is it good to know everything? Or is it better not to?
[Page 321]Les: Cutler thinks that the only surprises that will come out will be trivial.17
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 81, Carter (Billy)/Libya/Hearings: 7–8/80. No classification marking. Alfred Friendly also attended the meeting.↩
- On July 24, the Senate approved the creation of a special panel to investigate Billy Carter’s dealings with Libya. (Judith Miller, “Billy Carter Inquiry Set Up, President Vows Cooperation,” New York Times, July 25, 1980, p. A10)↩
- Not further identified.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 113.↩
- Presumably the message delivered during Brzezinski’s November 29 meeting with Houdairi.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 114.↩
- Not further identified. Vance resigned on April 24.↩
- Reference is to the Oshkosh trucks and C–130 planes.↩
- See Document 134.↩
- Not found.↩
- See Document 115.↩
- The July 24 statement reads in part: “The President will instruct all members of the White House staff to cooperate fully with the special subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee as to requests for information about the relationship between Billy Carter and the Government of Libya, as well as about any contacts between any member of the White House staff with Billy Carter or with the Department of Justice relating to Billy Carter.” For full text of the statement, see Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book II, p. 1420.↩
- The Senate panel planned to inquire about a telephone call in March between Brzezinski and Billy Carter in which Brzezinki warned Carter about his ties to Libya. (Steven R. Weisman, “Questions and Answers on Billy Carter,” New York Times, July 24, 1980, p. B26)↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Not found.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- President Carter held a news conference on August 4 during which he made a statement and answered questions about his brother’s activities. See Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book II, pp. 1477–1493. For the report on the Senate investigation, see Inquiry into the Matter of Billy Carter and Libya: Report Together With Additional Views of the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate Individuals Representing the Interests of Foreign Governments to the United States Senate. (Washington: Government Printing Office, September 1980)↩