274. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter 1

SUBJECT

  • Objectives During Visit to Europe for Talks with Vorster and European Leaders

We are in the final preparatory stage for my forthcoming visit in your behalf to Portugal, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom.

As currently scheduled, I will depart for Lisbon this Saturday for meetings with President Eanes and Prime Minister Soares on May 16; talks with King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Suarez in Madrid on May 17; and with Chancellor Kreisky in Vienna on May 18.

The talks with South African Prime Minister Vorster are set for Vienna on May 19 and 20.2 I will then travel to Belgrade on the afternoon of May 20 for meetings on May 20–21 with President Tito and members of the Yugoslav leadership; then to London on May 22 to debrief Prime Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary Owen on the Vorster meetings.3

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There are three basic elements to the visit, each of priority importance to your foreign policy objectives. My purpose will be:

—to demonstrate in Portugal and Spain the United States’ support for their return to democracy;

—to convey to Prime Minister Vorster your policy toward Southern Africa including the United States’ views on the role South Africa must play in current efforts to resolve the Rhodesian and Namibian problems, and on the approach South Africa must take within its society if our relations are not to suffer;

—to emphasize to President Tito the importance your Administration places on Yugoslavia’s independence, political unity and territorial integrity.

I do not plan to become a negotiator on contentious issues in any of my meetings, but I do anticipate an in-depth discussion with Vorster. The following paragraphs summarize principal issues I expect to be raised during the visit, review the approach I plan to take, and request your guidance.

Southern Africa—Talks with Vorster. The principal purpose of the meeting with Vorster is to convey authoritatively to the South Africans our new policy on southern Africa: that we seek a progressive transformation of South African society as well as a constructive South African role on Rhodesia and Namibia. Our relations are at a watershed; their future depends on South African actions on all three questions.

A secondary objective will be to seek from Vorster a number of specific assurances—particularly on Rhodesia and Namibia. Whether or not Vorster gives such assurances, our meeting will make clear to South Africa—and equally important to the rest of Africa—exactly where we stand.

I would plan to begin our meeting with a private session to set the agenda and to establish the following general framework for our discussion of Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

—South African actions are pivotal for the future of all southern Africa.

—We are gravely concerned about the implications of a gathering racial war in the region: for the destruction that it would bring to all the peoples of the region, for the ensuing growth in the Soviet influence in Africa, and for the divisive impact this could have on the United States and its allies and friends.

—We have been going through a transition in our own society of which we are justly proud. We will not turn our back on this experience in our foreign policy. This makes it inconceivable that we could support governments pursuing contrary principles, or remain politically neutral in a struggle for basic human justice.

—It is imperative therefore that the South African government understand clearly the fundamental character of our position. We all have a stake in progress. We would welcome positive South African actions that can lead to an improvement in our relations and a suppor[Page 819]tive American response. But we are at a watershed, and a lack of progress will inevitably affect our relations for the worse.4

On Rhodesia, I will review where we stand on the new negotiating effort and press him:

—to use his influence with Smith in support of a reasonable agreement on a settlement, including elections and a transfer to majority rule.

—to not just take the position that South Africa will enforce what Smith will agree to, but that Vorster will make a public commitment to acknowledge an internationally recognized Zimbabwe during 1978, and follow through.5

On Namibia, I will reinforce the Contact Group’s efforts by urging flexibility and cooperation in working toward a solution, based on UNSC Resolution 385, which is internationally acceptable. Specifically, I will ask that:

—He not establish a central administration authority that would be the unacceptable Turnhalle interim government by another name.

—He lend his fullest cooperation in facilitating an agreement with the UN Secretary General on the holding of elections for a constituent assembly in which all interested parties are consulted and can participate fully, and on other problems impeding an internationally acceptable solution.6

On South Africa, the toughest issue, I want to make clear that the strength of our support for a progressive transformation of South African society is not tactical, not conditioned on the help they give us on Namibia and Rhodesia. (I will put the point to Vorster more delicately—that we look for progress on three issues.) I would like your endorsement of this approach as our fundamental strategy—recognizing if the South Africans change course on apartheid, we will do all we can to help them over the tough times ahead.7

In elaborating our approach, I will explain that while it is not our role to define the specific actions South Africa should take, Vorster should understand:

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—our deep and abiding commitment to racial justice, reinforced by our recent experience. He should not misjudge or underestimate the depth of America’s dedication to human rights.8

—our consequent inability to accept the apartheid system in South Africa.9

—our convinction that there must be full and equal political participation and economic opportunity and justice accorded to all South African people. Otherwise there will be no peace.

—our judgment that the system South Africa defends is encouraging the growth of Communist influence in South Africa and our determination not to let our antipathy to communism draw us into actions contrary to our basic values. Moreover, the best way to beat communism is to move toward social justice.10

—that these circumstances underline the need for a new direction in South African policy.

—that if such a new and positive course can be charted, South Africa will have our support and understanding. The press of international events makes such action urgent.

—that without such a change, the United States, more in sorrow than in anger, will pursue the course (both bilaterally and in the UN) dictated by its principles, values and sense of justice.

—the choice is South Africa’s.11

Public Handling:

Our general approach will be to keep expectations for concrete achievements realistically low. I plan to make clear that it fits in with our overall policy to support majority rule and the progressive transformation of South African society. I will make clear our willingness to work with the South Africans to this end should they choose to accompany us on this road.

Prior to the meeting, I plan to explain to the press in general terms the purpose of the meeting. The statement I propose to use is at Tab B. This is designed to counteract suspicions over the purpose of the talks without prejudging the outcome.

If Vorster is receptive to our approach, at the end of the session, I would brief the press. The most favorable outcome I can foresee is outlined in the statement at Tab C. This will have to be scaled downward to reflect unachieved objectives.

If the meeting fails to elicit a favorable Vorster response, I plan a statement consistent with our overall objective of making America’s new policy clear to the world. This will:

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—show the Africans our determination to work change in South Africa as well as Rhodesia and Namibia and thereby give added credibility to our overall Africa policy;

—increase the pressure on Vorster.

I believe this is essential despite whatever risk there may be of making Vorster even less disposed to cooperate on Rhodesia and Namibia.12

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Southern Africa.]

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 45, Africa: Southern Africa: 3–8/77. Secret. Carter wrote at the top of the first page: “Fritz—Read notes—J.C.” None of the tabs is attached.
  2. See Documents 158, 276, and 278.
  3. See Document 159.
  4. Carter checked the approve option.
  5. Carter checked the approve option and wrote in the left-hand margin: “a) Nkomo made very bad impression on Cy & D Owen, I believe. Muzorewa may be better—keep our options open but feel Vorster & Andy out. b) Stability after elections important.”
  6. Carter checked the approve option and wrote in the left-hand margin: “Free elections would suit us—provided all contenders given an equal chance. S. Africa will have to lend military stability.”
  7. Carter checked the approve option and wrote in the left-hand margin: “Fritz—Listen a lot but make our position clear—you have plenty of time with him.”
  8. Carter wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin next to this point.
  9. Carter wrote in the margin below this point: “Get from Andy degree of flexibility & minimum acceptable progress year by year.”
  10. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “Possibility of S. Africa working with other nations to help poor [unclear] in Africa. If they don’t remain pariahs.”
  11. Carter checked the approve option.
  12. There is no indication of either approval or disapproval, however, Carter wrote in the margin below this recommendation: “ok, but sequential progress should be condoned. Let Vorster tell you what they will do & how long it will take. Measure this against Andy’s expectations. Don’t set our requirements so high as to obviate any cooperation. He must get credit for what he does, & not appear afraid of us.”