275. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance 1

Tosec 40133/106075. For Secretary from Christopher. Subject: Conversation With Foreign Minister Botha on Young Visit.

1. Summary. Following our telephone conversation, I called Foreign Minister Botha at 2:00 a.m. Pretoria time to relay our deep concern over their aide memoire2 and to ask for a reconsideration of their decision in order to take into account our mutual long term interests [Page 822] as well as problems with the holding of the Vienna meeting. He indicated he would talk to the Prime Minister first thing in the morning, and that he would be much helped by my suggestion that the visit could be narrowed in time and content. End summary.

2. At the outset of his response, Botha said that he wanted to be candid about the main problem with the visit. Never in his experience had he come across the phenomenom of continued insults and derogatory remarks from a high official of another country. In the past, the State Department and the USG had always opposed South Africa policy, but in a way that they could handle. Botha noted that he had gone out of his way since returning to his country to be helpful and to facilitate favorable action on the outstanding problems of Southern Africa.

3. I told Botha that I very much appreciated his candor. I indicated that we had high expectations for the Vienna meeting3 but if the SAG adhered to the position taken in its aide memoire it would put us in a most difficult position vis-a-vis the holding of those talks as well as presenting a longer term problem.

4. Botha said that they were not turning down the Young visit, but rather asking for its postponement. He noted that it came in the midst not only of the Vienna meeting but also a series of other plans which he had involving the BLS4 countries. Increasing in his candor, he went on to say that the atmosphere in South Africa is very bad for Ambassador Young. The bad feeling is not restricted to the Afrikaner community, but is shared by the English as well. Botha went on to note that he was impressed by his meeting with President Carter 5 and came back to South Africa determined to work for a solution of the Rhodesian and Namibian problems. But the “continued torrent of insults” make it especially difficult to create an atmosphere in which he could get approval for the changes in attitude and policy which are required.

5. At this point, I referred to his earlier statement regarding postponement, and asked him about the time frame he had in mind. He was hesitant in his reply, saying only that it is hard to be specific and that the month of May is bad. He went on to say that if it is difficult for us to go ahead with the Vienna meeting, it could be put on ice. I responded that we would not wish to do this, considering that the talks could have a very beneficial long term result. I asked whether limiting the Young visit to a meeting with businessmen and seeing a [Page 823] few people in the Embassy would not be a less difficult alternative for them.

6. Botha responded by asking me whether we were keeping track of what Young was saying about South Africa.6 I told him that Young was not going to South Africa for the purpose of causing difficulties. Young had made clear to us that his visit would be brief and was willing to limit it to the businessmen’s dinner and the meeting with a few people in the Embassy. He never intended to make the visits reported in the press.

7. Botha said they had irrefutable evidence that the statements attributed to Young came from the US Mission in New York. Botha continued that now we were exerting pressure on them to allow the visit. What are we to think, Botha asked rhetorically, if we meet in Vienna and there is another torrent of statements against South Africa. I hastened to point out to Botha that my call was not intended to be unwarranted pressure. I was trying to reason with him on the basis of the long term interests of the two countries. Again, I asked him to reconsider taking into account the implications if they insisted on their position in the aide memoire.

8. Botha’s response to this was that he would have to take it up with the Prime Minister the first thing in the morning. To be even more frank than he had already been, he noted that their main difficulty was that if the visit were to take place and conditions created where people were killed, then the situation would be “awful for us here.” I told Botha that I had known Andy Young for a long time and knew him to be a man of peace and not violence. He has always tried to avoid violence. The principal purpose of his going to South Africa would be to meet with the businessmen and a few people in the Embassy and not go to the university or other places. I asked him whether we could consider the aide memoire to be set aside while we worked this thing out. Botha said that he had maintained the aide memoire under very close wraps and no mention had been made of it in South Africa. He made an indirect reference to conditions which might be understood regarding the visit. Sensing that he was suggesting that there might be understandings at this end on the scope of the visit, I made the specific suggestion that Andy might arrive in South Africa on Saturday to meet with a few people at the Embassy and have dinner with the businessmen. He would leave either that night or early the next morning for the Sudan. Botha seemed interested in this [Page 824] schedule and said that he would speak to his Prime Minister first thing in the morning and get in touch with me tomorrow by telephone.

Christopher
  1. Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Overseas Assignments—Trip Files, 1977–1980, Box 15, African Mission—5/77: Situation Reports and State Africa Group Meetings [2]. Confidential; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Bowdler; cleared by Seelye; approved by Christopher. Vance was in London to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting.
  2. Regarding Young’s proposed visit, the May 9 aide mémoire noted: “In all those circumstances such a visit now presents the South African Government with obvious problems. It is accordingly suggested that a visit to South Africa by Ambassador Young be postponed until a more opportune time.” (Ibid.)
  3. May 19–20.
  4. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.
  5. See Document 269.
  6. In an interview with the Associated Press, Young replied “yeah” when asked whether he considered the South African Government to be illegitimate. (New York Times, April 16, 1977, p. 1)