Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

158. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, May 19, 1977

SUBJECT

• First Meeting Between Vice President Mondale and Prime Minister Vorster: Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • Vice President Walter F. Mondale
  • Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Adviser to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Mr. W. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
  • Ambassador Donald McHenry, USUN
  • Ambassador to South Africa William Bowdler
  • Mr. A. Denis Clift, Adviser to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
  • Mr. James Johnson, Executive Assistant to the Vice President
  • Mr. Jay Kenneth Katzen, USUN (note taker)

• South Africa

  • Prime Minister B.J. Vorster
  • Foreign Minister Botha
  • General van den Bergh
  • South African Ambassador to the United States Donald Sole
  • Mr. Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. Franklin, South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Acting Permanent Representative to the UN Eksteen

A photo session took place with the participants at the conference table from 0930 to 0950. At 0950, the Vice President and Mr. Aaron met with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Botha for a private conversation in the Vice President’s office, adjoining the conference room. This meeting was by prior agreement, and lasted 35 minutes. The full meeting began at 1025, and is summarized below:

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: As I understand it, we will discuss the three questions of Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa in that order.² I suggest we begin with the South African appraisal of the Rhodesian situation, then I will give you our own views.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Did you see Foreign Secretary Owen?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I will on Monday. Secretary Vance saw him at the London Summit, and I know the status of the initiative.³ The United States will support the effort to develop a constitution which will lead to elections and independence in 1978. The original suggestion was for a constitutional conference. Now, we are beginning bilateral consultations which will support Owen’s objective.⁴ The nature of these consultations has not yet been determined but, hopefully, a consensus will result on the constitution. We have appointed Ambassador Low to participate with the British. I want you to know confidentially that Ambassador Low will shortly be getting a higher position in the State Department. He is among our ablest officers, and is very experienced in African affairs. We hope that our efforts will lead to a consensus and that South Africa will encourage Mr. Smith to work with the process and for free elections with all participating, leading to a new government in Rhodesia in 1978. We have not developed details concerning the constitution. The consultative group will be in Salisbury May 22–23. The United States wants to support the entire effort, but we will not be getting into the details.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Let’s go back briefly and look at the history of the negotiations. In 1973 and 1974, Mr. Smith had discussions concerning a possible settlement. After the failure to reach a settlement with Mr. Wilson on “Tiger” and “Fearless” and the failure of Alec Home’s visit, Smith talked with the ANC and Muzorewa. These talks failed in August 1974. At that time, the South African Government contacted the President of Zambia, and exchanged emissaries. General van den Bergh went six or seven times to Lusaka. Toward the end of 1974, Zambia asked for assistance to get Nkomo and Sithole out of detention, asking that they be allowed to go to Lusaka for discussions with the so-called Front Line. We contacted Smith and although he initially was unfavorable, Smith agreed to release them. At our own expense, we flew Nkomo and Sithole several times to Zambia—well over half a dozen times. Also on behalf of the Zambian President, and following requests by Machel and Nyerere, they were released at our behest. We were as helpful as we could be. The objective was that in Rhodesia, blacks and whites should come together. The meetings in Salisbury and Lusaka were arranged by South Africa. We also sent a South African railway train to the bridge at Livingstone, and brought the parties together. I was there, and Kaunda was, but unfortunately, they didn’t find each other. South Africa at all times was prepared to help, and is prepared now. It is not our business to get into the details of the settlement. Smith is willing to find a solution and is understanding. Smith will accept majority rule, which means black rule. He and his people are reconciled to this. But he has a difficulty: with whom is he to negotiate? Geneva was a shambles and it is a shame that it ever happened. The sides were pulled apart there. Mugabe has a two to three percent following; Nkomo ten to twelve percent; Muzorewa seventy percent; Chirau and the others have the rest.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: What is your view on the Owen mission?

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We will not stand in its way. I am sure that Owen told you that South Africa could not be faulted in the least. We are prepared to listen to any proposals and to give answers. As an indication of my interest in a settlement, and this is confidential, two months ago I met Chivanduka, the No. 2 man in the ANC, in Capetown. We will extend the help we can.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: There are many disparate groups, with different objectives. In order to have the process lead to a government, we need to set into place the negotiating track and a constitution which will allow the elections people want.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I agree entirely.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We don’t want to choose the leaders; that is not our role. There should be integrity, fairness and equality in the system. But there is a big gap between where we are and our objective.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: If an election were held tomorrow in Rhodesia, Muzorewa would be chosen overwhelmingly.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Maybe, but we need elections.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I agree.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The crucial elements are fairness, equality, integrity, and participation by all Rhodesians. That is our objective, and we believe it will lead to a moderate government. There are difficulties on the way to it: white leaders see a threat and believe it is possible, by blocking the process administratively, and for instance, weighing votes, to frustrate the system. There are also blacks who would lose in an election and who would prefer to be anointed. We oppose both of these and, therefore, support the Owen effort to reach a constitution through consultations with all parties. We are aware that all parties won’t agree, but the best chance is elections on a fair non-discriminatory basis. South Africa can help by pressing those participating in the process with whom you have influence to accept the process and the results of fair elections. We will encourage others to agree to the process, a constitution, and the results of the elections. Let’s be frank.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Fine.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: There is resistance to the Owen idea. Smith still hopes to retain power. That is why I ask South Africa to press Smith to agree to the process, a constitution and elections—not just to agree to what Smith wants.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We have passed that point. Smith has accepted. In fact, because of that, he has had a rebellion within his own party.⁵ Nine left the party, and he expelled them. They had refused to accept the Owen proposal. Smith has resigned himself to the situation. Smith’s difficulty is that while he has accepted black majority rule, it is unclear to whom he is to give it. If one could achieve the ideal, it would be to have a referendum among blacks to elect a leader. It would be the easiest thing in the world for Smith to meet with him and turn over power. On the other hand, if someone on the outside wants Nkomo and Mugabe put in power, no settlement would be possible.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The Rhodesian leader should be chosen in an open plebiscite. That is our final line. It is not for us to choose one leader. The blacks have rejected an “internal option”. The Owen mission seeks to circumvent that process and, instead, to have a constitution with elections of integrity, leading to a process which chooses a leader to run the government. One problem at Geneva was the disagreement over who got anointed. It broke down over rivalries. We want consultations leading to a constitution leading to elections which will choose a leader. We don’t exactly accept the point that Smith has agreed to the process. At Geneva he wanted a disproportionate political role for whites, with a blocking possibility which was unacceptable to the black majority in Rhodesia and to international opinion. We want you to persuade Smith and his government to join in the Owen process and not limit your position to accepting what Smith agrees to. We want you too to agree to the result, and to get Smith to. If you only agree to what Smith wants, we won’t get the result needed. Others will also require pressure. We are sure that some blacks also don’t want elections.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It’s a pity that Rogers and Schaufele aren’t here. That Sunday when we met, Dr. Kissinger and Smith agreed to the initial Five Points.⁶ In my presence, when Smith intimated he could accept, I said—and Dr. Kissinger was there—that if you accept but don’t adhere, I will drop you. I can’t go any further than that. But I did go further. I said I would guarantee that Smith honors his commitments. I said that to Kissinger with Smith present. I can’t do any more. If Smith agrees to the election process, I will support the results.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We appear to agree on that point. We say that a government should be headed by the winner of fair and popular elections. We don’t want to say this necessarily will be a black. The figures may say otherwise. In the United States, for instance, we have the experience where a white has been elected from a primarily black electorate and a black from a primarily white electorate. For instance, the mayor of Los Angeles, which is ten percent black, is a black.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We cannot equate the U.S. situation to Rhodesia or South Africa.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: But this can occur. Let’s not say what color will be elected. That is up to the Rhodesian people.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I have no quarrel with that.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: All will participate, none will be excluded. Those outside will return home and participate, and there will be universal suffrage. Do you have any problems with that package?

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Smith and the Rhodesian people feel a need for negotiations between his people and a black leader, to prepare for elections.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Maybe we are talking about different things. The Owen mission wants a constitution which will lead to elections, where a government will be chosen to govern Rhodesia. It is not to choose people to negotiate with Smith.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I am not informed on that score yet.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: If it were otherwise, we would be back to the “internal option”, which we cannot accept.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: There is another element. Rhodesia is small, but it is sophisticated. I have spoken to many Rhodesians. They recognize that they can’t run Rhodesia with so few whites. They need whites to remain. They don’t want a repeat of Angola and Mozambique.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The more prompt progress is to honest majority government, the greater is the likelihood of avoiding that. We can avoid war and protect personal liberties, property, freedom of religion and independent choice and, thereby, make Rhodesia a more attractive possibility.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Guarantee is needed for the whites from you or Owen. I am not informed of your views on this. A guarantee is needed of law and order, that there will be no expropriation, no confiscation. Otherwise, the whites will leave. Mugabe has said that they will take over property, that there will be trials by people’s courts, a Marxist government and expropriation. If this is so, forget about a solution.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The process envisaged would lead to a constitution, which then would involve popular elections with constitutional protection of rights of property, free speech, religion. . .

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: an independent judiciary. . .

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We would hope the system would spell this out and, thereby, people will be encouraged to remain in Rhodesia. Among the elements to discuss in the negotiations are security and the integrity of the election process. That is, the details would be worked out in consultations, including discussions in Salisbury next week. That is our objective. It would help if South Africa would be forthcoming and say you will influence those with whom you have influence, to accept the process and the results and that South Africa will, too. I predict that if leaders are selected this way, you will have moderation. But I can’t predict what a lawless government would do. You know the saying, “if there is no law in government, there is no sense going to law school”. The longer a delay, the more the radicals will be frustrated and cause changes which will involve them taking power, and will allow the Soviets to enter the scene. The last thing the Soviets want is a democratic secure Rhodesia. That would send them to bed crying. That is why we need your help.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: If these objectives were stated publicly, I have no doubt that the white Rhodesians and the majority of black Rhodesians would accept, and you would have the full backing of the South African Government insofar as necessary. These assurances must be given so that there is no doubt that Rhodesians can accept them. Coupled with that, you would proceed on the Fund we discussed, and then we can have a settlement. All right. You will look to me on Smith and I will look to you on Nkomo and Mugabe. If you can guarantee Nkomo and Mugabe will fall into line, I will guarantee Smith does.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I don’t know yet whether we can get the support of all, but it is our intention to pursue that objective through the Owen mission, to try to get the Front Line support, and to do what we can to accept and support the new government once established. If so, we would support it, and the Fund, and I am confident Congress will be forthcoming.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: If so, I will be alongside you.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: So that what we want are: your support, hopefully public, for Owen; for you to press Smith to negotiate for a settlement providing for majority rule through fair elections in 1978; independence within that date; for you to work with us with such a government so chosen; and for you to help us reduce tensions which will tear at the process. Does that make sense?

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: If you guarantee the points discussed before: freedom of property, no expropriation, an independent judiciary, and so on.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I have discussed what we seek: a bill of rights, protection, due process. We hope for a multi-racial Zimbabwe, and the possibility for all who wish to to stay. I can’t guarantee the results. But our goals are free speech, freedom of assembly and religion, equal protection before the law, due process of protection of property—in the United States, property cannot be confiscated without compensation.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: That is the system in Rhodesia today.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: There also would be an independent judicial tribunal. This isn’t a Mondale bill of rights, but these are the general lines we are thinking about.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I understood Owen to say that he would consult with the parties and then the British, with U.S. backing, would draw up a constitution which would be put to the people, then presented to the British Parliament. If the constitution embodies all these points, and the Fund would have to be embodied in it, then, the whites would accept.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Would you press Smith?

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I don’t like the word “press”. The word is unfortunate. I have never pressed Smith. I talk sense to him.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: That’s like what Lyndon Johnson used to say, “reasoning together”.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Never ask me to press him, or say it publicly. I will repudiate it.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We want an internationally acceptable solution. Smith is respected for his obstinacy. You can play a role.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It is best to leave that to me.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The public impression is that you still support him. If you don’t want to “press” him, there may be a better formulation for what you can do to indicate your commitment.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: The problem in Rhodesia won’t be Smith. General van den Bergh knows that. Nkomo and especially Mugabe will be the problem.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I know the problem is not only Smith.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It is about twenty percent Smith and eighty percent Nkomo and Mugabe.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We want to move toward the election of a Rhodesian leadership quickly, with the expectation that it will thereby be moderate.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I still think it is best to elect a black to talk to Smith. But Owen and you say no to that. I accept that. The second best solution is to do as Owen says: that is, to draft a constitution with all the elements you have mentioned and US/UK guarantees that the government would be upheld and not be overthrown from outside, and that sanctions will be lifted. Then, the whites in Rhodesia will cooperate, as would South Africa.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: In the meantime, Smith should participate seriously.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We have advised him and believe he will. We would like the United States to urge the terrorists to hold their horses and help create a good atmosphere.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Let’s discuss that last. We want the Owen initiative to succeed. We want a constitution calling for equal and fair participation in Zimbabwe elections. We hope then to have a consortium, a Zimbabwe Fund, to help in the economic development, growth, infrastructure, and training of the young, moving the country on the path to economic stability. We also are prepared to consider other types of help to strengthen against the threats you describe.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: If so, we will have settlement; if not, we will have none.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We can’t guarantee that the people of Zimbabwe will choose a government that will reject public ownership. Even in the UK certain parts of the economy are publicly owned. But we want guarantees, with a judiciary, prohibiting violations through confiscation, prohibiting the violation of rights of assembly and religion. The people’s wishes are always so determined in a democracy. But there are public post offices, railways, and airlines in many countries. With this constitution, such decisions would be made with guarantees.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: What is the ordinary Rhodesian concerned about? The farmer is concerned about the confiscation of his property. The pensioner worries about the loss of his pension. The city dweller worries about the loss of property. If you can guarantee that not only the Fund will protect him, but that you will uphold the government and that compensation will be paid in the case of confiscation, I can’t foresee any difficulty.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: If we have our way, the constitution will say that no property can be taken without compensation and due process. The Zimbabwe Fund, though, can’t be used simply to buy out whites.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It had never been intended simply for security.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The Fund is intended to train the young, to improve agricultural techniques and infrastructure. It would provide essential capital for the economy. It would be the government’s responsibility, with an independent judiciary, to protect against expropriation.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: In the State Department, our talks reached an advanced stage. There were documents which were UK/US documents, not ours, which confirmed that.⁷ The terms in those documents stated that a formal guarantee was given that a scale. . .

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: a sliding scale

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: . . . of compensation would be paid if things went bad and people wanted to leave.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Yes, there has been a change.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: This is the first time I hear of it. Owen told the Prime Minister that the Fund is still alive.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It is. Let me read from our conception of it. The original plan was a safety net to be used if the government did not provide compensation. Many Rhodesians feel that that was its intention. But it could not be simply be a buy-out fund. The objective of the Fund would be to build the confidence of whites and to ensure fair treatment. We couldn’t support and pass a bill in Congress for a buy-out fund.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: We now hear this for the first time. This is a dramatic and radical change. It will make it impossible for us to continue. We don’t negotiate with Congress, but we have negotiated with the United States and with Owen. This is very serious and I am very upset. I have misled my Prime Minister and my government. I know of the difficulties with Congress.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: This is not a misunderstanding. This is what we were told.

MR. LAKE: The Fund, by contributing to an independent Zimbabwe, would underwrite an economy of the type of government described by the Vice President, thereby helping to build confidence. Although there would not be compensation from the Fund, this doesn’t mean that other methods could not be worked out.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: The whole basis for our approach in getting Smith was the US/UK paper on the Fund. This was the basis for our understanding.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It was Annex C.⁸

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: This presents us with severe problems immediately.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Under Kissinger, it was described as you say.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: This was a British Paper.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: In the United States, there has been much public discussion and congressional debate. The conclusion was reached that it would not be a buy-out fund, but it would be used to develop the economy, equal economic growth and opportunity. The protection should be in constitutional guarantees, protected by an independent tribunal.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Originally, the Zimbabwe Development Fund had a dual purpose. It was to help develop infrastructure, and it was to do everything it could to help the whites remain. But, in case they wanted or had to leave, there would be a sliding scale of compensation payable by year. The people are encouraged to stay. But this is a radical departure now from what we and Smith were told.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I regret the breakdown in communications. But, in the United States, there was public discussion of the question.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Owen told us several weeks ago that. . .

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Foreign Minister Botha discussed the question in the State Department.⁹

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Senator Clark agreed with the Fund as we had thought it was set up. The previous Administration had discussed it with Congress. We had discussed it with Smith.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Mr. Fourie told me that the British Ambassador had confirmed several weeks ago that the Fund was still all right.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: There has been much public discussion of the question in the United States. Testimony has been heard. I regret that communications have broken down.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: This is the first time we heard about it. That the Fund was all right was confirmed by the British only 14 days ago.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: But did the British describe it?

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Owen said that the Fund was very much alive then. The British representative later confirmed it.

MR. FOURIE: Please reread your statement.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: There would be provisions for the “fair treatment of whites, whose confidence is essential”.

MR. AARON: The objective remains to have the whites stay. The program we can support would maintain the economy against radicalization. It would offer the means for the government to provide compensation and encourage a moderate economy. A buy-out fund would encourage the whites to leave.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: What if the Zimbabwe Government says it won’t compensate despite the constitution, which doesn’t mean anything anyway. We have the documents. Now, this is a change.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA (to Prime Minister Vorster): I was there in Washington talking about this.¹⁰

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER (to Foreign Minister Botha): To whom were you talking?

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA (to Prime Minister Vorster): Rogers, and a black gentleman. There were three or four British gentlemen, including Duff. We discussed it in details. There never was any doubt. This places the whole thing in jeopardy. We can’t go back.

MR. LAKE: The Zimbabwe Development Fund is intended to support a healthy economy. The Fund, as constituted before, would not do that.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: “Fair treatment” doesn’t mean a buy-out. Rather, the whites would share in the development process.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: You should have communicated this to us. Did you tell the British?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: They knew. I thought you did.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: I have an 11 September 1976 State Department document here which lists the elements of the Fund.¹¹ They include providing capital to develop the industrial and agricultural economy, national development, technological and financial assistance, and training for blacks. Paragraph five lists the essentials which would be in the constitution. Zimbabwe would respect property, and there would be no confiscation. Pensions would be continued, and there would be a safety net to compensate on housing. This was the Zimbabwe Adjustment Fund. This was the latest information we got and was the basis for our work.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It is close to noon now. I propose we do two things: we will inquire in Washington. I have described the views of the new Government. Let’s see what we can do. Secondly, I acknowledge that the Fund is a matter requiring further discussions with the parties concerned, to have all participating. The Congress opposes a buy-out. This is a difference which may not be reconcilable. I am surprised that with all the discussion that has been going on in the United States, it had not been communicated to you.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: I remember Senator Clark said publicly that if we spent half a billion dollars a week in Vietnam, it would be worth one and a half billion dollars to save lives in Rhodesia. Since the senior congressional committees had agreed, we had been assured that the Fund was going ahead.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I know the views of the Congress on the buy-out aspect.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: This is not a buy-out fund.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Let’s talk about this later.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: The Fund would back up the constitution.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It still will, but our Government won’t pay for acquiring property. Rather, we will for training and so on. Let’s have lunch and explore the matter later in the consultative group. Let’s have a word on the violence going on. As I understand it, the British relayed the Smith-Kaunda message.¹² The other day, Smith struck into Botswana. They already have been in Mozambique. There has been violence on both sides.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Yes.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We should wind down the level of violence, in an effort to promote peace.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: OK.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I would hope that South Africa could help persuade Smith.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We have done so on numerous occasions. But Smith says he doesn’t have the bases in Mozambique and Zambia. They don’t strike soldiers or police, but civilians, women and children, who are abducted and killed. The Rhodesian Government is responsible for its blacks, too, and must protect them. Most of its citizens are black. The Front Line should play it down, too, but instead, has played it up. Therefore, we are saddled with the problem. We both regret it. What is there to do? The approach should be not only to Smith but to the Front Line presidents.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: As a practical matter, we can’t move unless progress is made on negotiations. We would hope to reduce the incursions and through this, diminish the military operations and eliminate them as we near elections. We do need the Front Line support. Otherwise, there will be an escalation.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I agree, and this help must come from both sides.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Are you a lawyer?

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I have had 20 years of practice.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Well you know what I mean, then, when I say this is like the lawyer in the middle of a couple about to be divorced. Let’s try to reduce the violence. You use your good offices and we will encourage those with whom we have some say.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: The Front Line presidents should encourage a reduction of violence.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We have stated our opposition to the killing, and will continue to do so.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: The violence should cease during the negotiations. If the violence continues, Smith will continue to strike back.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It probably is unrealistic to expect that. But let’s try to restrain them and reduce it.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: You don’t need to convert me. Someone should speak to Mugabe and Nkomo.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We are not encouraging them. We have spoken to them and we will continue to.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I don’t blame you, but you have influence.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We have some. If we ask for an end to violence now, it won’t succeed, but we will use our good offices, and hope you will use yours.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: You can call on me. There was a period when we also encouraged a de-escalation, but it must be more than a one-sided effort.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Let’s meet again after lunch.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: In view of the way things are going, and this new element, we are talking about the Owen effort and the constitution in a vacuum. We need a constitution as soon as possible, to have the guarantees incorporated in it. We have to see it and then, using the constitution as a basis, see where we go. This is the best way, as a practical politician and a lawyer, that I can see to proceed.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We can’t see all the details now, but we can move now to support the process. One of our ablest men is in the consultative group.¹³ We agree on general outlines and principles for an election by all Zimbabwe citizens, and that the government will be a new one. Also, that we will encourage the parties concerned.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We need a constitution first. We all will reserve our rights until we see the constitution.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We need general agreement. That is all we can expect now. I suggest that we refrain from press comments at this time.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We don’t talk to the press unnecessarily.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We try not to talk to the press at all.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We will not talk to them, but leaks scare me.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We say that in Washington, Top Secret is James Reston and Secret is The Washington Post.

The meeting broke up into private discussions at 1220, and adjourned at 1230.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, South Africa: 5/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Katzen on May 21. Mondale was in Vienna for meetings with leaders of the Austrian Government and Prime Minister Vorster. The meeting took place in the Hofburg conference room from 10:25 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.
2. For memoranda of conversation on Namibia and South Africa see Documents 276 and 278.
3. Reference is presumably to the Quadrapartite meeting held on May 9. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.
4. See footnote 2, Document 152.
5. In an April 13 Intelligence Memorandum entitled “Rhodesia: A Political Challenge to Prime Minister Smith,” the Central Intelligence Agency described the backlash from the right wing of the Rhodesian Front Party. (Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Trip Files, Box 122, Vice President’s Visit to Europe, 5/14–23/1977: Meeting with South African PM Vorster on Africa [1])
6. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, footnote 2, Document 206.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Tab B, Document 199.
8. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, footnote 10, Document 202.
9. See footnote 7 above.
10. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 215.
11. Not found. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 234.
12. See Documents 154 and 155.
13. Reference is presumably to Stephen Low.