159. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
8531. Dept please pass to Vice President’s Office and NSC for Dr. Brzezinski. Subject: Uncleared Draft Memorandum of Conversation: Mondale-Owen, May 23, 1977.
Participants
US: Vice President Mondale
Mr. Lake, S/P
Mr. Aaron, NSC
Ambassador McHenry, USUN
Mr. Clift, Vice President’s Office
Mr. Katzen, Vice President’s Office
Minister Spiers, Charge, Embassy London
Mr. Seitz, Embassy London
UK: Foreign Secretary Owen
Minister of State Judd
Sir Michael Palliser, Permanent Under Secretary
Phillip Mansfield, Assistant Under Secretary
Martin Reid, Head, Southern Africa Department
Patrick Laver, Head, Rhodesia Department
Ewen Fergusson, Private Secretary
Hamilton Whyte, Press Office
1. The Vice President described for Dr. Owen his talks in Vienna with Prime Minister Vorster.2 He called the exchanges candid, correct, and nonconfrontational. On Rhodesia, the Vice President said, Vorster had agreed to language which committed South Africa to the Owen Mission, that is, to elections in which all would take part and which would result in independence in 1978. The Vice President said he aimed to win Vorster’s commitment to the negotiating process and to its intended conclusion. Moreover, Vorster accepted this strategy regardless of the position of Ian Smith.
2. The Vice President said that the two parties had been unable to agree on the question of violence in Rhodesia but had recognized that the fighting would continue. The Vice President described Vorster as [Page 443] surprised to learn that the Zimbabwe Development Fund (ZDF) was intended to be developmental in nature and not a “buy out” of white Rhodesians. The South Africans had argued that the greatest merit of the Fund now seemed to have been rejected. The Vice President commented that Vorster should have been forewarned of this new concept not only because of public statements in the United States but also because of Dr. Owen’s straightforward talk on the same subject.
3. The Vice President said he told Vorster that the United States hoped that a new Rhodesian constitution would include provision for the protection of individual rights and might therefore serve to allay some fears in the white community. Vorster appeared to have limited confidence in the effectiveness of such constitutional mechanisms.
4. Owen expressed his satisfaction with the Vice President’s report and said he was particularly pleased to learn that Vorster had not “hedged” on the objective of an independent Rhodesia in 1978. He remarked that the problem of universal suffrage might still prove an obstacle to successful negotiations. The British, he said, had resisted publicly espousing one-man one-vote in order not to foreclose negotiations, but he expected US influence would have to be brought to bear on the issue. Owen said he anticipated some form of eventual agreement on universal suffrage, including women, but that there would likely be haggling over the minimum age.
5. The Vice President asked about the timetable the British had in mind for the completion of the process. Owen answered that it was difficult to be specific on dates because the armed struggle can at any moment radically alter the pace of events and the atmosphere of discussions. Nevertheless, he said that the first round of talks conducted by the Consultative Group would be completed shortly, and that the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference in London would afford an unique opportunity for carrying forward the negotiations. Three of the Front Line Presidents will be here at that time, plus the Nigerians, plus several of the black Nationalist leaders. By the end of the conference, Owen went on, we should have a better understanding of what could be achieved. It may then be necessary, towards the last part of June, to go back to the whites. Owen said that he did not exclude the possibility that he himself would make another trip to Southern Africa.
6. In response to the Vice President’s question on the role of the Patriotic Front, Owen said he was “relaxed.” He said that it was politically difficult for the Front to negotiate and fight at the same time. Nevertheless, Nkomo likely prefers a political settlement and will take advantage of whatever political opportunities present themselves so long as he retains his confidence of eventual electoral success.
7. Owen said that it is difficult for the US and the UK to accept the armed struggle and at the same time work for a de-escalation of [Page 444] the violence that will help the negotiating process. Attempts to reconcile these two forces—the fighting and the talking—run the danger of sacrificing our credibility with one group or another. “It is a delicate balance,” the Foreign Secretary said. He added that the greatest danger would be to fail to take account of white opinion. The Western position at the Maputo Conference seems to have struck about the right balance, due largely to the efforts of Ambassador Young.
8. Owen also said that the ZDF would play an important role in maintaining Western credibility with the white community in Rhodesia. He said he agreed that the Fund could not be used for “buying out” purposes but that whites must be convinced that general developmental assistance for an independent Zimbabwe will contribute to the country’s stability and therefore to its attraction for the whites. He said he recognizes US political sensitivity to the issue. Owen then mentioned the question of pension rights which he described as extremely important in order that white public servants remain in Rhodesia in the post-independence period. The Vice President said he would find it difficult to conceive the Fund as providing for pension rights and that the issue must be carefully discussed between our two governments. Lake suggested that the Fund itself could not include pension rights but might have a budgetary off-set function which could release money for this specific purpose. He noted that the details of the ZDF should be worked out later in the process of negotiating a political settlement. Owen agreed but commented that the question of pensions, which former Secretary Kissinger had perhaps oversold, remains important in the eyes of the white community and, most likely, in the eyes of both major parties in Parliament. The Vice President reiterated that we must proceed with care in developing the terms of the Fund so that it is acceptable to the donors and to Congress. Lake pointed out that the Congress will likely object to any arrangement which seems specifically designed for white interests. The Africans, too, have problems with the Fund, and it is therefore probably best to leave the arrangements general for the moment and define them more specifically later. Owen suggested that the US and the UK begin to discuss the issue at an experts’ level.
9. In response to Lake’s question about the timing of elections, Owen suggested that by the end of the Commonwealth Conference, the British may be able to put together the broad outlines of a constitution. They would then set about winning agreement among the parties to ten or twelve basic principles, after which British constitutional experts would fill in the details and prepare the required legislation. Owen noted that Ian Smith claimed that the Rhodesian Parliament itself must pass any constitutional bill by a two-thirds majority. While this may be a stalling tactic, it could also reflect an element of Rhodesian [Page 445] pride. In any event, if the principles can be agreed in June, the details can be developed in August and September. Draft legislation could be introduced to the House of Commons by the end of November and could presumably emerge from Parliament by the following February.
10. The important remaining issue, Owen said, will be the nature of the interim government. It is conceivable that some or all of the parties may ask for a return to colonial status. The British response, Owen said, would depend in large part on the US and on the support we would be willing to offer. In any event, at this delicate juncture, the British would not want to be sucked into taking responsibility for Rhodesia. The UK is prepared to undertake a role for a specific period of time but not to guarantee that the violence will stop or, for example, that the guerrillas will be successfully integrated into the armed forces.
11. Lake asked to what degree it might be necessary to impose constitutional and transitional arrangements on the parties. Owen replied that it is difficult to predict how the initiative will unfold and what amount of pressure may be required. Much will depend on the de-escalation of violence after the agreement of constitutional principles. There must then be a gradual re-integration of the guerrillas and the introduction of outside elements such as Commonwealth personnel. Moreover, much will depend on whether Smith proves intractable on every issue along the way. The Vice President interjected that we had talked to Vorster precisely because we wished to give him the reasons why he must press Smith to cooperate. A great deal will depend on successful communication with the South Africans.
12. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that the proposals for an interim government which had developed under Ivor Richard’s direction in January remained on the table.3 Perhaps these would be picked up when the time came for discussing transitional arrangements and we could thus avoid developing another formula. Owen said that Vorster had left him with the impression that Smith would be prepared to step down if satisfied with the equity of the constitution and if not pressed publicly. Owen agreed with the Vice President that Vorster has considerable influence in the equation. He referred to a statement made by Smith which indicated that he had no illusions about the consequences of deceiving the South Africans. It is therefore necessary, Owen went on, to convince the South Africans that what is offered is good and fair. Owen again mentioned that if consititutional principles can be developed by the end of June, he may return to Southern Africa sometime during the following month.
[Page 446]13. Lake pointed out the danger of appearing to the Front Line Presidents and to the Patriotic Front to have sided with the whites. We run this danger even if the Patriotic Front is recalcitrant during the consultative process. It is important, Lake said, that if the current initiative fails, it be clearly seen that the white element has been the cause of obstruction. We cannot afford to isolate ourselves from the Nationalists. Owen said that while he agreed with Lake, he nevertheless contended that it would be impossible to undertake this process without making enemies. The whites are important, but any negotiations with them are bound to be criticized by the blacks. While the future of Zimbabwe is unquestionably one of African rule, there is a danger that the whites may simply surrender any measure of responsibility for the country and this would inevitably lead to civil war.
14. The Vice President commented that our objectives must be to moderate both sides without exacerbating the situation. We must talk about this strategy in detail, he said. He suggested that meetings at all levels between our two governments continue, and he assured the Foreign Secretary that we support his efforts. We have no illusions about the difficulty in succeeding. The Vice President said he did not relish his two days with Vorster but that Vorster needed to know how fully we support the Owen Mission. He again stressed that US–UK talks are crucial. Owen agreed, suggesting that exchanges continue through working groups and offering to come to Washington at any time it may prove necessary. Lake noted that the working groups would prove invaluable in avoiding misunderstandings as to which party may be veering in which direction. The Vice President and the Foreign Secretary agreed that such talks should begin soon.
15. The Vice President then asked McHenry to describe the Namibia portion of the dialogue with the South Africans. McHenry said that while the South Africans had not appeared prepared to discuss the question in depth, they nevertheless seemed to be backtracking from the discussions carried out by the Contact Group three weeks ago in Cape Town. In particular, Vorster implied that the Five had been concerned about the name of the central administrative authority and not about the substance. Our suspicions that Turnhalle may in fact prove to be the basis for an interim government came close to confirmation. Vorster had spoken of interim arrangments in ethnic terms. The Vice President had made clear that the nature of the interim government was vital and that any effort to “stack the deck” would make meaningless whatever followed. Vorster seemed committed to Turnhalle and it is not clear yet how we can extract him from that commitment.
16. On the question of political prisoners, McHenry continued, Vorster agreed to the concept of an international commission of jurists and appeared to accept the suggestions that prisoners would be trans[Page 447]ferred to Namibia. He also raised the question of Namibians held in Zambia and Tanzania, and we agreed to pursue this point. McHenry stated that in the likely event that South African proposals for an interim arrangement prove unacceptable, we ourselves may be obliged to put forward an alternative plan. McHenry said that the Vice President had made it abundantly clear to Vorster that Turnhalle, no matter how presented, is unacceptable.
17. The Vice President stressed that it is imperative to move quickly on the Namibian issue. It is possible that the next series of meetings could produce a formula for an interim authority which Vorster could accept. If the West can clear this hurdle, and come to a satisfactory agreement on prisoners, then the rest would appear to fit into place. Prompt progress on Namibia will have a favorable influence on the Rhodesia process and will help create a more moderate mood in all of Africa. Failure, on the other hand, makes the other problems even more insoluble. The Vice President confessed he was slightly less pessimistic than McHenry. He explained that the South Africans want international acceptability and the best place they can find it is in Namibia.
18. Owen agreed that the crucial question in Namibia is the nature of the interim authority. He pointed to the inevitable pressures and challenges which will present themselves in the United Nations and emphasized the desirability of joint US–UK talks about these problems. “We need to know how far we can go,” he said. “It will test our credibility in Africa.” It was agreed with the Vice President that Owen could discuss these issues with Secretary Vance in early June in Paris and that this meeting would be preceded by detailed preparations at the working level. Owen added that the Paris meeting would have the additional asset of bringing in the French and Germans who appear more concerned on Namibia than on Rhodesia.
19. Owen congratulated the Vice President on his meeting with Vorster. It was important to convey the message directly, he said. There has been too much doubt in the past. The Vice President commented that he expects more progress on Rhodesia and Namibia if we press South Africa on its domestic problems. The talks in Vienna have been of fundamental importance for our longer term interests in Africa, he concluded.
20. Non-African topics were not discussed during the meetings.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2515. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- See Document 158.↩
- See Document 131.↩