273. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State1
591. Please pass Eyes Only for the President from Ambassador. Subj: Meeting With Prime Minister Vorster. Ref: State 085992,2 Cape Town 0568.3
1. Over lunch today I conveyed to Prime Minister Vorster the points contained in your message. He was accompanied by FonMin Botha and OFA Secretary Brand Fourie. The luncheon was somewhat hurried because the Prime Minister had to hasten back to Parliament for the budget debate.
2. After my presentation the Prime Minister first asked that I go over the second paragraph of the points, particularly the section expressing need for progress on Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. He then inquired whether the special emissary would be coming to South Africa. I told him this was not excluded. It would depend, however, upon whether significant concrete developments can be achieved. Such developments would be needed in order to establish a positive framework for contacts with a cross-section of South Africans of different races and political persuasions which a high-level emissary would be expected to make during a visit to South Africa.
3. FonMin Botha then entered the discussion to inquire what was meant by significant results. He asked whether the results referred to had to be anticipated before the decision was taken to send an emissary or could flow from the discussions after he arrived. The Prime Minister joined in this request noting that conversations with former Secretary Kissinger last year produced good results which flowed from the talks. The fact that it was not possible to implement them did not detract from their positive quality. He added that he did not think it possible to state in advance what the results might be since these would depend upon the understandings reached. He said he did not know what more he could do on Rhodesia except support the Owen effort, which he was prepared to do. On Namibia, the discussions with the Five Powers were pending and the wishes of the SWA people had to be taken into [Page 816] consideration. He displayed sensitivity on the domestic front saying that South Africa could never accept dictation on domestic policy.
4. I reassured the Prime Minister that no one was talking about dictating. You were interested in an indication of his views on actions which South Africa might take to advance peaceful settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia and his thinking on how progress might be made on the domestic front. This would be helpful in deciding whether a visit by a high-level emissary at this time would be useful.
5. The Prime Minister’s response to my efforts to draw him out was evasive. He said that results cannot be anticipated. They should flow from the conversations and not be committed to paper in advance. He asked that I convey to you that “he thinks it would be worthwhile to have the discussions” and that “he was sure that positive results can flow from the discussions.” Later on he said that the discussions would: (a) produce a better understanding of the situation, (b) clarify misunderstandings and misconceptions, and (c) promote peace in Southern Africa which we are all looking for.4
6. When the discussion turned to latest developments in Rhodesia and Namibia, the Prime Minister was slightly more forthcoming. On Rhodesia he said he wanted to reiterate to you his support for the Owen effort and to guarantee that he would see to it that Smith lived up to whatever agreement is reached. On Namibia, he said that leaders of the groups participating in Turnhalle would be coming to Cape Town next Friday, April 22. He would be seeing them. Among the items to be discussed is the Five-Power demarche. He wanted to acquaint them with its terms. (Botha added later that the discussion would also include the implications of the demarche for Turnhalle.) Implementation of the Turnhalle Agreements depended on their wishes. If they want action this parliamentary session, they must ask for it by the middle of May. He stressed that enabling legislation for an interim government decides nothing on a permanent basis because the decisions on the shape of the independence government remain to be taken. I noted that setting up an interim government would compli[Page 817]cate reaching an internationally acceptable solution. He disagreed asserting that it makes it easier. On the domestic front, he was reluctant to speak beyond saying that he would be happy to explain to the emissary what his longer term plans are.
7. In the end the Prime Minister asked that I convey to you his interest in receiving the Vice President. He is convinced that it would lead to positive results but was no more specific. He said that if you had any particular questions, he would be happy to try to answer them. It was clear that he regards the ball in our court, having given what he regards as a favorable response.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 45, Africa: Southern Africa: 3–8/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- See Document 272.↩
- In telegram 568 from Cape Town, April 16, the Embassy informed the Department that Bowdler was invited to lunch with Vorster on April 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800020–1200)↩
- In telegram 92271 to Cape Town, April 23, the Department wrote: “We consider Vorster’s response to be insufficient. The President’s message made it clear that we are not disposed to have a high-level emissary meet with Vorster unless there are real prospects for progress. In order to make an adequate assessment of the prospects, we need a clearer idea about what positive steps South Africa is prepared to take regarding Rhodesia, Namibia and the future political evolution of South Africa itself. Neither Vorster nor Botha did this during their conversation with you. Accordingly, you should convey to Botha and through him to Vorster (unless you have separate opportunity to see PM) that before we can send an emissary to meet somewhere with the Prime Minister, we must have a much fuller explanation from them of the SAG’s intentions regarding Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa’s racial situation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086–0029)↩