Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

276. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, May 19, 1977

SUBJECT

• Second Meeting Between Vice President Mondale and Prime Minister Vorster: Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • Vice President Walter F. Mondale
  • Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Adviser to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Mr. W. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
  • Ambassador Donald McHenry, USUN
  • Ambassador to South Africa William Bowdler
  • Mr. A. Denis Clift, Adviser to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
  • Mr. James Johnson, Executive Assistant to the Vice President
  • Mr. Jay Kenneth Katzen, USUN (Note taker)

• South Africa

  • Prime Minister B.J. Vorster
  • Foreign Minister Botha
  • General van den Bergh
  • South African Ambassador to the United States Donald Sole
  • Mr. Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. Franklin, South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Acting Permanent Representative to the UN Eksteen

The meeting began at 1445.

Vice President Mondale: I have looked into the Rhodesia question.² The only reference I have found is a memorandum of conversation between Owen and the South African Government several weeks ago, in which Owen said it would be difficult to get sponsors if the Fund were interpreted as a buy out. Owen knows the Congressional views, and the Congress didn’t support the Fund for only buy out purposes.

Prime Minister Vorster: Owen never mentioned this to me.

Mr. Fourie: The question asked was, “Is the Fund dead?”, and the answer was, “No, it is very much alive”.

Vice President Mondale: We support the Fund, but not the buy out aspect envisaged by Dr. Kissinger.³ We support stability in a future Zimbabwe through constitutional guarantees, a swift move to elections, which will create a moderate government and, as we develop details of the Fund, we would be willing to shape assurances of protection and help to property owners. This would be part of the consulting process.

Prime Minister Vorster: We reserve our position. We will have to go back and look at the minutes.

Vice President Mondale: The position of the Congress and our own position are clear. The original plan was for a buy out Fund. It now would be a way to have provisions which will reassure all. Perhaps the money from the Fund could be used for expenses within Rhodesia, which would release other funds which could be used for that purpose. We hope that a post-independence Rhodesia would be secure for all.

Mr. Fourie: You have mentioned a desire to include protection for those with property. Would that include pensions?

Vice President Mondale: I can’t get into details. But we believe, yes. And property at a real market value.

Prime Minister Vorster: We reserve our stand. We will have to clear up the matter with the British.

Vice President Mondale: In an effort to produce a constructive hopeful environment, could you agree to the following language?: “The South African Government agrees to support British/American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements, including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally, so that Zimbabwe . . .

Prime Minister Vorster: Rhodesia . . .

Vice President Mondale: “. . . can achieve independence during 1978”.

Prime Minister Vorster: I will consider it and reply before you leave. I already have told the Five my position concerning South West Africa.⁴ South Africa is not occupying the territory, but is administering it, and has done so since entrusted to by the Mandate. We do not want one inch for ourselves. It is not part of South Africa, and we would not incorporate it if you wanted us to. South West Africa belongs to various peoples; they are independent people, have different languages, different cultures, different levels of development, and different numbers. We always wanted it to come to independence as an entity although, for a period, we explored establishing separate development—which is what they wanted. From 1967, we agreed that the peoples would determine their own future. Six years ago, Secretary General Waldheim came to South Africa.⁵ As a result, he agreed to send a personal representative to South Africa and South West Africa. He was Dr. Escher, a Swiss diplomat in Vienna. Escher and I came to an understanding, in writing.⁶ We both signed it. I received a copy of Escher’s report, and that was the last I heard. The fact is that Escher was ignored: such is the nature of UNO. Both Waldheim and Escher reproached us, saying that we were keeping the people of South West Africa from each other. As a result, to the satisfaction of Waldheim and Escher, I brought the leaders together, to know each other, and to work together. I have kept to this obligation. Meetings have been held and agreement was reached to work together. The Ovambo people, which constitute 47% of the population, have an elected, adult suffrage, one-man one-vote government. They have had several elections. In the last one, two years ago, all Ovambos who had left were invited back, with the agreement that nothing would be held against them. Many came. The only requirement was to come in peace. SWAPO had a chance to participate in the elections, which were held as elections are held in South Africa and the United States. The Okavango, who constitute 50,000 of South West Africa’s 800,000 people, also have an elected government, with a cabinet, and ministers. South Africa never, from the Mandate, governed either Ovambo or Okavango. The Basters have 16,000 out of 800,000 people. They are proud of being Basters. They will come up on the street and introduce themselves as Basters. They have their own constitution. They also have governed themselves and have laws which apply only if the Basters want them applied. The Damaras, and there are 65,000 of them, haven’t a government yet. Nor do the Hereros, who are 43,000. They all want a government and have asked for it, and we owe them governments. From the Escher/Waldheim meetings, the South West African authorities decided to hold a conference which led to the meeting at Turnhalle. This was serious work. By a miracle a consensus approved a constitution. South Africa is commited to giving them a constitution. We warned the parties of this commitment and have told them that by mid-May, they would be asking for it. After all, they drew it up. I have no desire to interfere. Had it not been for the Five, I would have given them that constitution. But the Five objected seriously. I stuck my neck out far by agreeing not to have the South African Parliament approve the constitution. Rather, the State President will. But, I suggested that the contact group see the people in Windhoek. Turnhalle is not my friend: it is my enemy. That is the situation. Now our attitude is—and no one will get us away from this—that it is their situation to decide.

Vice President Mondale: As I understand it, agreement was reached with the Five that there would be elections, with all participating.⁷

Prime Minister Vorster: There was no agreement. The Five said they had to go back to their governments. We said we had to go to speak to the people at Turnhalle. I don’t know what happened. I didn’t see the people at Turnhalle. But you should know that 95% of the white electorate approved the Turnhalle constitution the other day.

Vice President Mondale: Secondly, I understand that agreement was reached for the UN to have a representative present to satisfy the fairness of the elections and the electoral process.⁸

Prime Minister Vorster: To give it international credibility. Yes.

Vice President Mondale: Thirdly, that South Africa agreed to withdraw instrumentalities of government in phases.⁹

Prime Minister Vorster: “After the installation of a government”.

Ambassador McHenry: We discussed the development of a program for the withdrawal of instrumentalities after the electoral process.

Vice President Mondale: That was the situation then on withdrawal. There were no agreements on detainees and political prisoners, or restrictive laws. But we found these discussions very hopeful.

Prime Minister Vorster: I also agreed on 31 December 1978 as the date for independence.

Vice President Mondale: There was progress and we were glad of it. There also were problems and we’d like to discuss them.

Prime Minister Vorster: Fine. What happened in the later talks you had after the Capetown meeting?

Ambassador McHenry: As agreed, we sent representatives to Windhoek, to speak to Internal SWAPO, the National Front, church leaders and others. We also have spoken since to External SWAPO, the Front Line Presidents and members of the Security Council. There was a full gamut of reactions, running from the belief that real progress had been achieved to the feeling that no progress had been reached. There also was suspicion over the trust-worthiness of South Africa. In general, the questions asked were the same as those asked in Capetown: What is the “central administering authority”? There was concern over the extent of UN involvement which would be necessary to overcome suspicion. The question of political prisoners had to be resolved. There must be a phased withdrawal. South Africa could be in a position to intimidate, thereby upsetting the environment for free elections. These were the basic questions; there also were other ones. The reaction of the Turnhalle group was different. They suspected any UN role. They were disappointed over the delay in ratification, but were open.

Prime Minister Vorster: Only this morning I received a telegram from them asking the status of the constitution.

Vice President Mondale: The United States supports Security Council Resolution 385.¹⁰ That requires an impartial interim administering authority, which would not prejudge the future government by tilting. In order to be consistent with Resolution 385, it must be a neutral authority. Secondly, we need fair and equal participation in a national election. Its purpose should be to create a constituent assembly, leading to a constitution and a governing process. What does South Africa have in mind?

Prime Minister Vorster: We already explained this to you. Most of the people already have their own governments; there are some without. The Hereros and Damaras want local government. My government and I are committed to give it to them. Normally, there would have been a law approved by the South African Parliament before the end of June but, to accommodate the Five, rather than Parliament, I agreed that the State President could promulgate it. I understood that the Five looked favorably upon this. I am also heavily committed to give them a constitution, if they want it. But again, as I have said, I agreed that rather than Parliament, the State President will promulgate it. This is an absolute minimum. The South African Government will give the Damaras and Hereros local government and give an interim government to South West Africa. The people are elected under a system the same as that which we seek to apply in Rhodesia.

Vice President Mondale: What is the central authority?

Prime Minister Vorster: Whereas the Ovambos would have been entitled to 47% participation in the central authority/interim government, they won’t ask for it. The government will have representatives of each population group. At the most, there will be two whites and eleven non-whites. That is the way they are used to working.

Vice President Mondale: This is a very serious matter from our own standpoint. It was our hope that South Africa would accept national elections with all Namibians participating, leading to a constituent assembly, which would create a constitution. The structure would have free and equal elections, without an intimidating environment. As in Rhodesia, many leaders want to be anointed.

Prime Minister Vorster: The leaders in South West Africa have been elected.

Foreign Minister Botha: In Rhodesia and South West Africa, like it nor not, there is a central authority.

Vice President Mondale: We want a neutral administrative authority doing all the necessary functions, while elections are conducted leading to the preparation of a constitution.

Foreign Minister Botha: Elections are not ruled out.

Vice President Mondale: That’s our objective. The Turnhalle structure was rejected both by the UN and the United States.¹¹ You don’t need my sermons, though. But I can tell you that the equivalent of the Turnhalle conference, as the central authority, would be rejected.

Prime Minister Vorster: An election was envisaged. Turnhalle would prefer a referendum of all South West Africans, with equal voting and adult suffrage, concerning the issue of a constitution, i.e., to ratify the Turnhalle constitution. I believe that this is the fair way. If you think it is not representative, test it. No harm is done by doing that.

Ambassador McHenry: At Capetown, the Foreign Minister suggested that the Turnhalle constitution would not be submitted to Parliament. Rather, administrative rearrangements would be made to create a central administering authority. The term “interim government” was not used.¹²

Foreign Minister Botha: I dropped it.

Ambassador McHenry: The Group had reservations over your position. To the extent that this authority resembles Turnhalle, it would complicate efforts to reach a solution. But the Group at Capetown was in the impossible position of trying to shape things but being told when we raised questions that the South African Government had not had enough time to develop answers. South Africa had insisted in the agreed points that the central authority would not be Turnhalle by another name. Although Turnhalle representatives were elected, there is a question over the participation in the election, and whether the electorate really had a choice. The reason we are asking for details is to avoid a stacked deck. The central authority could determine the future form of a government in Namibia. The question of local authorities was raised, and the contact group said that possibly this would be no problem.

Prime Minister Vorster: We envisage one representative participating in the central authority from each tribal group, and not all tribal groups would be included. The UK representative had asked me whether this would not be a reconstitution of Turnhalle. I said, “more or less”. You asked about including businessmen. That was thoroughly discussed.

Vice President Mondale: Our hopes are somewhat smashed. We had thought that questions on the UN and so on related to what form was to be determined for the central authority. Now we learn that the result of these talks will still mean Turnhalle authority, with representation determined by tribe. It is thus possible that a “yes” or “no” proposition will be put to the Namibians regarding their future by a group elected by many, but without full participation or national approval. This solution will not receive international acceptance.

It will be internationally rejected. The United States will oppose it. It will result in the aggravation of what I hoped to have, namely, better relations with South Africa. This is not a threat. But in sorrow, I ask you to reconsider this question. Such a conference which may be held could accept parts of the Turnhalle constitution, which could be accepted internationally through a fully participating election, leading to a constituent assembly, and independence. This would reflect your commitment to fulfill the wishes of the South West African people.

Prime Minister Vorster: As much as the United States, South Africa wishes to get out of South West Africa. The costs of remaining are higher than we currently can afford. If we leave, we will take what we own. This would lead to a standstill. But if we are forced, we will do so. We will take the railroad wagons and rolling stock out. We want our troops and police to leave. They both cost a lot of money. We are only there because governments have asked us to be. If we left, we would have an Angola twice over due to SWAPO and, as in Rhodesia, abductions of our people.¹³ We have a common purpose. But I would rather leave public life than be responsible for such a development. I am absolutely committed, having promised the people of South West Africa an interim government. If I did not do so, this would totally destroy the credibility of South Africa with South West Africa.

Vice President Mondale: We don’t care about the name of the authority. We do care about the process, and participation in developing the structure. If such is done, we and the international community would support an independent Namibia, and also thereby have improved relations with South Africa. We don’t like communism. What we did in the United States was to deny them their causes. Communists use pockets of violence to exploit a situation and to accelerate hostility and more violence. In Namibia and Rhodesia we have a chance to turn the corner. Turnhalle would contribute only to producing an undesirable environment.

Prime Minister Vorster: That’s where we differ.

Vice President Mondale: Aspects of Turnhalle can be included in the settlement. We want all people to participate in the elections.

Prime Minister Vorster: That’s alright. The machinery of the electoral process could be supervised by the UN.

Vice President Mondale: But we had hoped elections would be to determine the process.

Foreign Minister Botha: That is not ruled out.

Vice President Mondale: I thought you said that elections would be constituted to ratify Turnhalle.

Prime Minister Vorster: South West Africa would prefer the Turnhalle system, and I think it’s best. There would be elections under universal suffrage for a constituent assembly, leading to an independent government.

Vice President Mondale: What is the entity of the interim government?

Prime Minister Vorster: We haven’t clarified it with the Turnhalle. The Foreign Minister has been busy with his own election recently.

Foreign Minister Botha: There have been 31 years of dispute over South West Africa. That’s a long time. We had 5–6 International Court decisions, over 200 General Assembly resolutions and Security Council resolutions. Our real concerns are South West African independence as an entity within a reasonable period, with majority rule and no prejudgment as to its future government. Too much is being made of what the central authority is. You fear that an interim government would give an edge to one side. Turnhalle has been in operation for three years. South Africa could have influenced the details, but they have not yet been worked out. There is nothing sinister here.

Vice President Mondale: The structure must be suitable. The question is who will be the interim government.

Prime Minister Vorster: South West Africa will not control all the ministries.

Vice President Mondale: The interim period will be crucial. If it is only Turnhalle, it will not be accepted. If it is broadly created, it could be. The nature of its functions must be clearly neutral and all Namibia should participate in the process, with UN involvement. Then, we are coming close. The key point is what is the interim government?

Prime Minister Vorster: Would it suit you better if we withdrew tomorrow lock, stock and barrel from South West Africa:

Vice President Mondale: We want a stable situation. We wish full participation in elections, and a constituent assembly. We want your cooperation.

Prime Minister Vorster: There are only two alternatives for South Africa: Either we pull out and stop salaries and payments, telling South West Africa that we’re sorry, but that we have been forced out or, to do what people have asked. Turnhalle is representative, no matter what you think. You should accede to their minimum demands and that government, calling it by whatever name you wish. I will accord local government to the Damaras and Hereros and an interim government will be set up to run daily life. Then elections will be held, with caveats mentioned by the Five, on a territory-wide basis. Independence will come for one territorial entity. These are the only two alternatives. I can’t think of another.

Vice President Mondale: The process needs international acceptability. It is in your best interests, we believe, and in the interest of better relations with the United States, to support a neutral authority, which will lead to elections, a constitution and independence.

Foreign Minister Botha: Your concern is exaggerated. What we envisage is an alternative to the status quo. Currently, there is a white legislature in the South, a colored council advisory body, a Rehoboth authority, and black governments in the north. Certain members of South African ministries now are in South West Africa. They could have manipulated and still can far more than the central authority will be able to. The central authority as we envisaged it will be open, and black dominated, and will achieve the goals we seek.

Vice President Mondale: What would be the powers of the interim government?

Foreign Minister Botha: We have discussed this with the people at Turnhalle. Turnhalle is ready to move ahead on a change in some of the modalities.

Vice President Mondale: We are grateful for the schedule having been changed.

Foreign Minister Botha: The Prime Minister’s own caucus would ask him to leave office if he does not honor his commitment.

Prime Minister Vorster: Over the years, the UN demanded independence for South West Africa as a whole, “come hell or high water”. If this then is not acceptable, it is not our problem. At least we can wash our hands of it.

Foreign Minister Botha: Independence would be preceeded by a fair test.

Vice President Mondale: What if you withdrew now? What would the world say were South Africa to withdraw when Namibia was internally fragmented?

Prime Minister Vorster: That always was the case.

Vice President Mondale: Can we define the interim government which will move the process forward to elections as being fair and independent?

Ambassador McHenry: Whether South Africa considers this a small matter or not, the interim government is seen as an important shaper of the future.

Foreign Minister Botha: The status quo also could shape the future. There is much focus on the interim government and the interim period. We don’t want a system like that in Rhodesia. We are almost in agreement. Since there is only one point of contention, it would be a pity to have this cause us to differ.

Prime Minister Vorster: The interim government isn’t new; it is two years old. No one objected to it before. You must accept the point that we are committed. I cannot stay in public life if I do not honor that commitment.

Vice President Mondale: Opposition to the Turnhalle was set forth when the contact group met.¹⁴

Prime Minister Vorster (to Fourie): Has any government gone on record as objecting to Turnhalle?

Mr. Fourie (to Prime Minister Vorster): We have received no note on this.

Vice President Mondale: On April 22, 1975, we sent an Aide Memoire to you, along with the UK and France.¹⁵ On October 23, 1975, we, the UK, and France made a demarche concerning this.¹⁶ Dr. Kissinger also sought an alternative to Turnhalle.

Foreign Minister Botha: That is incorrect. Dr. Kissinger wanted the conference moved to Geneva, with SWAPO joining it.¹⁷

Ambassador McHenry: Our underlying efforts have been for equal participation. Turnhalle has not been a fully participatory organization.

Mr. Fourie: The presentation by the Five was the first time we heard this.

Prime Minister Vorster: The Ford Government had said that SWAPO did not have a full chance to participate. We said we would tell Turnhalle of that view. Dr. Kissinger said that money for a Geneva conference to include Turnhalle and SWAPO would be raised. He drew up the Seven Points, to which we agreed.¹⁸ The program then was put to SWAPO, and SWAPO shot it down.

Mr. Fourie: Dr. Kissinger asked the Prime Minister not to allow Turnhalle to go too fast. The first deadline was extended to November, then later. We said not later than January–February.

Vice President Mondale: Let’s take a short break.

The meeting adjourned, 1630–1700.

Vice President Mondale: Concerning the interim authority, I suggest, as we just discussed privately, that we have the contact group come to Capetown in two weeks to discuss with your government plans for phased withdrawal and other details.

Prime Minister Vorster: We had a gentleman’s agreement that phased withdrawal would be the last item discussed.

Ambassador McHenry: The phrase we agreed to was “South Africa would prepare a plan for phased withdrawal”.

Prime Minister Vorster: That is correct. It was a “plan for withdrawal at the end of the political process.”

Ambassador McHenry: It is somewhat imprecise.

Prime Minister Vorster: I am reading from your document.

Vice President Mondale: That’s the first time we have ever been imprecise.

Ambassador McHenry: We wouldn’t await the end of the process before the withdrawal. We should discuss this.

Prime Minister Vorster: Alright, but this is our stand.

Vice President Mondale: Then the contact group will meet again in Capetown in two weeks, there will be free and fair national elections, leading to a constituent assembly, leading to a constitution and phased withdrawal. This would be internationally acceptable.

Prime Minister Vorster: I suggest we meet 1 June. I can’t make it 31 May.

Vice President Mondale: Let’s say late May, at a date to be immediately determined. It will discuss the nature of the central administrative authority. Would you discuss withdrawal at that time?

Prime Minister Vorster: Yes. I’ll discuss all questions.

Vice President Mondale: OK.

Foreign Minister Botha: The Turnhalle representatives should be present. They would be helpful.

Ambassador McHenry: I can’t speak for the Five, but I think our position is that it would be inappropriate. The UN wouldn’t be there, nor would any group like SWAPO, or the National Front. We have tried to brief all groups. We don’t want to anoint one group. We are prepared to explore the ideas there with you first, then with other parties.

Prime Minister Vorster: I can understand your point of view, but they will be there because we have to refer to them.

Vice President Mondale: That poses real difficulties for us.

Prime Minister Vorster: As we said at coffee, I have my own commitments to honor by 20 June, if we don’t find each other. I am not saying we will.

Vice President Mondale: Having Turnhalle present would be different from the first meeting, and would imply tilting. I understand your position; you understand ours. Both governments should think carefully about this over the next few weeks. I don’t know if we can reach an agreement, but we should make the effort. Maybe now, since elections prevented you from doing so earlier, we can come up with something, reserving the right to pursue our own policies.

Prime Minister Vorster: I’m prepared to meet you there.

Vice President Mondale: Let’s talk about the question of returnees.

Ambassador McHenry: This involves language referring to “all persons”.

Prime Minister Vorster: I accepted that in Capetown. It has been and is our policy. But it does not apply to those floating around. According to our intelligence, a substantial number are being detained in Zambia and elsewhere.

Vice President Mondale: All should be allowed to return.

Prime Minister Vorster: You realize that those have been detained for not agreeing with Nujoma.

Vice President Mondale: Yes.

Prime Minister Vorster: The distinction between detainees and political prisoners was made in Capetown.

Vice President Mondale: They should be released.

Prime Minister Vorster: There is a difference between detainees and common prisoners.

Vice President Mondale: In the United States, we have had success over a period of 200 years and know that the best way to destroy an opponent is not to lock him up, but let him speak. Don’t martyr your militants.

Prime Minister Vorster: They have been guilty of arson, murder and theft; there is a distinction.

Vice President Mondale: There are charges though, that they are incarcerated. You can’t have an electoral campaign and process without the prisoners being freed and returned. The United States is having its own fight with the Soviet Union over political prisoners. Solzhenytsin, Sakharov, Bukovsky, Amalrik, and others were in jail only because the Soviets didn’t want to listen to them. We have honored them, including sending a letter to Sakharov, which made Brezhnev mad, and receiving Bukovsky in the White House. At Belgrade we are making our point over political prisoners. There is difference between a militant and a political dissident. The contact group suggested setting up an international commission of jurists. If the prisoners could be returned to Namibia and cases reviewed by the commission of jurists, that might be an acceptable solution.

Prime Minister Vorster: We can discuss that too. It was discussed with Kissinger; he gave us a list.¹⁹ We reviewed it and have made a note. According to the note, a substantial number of those on the list already were released, but their names were still on. A substantial number were never detained whatsoever. Those convicted of crimes we cannot release, but we could if SWAPO states that it seeks peaceful change, will cease its terrorism, and that release of prisoners will not jeopardize either of these objectives. The final decision is up to the South African government. It is sensible that the commission might look into it.

Ambassador McHenry: At Capetown there was some agreement on detainees.

Prime Minister Vorster: Let’s have further discussion.

Ambassador McHenry: Now.

Vice President Mondale: Yes, now. It is an important question. Where the courts have decided a case is criminal, the commission would have jurisdiction to decide on its own.

Mr. Fourie: The commission would settle electoral disputes and decide who is a political prisoner.

Vice President Mondale: The first part of that was accepted.

Prime Minister Vorster: Let’s discuss this in Capetown. I have to see my colleagues and will try to review the matter as favorably as possible.

Vice President Mondale: Both of us have served in public life; we know of the need for political gestures. We know that there are Namibian prisoners held elsewhere. We object to that and will say so. We suggest that it would be a helpful political gesture for Namibian prisoners whom you hold in South Africa to be returned to Namibia with the assistance of an international commission.

Foreign Minister Botha: We have reliable intelligence that as soon as this becomes known, that is that we will release prisoners without a trial, that there will be hasty military trials held for South West African prisoners detained in other countries, and that they will be executed summarily. We need urgent action to avoid this. Nujoma will not want to have released prisoners who oppose him.

Vice President Mondale: That is an excellent point, and we will act on it.

Prime Minister Vorster: Some may argue that all prisoners should be released on the same day.

Vice President Mondale: Just because other countries don’t release their prisoners at the same time doesn’t justify you not releasing yours. It would be a point of honor for South Africa to do so, and provide an example. It would put you in a good position, and help us enormously.

Foreign Minister Botha: Isn’t that a double standard?

Prime Minister Vorster: We would lose face with the blacks in Ovambo whose relatives are held in Zambia.

Vice President Mondale: Tell them that to do otherwise would build up pressure.

Prime Minister Vorster: I would lose face.

Foreign Minister Botha: If we don’t move quickly, they will shoot them.

Prime Minister Vorster: It would be better were you to say in your approach to the Zambians that we have a guarantee that if you release your political prisoners, South Africa will.

Vice President Mondale: If I may go off the record, I believe that if some of your prisoners were released, they could represent a moderating force on SWAPO.

Prime Minister Vorster: Our intelligence is just the opposite.

Vice President Mondale: Why does Njoma want them in jail then?

Foreign Minister Botha: Your criticism just isn’t fair. Many former SWAPO members are returning to South West Africa voluntarily, and are participating in political life. Karena and Kazunguizi are examples.

Vice President Mondale: We would like South Africa to provide an example on this and consider it seriously.

Prime Minister Vorster: Alright, but others should too.

Vice President Mondale: OK, but I hope this is not a condition.

Prime Minister Vorster: Look into the Zambian and Tanzanian prisoners.

Foreign Minister Botha: Have you seen the Amnesty International Report on SWAPO detainees in Zambia?

Vice President Mondale: We want their release, too. I’d like to discuss South Africa tomorrow and hope that you will study our language on Rhodesia in the meantime. I’m not going to advise, but I want to tell you about us and what is going on in America in order for you to understand us better. Mr. Botha knows much of this already. We have undergone a profound transformation over the past ten years. Those who deal with us must understand this. For 200 years, our record on race was disgraceful. It separated people in politics, schools, buses, business, and systems of justice. Growing up a non-white was a curse. We had slavery. For 100 years, we made a long and tortuous march to justice. We are not perfect, but we are proud of where we are. We are proud of our attitudes toward each other. We have gained increased strength as a nation over the past ten years. When I replaced Hubert Humphrey in the Senate, many senators from the South would argue against blacks, saying they were violent, communists and rip-offs; they saw Martin Luther King as a dishonest hustler. It was a dangerous situation which led to violence. In 1968–69, our cities looked like we were at war. Washington looked like Vietnam—it was sickening. We have eliminated all laws which separate and discriminate. We have insisted on enforcing the constitution in schools and elsewhere. Now we’re doing things together—politics, religion, education. A symbol of that is that we have the first southern President in 130 years. In a town that is 80% black, he led the fight for equality. Martin Luther King’s assistant represents us at the United Nations. The result is more peace and good will and strength in the United States. It is indescribable. We have an economic boom in precisely those places where most discrimination had existed. Atlanta is the heart of that boom. We have no more rhetoric. Blacks want to become middle class and rich, as we all do. Perhaps no one is more middle class than the blacks. In the South, blacks are often elected by whites, as in Andy Young’s case. Tom Bradley was elected in Los Angeles, which is only 10% non-white. We are not only at peace with ourselves, but can challenge others; before, we couldn’t. Now, Brezhnev is angry with us because he can’t attack us. President Carter wanted me to describe this to you. It was reflected in the prompt repeal of the Byrd Amendment.²⁰ The change is fundamental and enduring. It is based on religion. Human rights are at the core of our meaning, and those who deal with us must understand this.

Prime Minister Vorster: There really isn’t any time for me to reply. Could we meet tomorrow a bit earlier?

Vice President Mondale: Yes. Let’s meet at 8:00 o’clock, and continue on now. Let’s also agree not to make any statement to the press tonight.

Prime Minister Vorster: Fine. You have said that blacks are not inferior. I too have said that they are not. I have asked, “who am I as a creature of God to say another is inferior?” The basis of our philosophy is not that I am better. But there are certain South African realities you must understand, and certain backgrounds. Let’s look at education. The better an education, the better one’s chance for fulfillment. Before my government came to power, the state had no responsibility for black education—only for the whites and some for Coloreds. It subsidized state and religious organizations. Then, my predecessor, Dr. Verwoerd, took over Bantu education. 7.5 million pounds were set aside for black education. The South Africans who are feted in the United States opposed that then. In 1955, the state accepted full responsibility for black education. In 1955, 731,000 blacks were in primary school; in 1973, 2,166,000 blacks were in primary school; now, 22% of the whole black population is at school—the highest in all of Africa. 3,200,000 blacks are now in schools of all levels. In high school, in 1955, there were 34,000 blacks; in 1973—181,000; now, over 200,000. At universities until 1936, admission was refused to blacks. Thereafter, universities opened but, if a “Vorster” applied he got in; if a “McHenry” applied there was no room left. Black universities were built, with equal facilities and 100% subsidized. Thanks to the current government, thousands of blacks now are at universities. There also are Indian and Colored universities. Of the 32,000 member police force, half are white, half non-white. Until our time, a non-white could not advance beyond the level of sergeant. I know what the world says about me. But when I was Minister of Justice in the 60’s, I asked, why not have non-white officers? I put it through. Previously, black people couldn’t be professors or lecturers. They wouldn’t be there now if it hadn’t been for me. I want you to accept that from me. There is a black Rector at the University of the North. Whites serve under him. If that is not progress, what is? In sports—when my critics were in, no non-white could compete at home or overseas. Your Ambassador knows the situation now. This government made it possible. Now they do participate. Rugby is a national sport, nearly a religion. Different colored teams now play each other. Mixed teams also play international teams. Even five years ago, this was unheard of. If not for my policy this couldn’t have been possible. You mustn’t equate the American black with the South African black, and I can argue this until the cows come home. Whether you like it or not, due to our history and British efforts to Anglicize us, Afrikaans was not tolerated as a language. The British used to put us in the corner with a dunce cap and insist we write a hundred times on the board. “I must not speak Dutch”. Now, Afrikaner children go to Afrikaans schools; English go to English schools, Xhosas to Xhosa schools, Vendas to Venda schools, Zulus to Zulu schools and Coloreds to Colored schools. No one can change this. No one will dare to. If you say change, I’ll say I can’t. It is ingrained and I won’t. Whilst this is our position, we have created opportunity. We always will have separate townships. No one can change that. In the black townships, only blacks have rights. In our economy, in sports, and in social fields, there has been progress. There is no law against blacks visiting whites. There are certainly laws—we’ll discuss them tomorrow.

Vice President Mondale: I’m afraid I must leave. I have a phone call booked to the President, and I can’t keep the President waiting. If you had a Deputy Prime Minister, he would feel the same way about you.

Prime Minister Vorster: I don’t have one.

Vice President Mondale: I know your problem.

The meeting adjourned at 1800.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, South Africa: 5/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on May 21 by Katzen. Mondale was in Vienna for meetings with leaders of the Austrian Government and Prime Minister Vorster. The meeting took place in the Hofburg Conference Room from 2:45 to 6 p.m.
2. During the morning meeting, there was a dispute over the purpose of the Zimbabwe Fund. See Document 158.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 197.
4. For Vorster’s position, expressed in response to a démarche by the Five, see Document 49.
5. Waldheim travelled to South Africa and Namibia March 6–10, 1972.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 73.
7. See Document 54.
8. Ibid.
9. See Document 55.
10. See footnote 3, Document 264.
11. For the Group of Five démarche, see Tab A, Document 50.
12. See Document 52.
13. Reference is to the continuation of guerrilla warfare in Angola and Rhodesia.
14. See Document 54.
15. In telegram 82914 to Cape Town, April 11, 1975, the Department transmitted the text of the aide mémoire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750127–0839)
16. In telegram 246397 to Pretoria, October 16, 1975, the Department transmitted the text of the joint démarche. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750360–0046)
17. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 204.
18. See Tab 2, Document 264.
19. Not found.
20. The repeal was approved by Congress on March 15 and signed into law by Carter on March 18.