Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

200. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Lagos, April 1, 1978, 10:40 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Talks Between President Carter and the US Delegation, and Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo and the Nigerian Delegation: First Bilateral Session

PARTICIPANTS FOR THE US:

• The President
• Dr. Brzezinski
• The Secretary of State
• Ambassador Andrew Young
• Ambassador Donald Easum
• Ambassador Donald McHenry
• Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose
• Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning, Department of State
• Henry Richardson, NSC Staff
• Parker Wyman, Embassy Lagos

PARTICIPANTS FOR NIGERIA:

• Lt General Olusegun Obasanjo
• S.M. Yar’Adua
• Brig J.N. Garba
• Mr. Yaya Abubakar
• Ambassador E.O. Sanu
• Ambassador J.A. Oladel Akadiri
• Ambassador Haruna Bin Musa
• Mr. S.O. Falalu
• Ambassador O. Jalaoso

The talks began at 10:40 a.m. when the President and General Obasanjo entered for the press opportunity.

The President spoke of the good relationship between Obasanjo and himself. Obasanjo suggested that they discuss international matters that day, and at the next session take up economic and trade questions.² (The press opportunity ended)

OBASANJO: I welcome you on behalf of the people and government of Nigeria. We feel and believe that this visit is an indicator of U.S. African policy and a manifestation of your personal commitment to your ideals as a man of conviction. We have always known America to play a role in the world, but equally important are the principles on which you act of human rights and freedom for all people.

If we seem somewhat urgent in recalling these principles, it is because we believe that the United States holds these principles to be fundamental. Our discussion this morning should cover international matters, with whatever residue from those discussions being taken up in the second session. (Obasanjo then introduced his delegation.)

OBASANJO: When we met in Washington, D.C. we discussed several things.³ The Angola situation was discussed. Zimbabwe is now a current problem, and Andy Young was recently there and I would like to have his thoughts. Namibia is also of concern as well as the Horn.

Since our talks in Washington, the Angolan situation has changed somewhat for the better. Since we made our effort to mediate in the Angolan-Zaire dispute, that border has not been closed. We agreed to send a mission to mediate and we did. When Neto recently visited here, all went well. He indicated more confidence in the security of his northern border, though he still has problems with UNITA in the southeast. We expected that Neto’s instability would be lessened with the outside assistance that he received.

Our impression is that as soon as he is confident of his security, and he seems to be more so since the May coup attempts,⁴ which was especially indicated by his coming to Nigeria, the situation could be improved. This is as much as we can say.

THE PRESIDENT: We have no contact with UNITA or Savimbi. Our information, which is only secondhand, is that the number of Cubans in Angola include approximately 20,000 troops plus 4,000 civilians. Our information indicates that UNITA has also increased its strength. Cuban troops which were sent from Angola to Ethiopia have been replaced. Neto appears to have dropped out of sight and there are indications he might be ill. The question is whether the UNITA threat will have to be completely removed before the Cubans leave. The logic of this is that the Cubans might stay indefinitely. If this became the situation and the Cubans remained in Angola permanently, it would be of concern to the United States.

OBASANJO: If Namibia was neutralized, would this help the situation?

THE PRESIDENT: It would help, but it is doubtful if Savimbi would collapse. We have no relations with Savimbi. But our information is that help from South Africa to Savimbi is exaggerated. He evidently has substantial local support.

OBASANJO: Savimbi benefits from his tribal affiliations with the people in that region of Angola.

THE PRESIDENT: It would be a move in the right direction for the Namibian border to be neutralized by a settlement for Namibia bringing majority rule.

OBASANJO: I agree; that will help the situation.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Southern Africa.]

OBASANJO: After our talks in Washington, there were changes in the Zimbabwe situation, especially the emergence of the internal settlement.⁵ The Anglo/American Plan (AAP) ran into problems and gave us choices to make.

We have supported the AAP all along. At the time we first supported it, there was no internal settlement, only the problem of gaining liberation. The internal settlement is a threat factor in the situation, and it will not bring peace. We fear and shudder to think of civil war in Zimbabwe. We can imagine a scenario of the military forces of Muzorewa, which would likely be supported by Vorster, opposing the forces of the Patriotic Front with their outside support. It would be a grave situation.

The AAP is the only choice to prevent this, and I don’t know how you will get it back on the rails. It is your proposal.

THE PRESIDENT: Our proposal? I thought it was your proposal! (laughter)

OBASANJO: I am delighted that you are personally committed. You cannot be seen to abandon it. If the Patriotic Front can be convinced that the AAP has more in it than they formerly thought, it may be possible for them to accept it. Frankly, we were surprised by the success of the Malta talks,⁶ since our immediately previous talks with the Patriotic Front did not make us optimistic. If we are to act, we must do it speedily before the internal settlement solidifies. Time is not on our side. The more that Muzorewa and the other nationalists in Salisbury enjoy the trappings of office, the more they will wish not to give up their office. If we are not giving up on the AAP, we must act fast.

THE PRESIDENT: We have no indication that Nkomo and Mugabe accept the AAP.

OBASANJO: They do accept the AAP.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you certain of that?

OBASANJO: They do now. They will probably have areas they want to talk about. The Patriotic Front now realizes they cannot ask Britain to take over with responsibility, via a resident commissioner, if he will have no power. They are more amenable to the UN forces. A Governing Council could be fashioned to be more advisory than executive, though its advice could be strong. The Patriotic Front will accept a governing council of Zimbabwean leaders not exclusively Patriotic Front.

THE PRESIDENT: Andy has been in Africa during the last week, meeting with the Front Line presidents. Nkomo and Mugabe have indicated their support of the AAP only as a basis of negotiation, but will not accept it without substantial changes. We are completely committed to the AAP. We are not going to invade Rhodesia to enforce it, and we are now doing all we can to keep the British on board. Andy’s statements have caused them to reaffirm their support. Our feeling is that for the United States to relate directly to these problems as African problems is in the best interests of the United States. We have no preferences among Zimbabwean leaders. After an interim period—six months or more, we are not particular about the exact time. We wish to see democratic principles operating in Zimbabwe similar to those in Nigeria. My impression is that Nkomo may not have as strong a political base as Muzorewa. It is conceivable, since he has been out of the country some time, that Nkomo might need a period within Rhodesia to reestablish his political base. If it were 6, 8, 10 months, we would not abandon the Plan.

To maintain the support of the American people for the AAP, which currently is not strong (as I told you), there must be (1) UN presence (2) UK authority and (3) free elections. Free elections would give the world a sense of the wishes of the Zimbabwe people. The issue of the armies of Zimbabwe is the most difficult. The AAP provides for a Zimbabwean army to be based on the liberation forces, but we want to make sure that there will be no extermination of whites in Rhodesia. We want to prevent civil war. We share your concern that war could break out with Muzorewa and Vorster on one hand, against Nkomo and Castro on the other; this would surely lead to a wider conflict which we do not want. In every sense, we agree with you that the only basis on which to proceed is the AAP. If Mugabe refuses, or Nkomo, we must work out next steps with you, the Front Line and the UN.

OBASANJO: What is our next move?

THE PRESIDENT: We discussed that at length between Brazil and here, but we have no clear schedule. We need your advice and your thoughts. We would like to have communication with all parties to see what the next steps might be, but we are not wedded to a strict sequence.

OBASANJO: The Front Line and the Patriotic Front see the AAP as a basis for settlement; they do not see the plan as being dead. Where do we go from here? As long as Smith is a factor there is no solution to the Zimbabwe problem under the AAP. Smith must go. As long as he is there, everyone will be suspicious of everyone else. Why can’t Smith be removed?

THE PRESIDENT: Through what means? How? The Patriotic Front has been trying for several years. The Front Line has tried. It is difficult to think how to physically remove Smith.

OBASANJO: I asked this during our first session when the AAP was presented. I was under the impression that this planning had been taken care of, relative to putting pressure on South Africa to in turn pressure Smith. I thought that I understood this also in talks with Andy.

THE PRESIDENT: We can talk frankly on this. After our meeting, I concluded that it was in our interest to become more involved with Africa than perhaps the American people would currently wish to be. We put forward the AAP after I had met with Owen,⁷ and Andy also played a part here. Initially, we got almost no support from the Front Line presidents. After the internal settlement became a possibility, then the Front Line states and the Patriotic Front began to look at the AAP. The Patriotic Front has still not told us that they accept the plan. If they would accept it, this would put great pressure on Smith and Vorster to do the same. Otherwise, the issue remains in doubt, and creates a public image of the Patriotic Front being adamant while Muzorewa and the other nationalists are moving with Smith towards majority rule. You and I know that this is not true, but the Patriotic Front has not yet agreed to the AAP. We need the Patriotic Front to make public statements on this point in order to put more responsibility on the United States and Britain.

If it was clear from public statements that Nkomo and Mugabe did indeed adopt the AAP, not as a basis for negotiation, but as the basis for settlement, I could go to Congress. I could talk about protection for settlers, a democratic constitution and free elections, but that’s not my understanding of the Patriotic Front position.

ANDY YOUNG: When the Patriotic Front meets in a room with the Front Line States or with Nigeria they agree to the AAP. But when they go back to their military and get back with us, they change their position. We spent three months trying to get them to meet Lord Carver. There were problems as to where such a meeting would take place plus other minor matters, and all of this took time. Meanwhile Smith and South Africa were moving fast and managed to seize the initiative.

OBASANJO: Your point is well taken. You are saying we have not done enough to enable you to do more. Andy may be right. We had no problem with Nyerere. My speech in Kitwe (Zambia) supporting the AAP was cleared with Nyerere and Machel, and with the Patriotic Front. I saw Nkomo from midnite to 1:30 but I didn’t see Mugabe. Kaunda did not fully understand the AAP, and the problem of getting rid of Smith bothered him. I went to great lengths to reassure him that Smith would not be a factor and I believe I was successful in this. The same thing happened with Nkomo, but he seems to have slipped, as Andy says.

Getting rid of Smith is a critical point for us. We will try to move the Patriotic Front on this issue.

ANDY YOUNG: It comes back to the question of the military commanders. The political leaders—Nkomo, Mugabe and Nujoma feel a little insecure. I don’t know about Tongagara⁸ and Rex Nhongo.⁹

OBASANJO: What were their views?

ANDY YOUNG: Tongogara doesn’t talk much about politics. He seems to think that it is in the long range interest of ZANU to keep on fighting and that it can outlast anyone. If ZAPU forces move over to fight out of Mozambique, it might be under a joint command, but not as ZAPU. The danger for the the US (and even more so for the UK) is to launch such a process as this which puts us on your side pushing for a settlement, only to have it undermined.

OBASANJO: Didn’t we say originally that the UN forces would cure this? They must fight if necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: Would the UN send forces into Rhodesia, especially without Patriotic Front acceptance?

ANDY YOUNG: No. Our effort to put UN forces into Lebanon was successful because Lebanon requested them very strongly and the Soviets did not cast a veto. We strongly backed Lebanon, though the Israelis did not. Analogously, we have been trying to find someone on the African side to play the sergeant, to line up everyone for negotiations.

VANCE: I am not sure that if the Patriotic Front and some of the nationalists agreed to UN troops that the UN would refuse to send them; they might do so.

OBASANJO: Muzorewa would not agree to such a plan.

GARBA: When Prem Chand was appointed, this should have been followed up. The Security Council should meet, the Secretary General and Prem Chand could report to it, leading to a Security Council resolution adopting the AAP. This could hold everyone in place and serve as a basis for putting UN forces into Zimbabwe. This could possibly be our next move.

OBASANJO: There may be a problem. The socialist countries do not like the AAP because it takes the play away from them. Fighting in Southern Africa is in their interests. Anything that solves the problem except by military means is against their interests. If we do not support the AAP, we are playing into their hands. In that case we will have no choice but to be on the side of those who fight; we could not side with those who are allied with South Africa. Unfortunately, I can see a situation where Nigeria and the U.S. would wind up on two different sides.

THE PRESIDENT: I agree with what you say. The socialist countries prefer armed struggle. They supply the arms and the blacks die. If a war breaks out, it would be a very great challenge between the US and the USSR. South Africa would also be involved. Prospects for peace in Namibia and Angola would be lost. You would be involved, as you described. At this point I see no differences between us and you. Let us be frank. In the eyes of the white western world, the Patriotic Front have rejected the AAP, and the Front Line States have been successful; the Patriotic Front is relying on Soviet bloc assistance. Though the impression in the west is that Smith is untrustworthy, he has at least made a move toward majority rule. I don’t think Smith will do anything to turn over power to any black government unless faced with very great pressure. We need as much harmony on the AAP—you, me, Front Line States, the UN—so as to bring peace and some protection for whites in Rhodesia who are willing to remain and equitably share in the country. We must spread support for the AAP beyond me and Callaghan and you—sometimes—and the Front Line States. Meanwhile, the internal settlement gathers momentum. Though it is not difficult for us to support the AAP, it is difficult for the United Kingdom. Legally, the U.K. has responsibility in this matter. We will try to hold them to the Plan, and I refer to this in my speech.

On Namibia, we have the same problem with Sam Nujoma. We need his acceptance. The world thinks that Nujoma and South Africa have rejected the Five Power Contact Group Plan. I am afraid South Africa will move unilaterally in Namibia towards its own internal settlement. Black leaders in Africa must mobilize world opinion to bring pressure on Nujoma to accept the plan in order to prevent this from occurring. Smith and Vorster wish to stay in power in Rhodesia and Namibia. At the moment, the U.S. and Britain are not getting much support.

OBASANJO: Let us return for a moment to Zimbabwe. Since progress was made in Malta, why not have another Malta Conference followed in a day or two by a meeting of all the parties, that would then lead to a meeting of the UN Security Council to adopt the AAP proposals.

VANCE: That fits with our thinking. We have made great efforts to set up an all-parties meeting, but we consider it essential.

OBASANJO: Can you put pressure on South Africa?

ANDY YOUNG: The U.S. has no leverage on South Africa since the arms embargo and our relations are terrible. We cannot now get Smith to attend an all-parties conference unless there is either South African pressure or the military situation gets so much worse that his military advises him to meet.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there a possibility of sequential meetings? Malta, then Smith and Muzorewa?

VANCE: Malta, closely followed by all parties.

OBASANJO: What if Smith refuses to meet?

THE PRESIDENT: What if Andy and Owen went to see him? If Smith won’t come to a meeting, then go and see him.

ANDY YOUNG: That might be possible.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the UN would give support if the Patriotic Front would support such a meeting.

GARBA: The Patriotic Front is not quite that intransigent.

OBASANJO: That’s o.k. Smith turned down the AAP after talking with Lord Carver. We were disappointed that Lord Carver did not come away from that meeting with more. This, unfortunately, has been downplayed.

THE PRESIDENT: Both have rejected the AAP. Subsequently Smith moved to set up the internal settlement. He may be lying. But there has been no move on the other side—we are divided. We need unanimity around the AAP. It would be good if we could reconvene the Malta Conference and get a public commitment from the Patriotic Front to accept the AAP with only minor details to be worked out, and then we can take that to the world community. Otherwise, it is very difficult if we are the only ones supporting the Plan.

OBASANJO: Can you keep the British on board?

VANCE: The U.K. will go along if there is only a short time elapsed between the reconvened Malta Conference and an all-parties conference.

OBASANJO: The all-parties conference could possibly be delayed.

THE PRESIDENT: Would Smith refuse to see Andy Young and a British representative if they came there?

ANDY YOUNG: I met with Salim and told him that the Patriotic Front—Front Line Meeting could be held in Dar-es-Salaam and that another meeting with Smith was then possible in someplace such as Mauritius.

THE PRESIDENT: Someone could go to Salisbury if Smith will not come out. If the idea of a Malta Conference is accepted by the Patriotic Front and the Front Line, and the internal settlement parties reject it, we can move on that basis.

OBASANJO: Separate meetings might not work. We need a joint meeting with everyone there to avoid suspicion and distrust.

ANDY YOUNG: We must include South Africa in this process; perhaps this is possible through Namibia. It is not possible through Rhodesia. We want to tell Sam Nujoma that with his agreement, we could guarantee that there would be a UN force in Namibia—the rest of the Contact Group would push the British on this point.

If South Africa agrees with the Five on Namibia, they will not let Smith jeopardize their interests by creating a war on their northern border, and will force him into the AAP. But without a united Africa group in the UN, the USSR will veto. Even without SWAPO’s agreement, the USSR will hesitate to veto if the Africa Group is unified.

OBASANJO: We must consult with SWAPO, and it will be difficult to find him. I fear that he will go off half cocked on this question. There are two issues that must be resolved: (1) Walvis Bay; (2) the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and the responsibilities there of the South African police. It is important to build confidence in the people of Namibia about elections.

VANCE: Our position is that the UN Secretary General should decide at what strength the UN forces should be deployed.

OBASANJO: Will there also be UN police in Namibia as well as troops?

ANDY YOUNG: We are proceeding along the lines of the “two men in a jeep” concept. This means that in the UN Observer Team there will be one UN official that will accompany the responsible officials in the South African forces to monitor their activities.

MCHENRY: The Secretary General should be authorized to do whatever he feels is necessary in the situation. We believe that the two men in a jeep concept satisfies these requirements.

OBASANJO: O.K.

THE PRESIDENT: The UN is more deeply involved in Namibia already than in Rhodesia.

VANCE: On the issue of the size of South Africa forces, we have proposed that 1,500 would remain in one of two camps in the North. In the Proximity Talks in New York,¹⁰ SWAPO stated their position and agreed with us on the number of 1,500 but said that these must be located in the south of Namibia.

OBASANJO: Why cannot a compromise be reached on this point?

MCHENRY: From our talks with the South Africans and the history of these negotiations, the provisions in the current proposal already represent a compromise, especially in moving those troops back from the northern border. They will be confined to base, surrounded by UN forces, and this would provide sufficient guarantees; South Africa has not yet accepted this. Proposing to move them to the south would rub Vorster’s nose in the dirt, he would dig in his heels and there would be no settlement.

OBASANJO: Our effort then will be to try to get to SWAPO before April 10th.¹¹ What about the question of Walvis Bay?

VANCE: There is a serious legal question on Walvis Bay. It must be resolved by negotiation. If we push to negotiate the question now, we will not get a settlement in Namibia. After such a settlement is in place, South Africa will probably go along. It is both a legal and a political matter, but we believe that it must be resolved as a political matter.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the UN position on this question?

MCHENRY: It is confused. Walvis Bay was ignored as an issue until about two years ago. Historically, it is not a part of the original League of Nations Mandate. When Southwest Africa was delivered to South Africa under the Mandate, Walvis Bay was to be administered as if it were a part of Namibia. In historical, ethnic, political, and economic terms, Walvis Bay is part of Namibia. However, South Africa has a strong legal case and therefore we must argue on the basis of practical political realities. But even the Turnhalle Group agrees with SWAPO that Walvis Bay should be part of Namibia.

OBASANJO: Perhaps you can get a private concession from South Africa that this will eventually happen.

THE PRESIDENT: We can express an opinion, but the question must be negotiated. To inject it now as an issue would kill the Namibian settlement.

ANDY YOUNG: Walvis Bay is no good to South Africa without the land surrounding it which belongs to Namibia. South Africa thinks that SWAPO is communist, and they are concerned about their future relations with an independent Namibia. If South Africa thought that a relationship similar to that which they now have with Mozambique would evolve, they would probably think it over.

MCHENRY: The issue of Walvis Bay has been blown all out of proportion. Vorster is emotional on the legal issue. But South Africa is willing to say that all Walvis Bay questions, including sovereignty are subject to negotiations, but they will not concede the question of sovereignty in advance. They possibly wish to hold Walvis Bay as a card vis-a-vis Namibia in the future.

OBASANJO: How much time do we have? On Zimbabwe, I understand that the next move by you would be to convene the Malta Conference and then a general all-parties conference. We will make the Patriotic Front and the Front Line see that they need to accept the AAP with only minor modifications. This would lead to a Malta Conference and then a general all-parties conference followed by a Security Council meeting.

VANCE: I should mention here that we will be tabling our proposal on Namibia in the Security Council on April 10th, and hopefully Nujoma could be contacted before then.

OBASANJO: We might spend five minutes on these questions at tomorrow’s session.

End of First Session

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 4/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Dodan Barracks. President Carter was in Lagos on a State Visit March 31–April 3.
2. The next meeting took place on April 2. The memorandum of conversation of this meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa.
3. October 11, 1977. See Document 171.
4. Reference is to the failed coup attempt by Nito Alves on May 27, 1977.
5. See footnote 3, Document 194.
6. See Documents 183–186.
7. See Document 163.
8. Reference is to Josiah Magama Tongogara, commander of the ZANLA guerrilla army.
9. Reference is to Solomon Mutuswa, also known as Rex Nhongo, supreme commander of ZIPA.
10. See Document 81.
11. In an April 10 letter addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Western Five submitted a proposal to achieve Namibian independence in 1978. For provisions of the proposal, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978, pp. 881–882.