81. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
501. Capetown for Embassy. Subject: Namibia: Meeting of Western Five Foreign Ministers With Representatives of Frontline States—February 11.
1. The Foreign Ministers of the Western Five met pm February 11 with representatives of the Frontline States and African members of the Security Council. The two-hour meeting provided a valuable exchange of views on the most pressing issues concerning a Namibian [Page 213] settlement. It was especially significant because of the presence of three African Foreign Ministers as well as other special emissaries, who contributed greatly to the quality of the exchange. The African representatives present included: Angola: Ambassador Figueiredo as well as Mr. M.A.D. Rodrigues and Miss Olga Lima from Luanda; Botswana: Foreign Minister Mogwe and Ambassador Tlou; Gabon: Ambassador N’Dong; Mauritius: Ambassador Ramphul; Mozambique: Sergio Vieira, Special Assistant to the President, and Ambassador Lobo; Nigeria: Deputy Permanent Representative George; Tanzania: Foreign Minister Mkapa and Ambassador Salim; Zambia: Foreign Minister Mwale and Ambassador Konie.
2. Following is an account of the most significant views and comments expressed by the African representatives:
A) Size and location of residual South African Force: Western Five stated that SWAPO had agreed to the presence of 1500 South African troops in Namibia during the electoral campaign and insisted that those troops be confined at Karasburg in the southern part of Namibia. Foreign Ministers Mkapa (Tanzania) and Mwale (Zambia) both heralded this as a major concession. In addition, Nigeria and Zambia expressed support for SWAPO’s insistence on Karasburg. Foreign Minister Mogwe (Botswana) rounded out discussion of the item by stating that, before worrying about the location of the residual force, the Five should, first, get the South Africans to accept 1500 as the size of the force, and, second, get them to accept that the UN force would be larger than the South African force. After that is done, Mogwe believes that SWAPO will be prepared to talk about location.
B) Size of the UN military presence: Like Mogwe, Mkapa also believes that the UN force must be larger than the residual force. Foreign Minister Genscher (FRG) responded that he was quite sure that the UN military presence would be considerably larger than the residual force. He added that the determination of the size would be left to the UN Secretary General, who would keep in mind the operational and logistical requirements, and that the Five will not let financial considerations be a barrier.
C) Control of the police: Both Gabon and Mozambique expressed concern for controlling police. Sergio Vieira of Mozambique described the army-like characteristics of the police and then echoed SWAPO’s call for the insertion of a UN command structure over the police.
D) Walvis Bay: Vieira reminded Five that it is not only SWAPO which says that Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia; it is the entire international community which holds this view. He further stated that a guarantee must be obtained from South Africa that when their troops withdraw from Namibia they will not be sent to Walvis Bay. Nigeria also questioned whether South Africa would expect to retain any troops in Walvis Bay during the electoral campaign.
[Page 214]E) Role of the UN Special Representative: Throughout the meeting considerable time was spent discussing the relationship between the Administrator General and the UN Special Representative. Tanzania and Mozambique were most vocal in support of veto power and the power to initiate action for the Special Representative. Secretary Vance assured them that the Special Representative’s powers, as described in the proposal, amount to veto power and that South Africa understands this, but Mozambique urged that the understanding be put in writing—perhaps in a secret document. Tanzanian Foreign Minister Mkapa explained his position on this matter by saying that he has the utmost sympathy for the person who emerges as the Special Representative and is therefore trying in advance to ease that person’s burden by attempting to clarify the Special Representative’s powers in advance.
3. Near conclusion of the meeting Sergio Vieira, in characteristically precise and thorough manner, detailed several additional concerns. He urged that the white “settlers” in Namibia should not be allowed to vote unless they first provide assurance of their intention to become Namibian citizens. His view is that many whites will decide to leave after the elections, and still others will remain but decide not to become citizens. He argues that some citizenship requirement should be included in the voter registration process.
4. In conversation between Mission Officer and Tanzanian Ambassador Salim following meeting, Salim discussed SWAPO’s insistence on including Walvis Bay in any settlement. He realized that a settlement was practically impossible if Walvis Bay was included, and he presumed that SWAPO would in the end not insist on inclusion of Walvis Bay at the expense of a settlement. He argued, however, that tactically SWAPO has to inject the issue of Walvis Bay into the talks at this point. SWAPO has much more leverage with the Five now than will an independent Namibia. The Five have not committed themselves even privately on the issue of Walvis Bay, and SWAPO is wise to work for a commitment which could be drawn on later by the independent government of Namibia.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780065–0353. Confidential: Immediate. Sent for information to Bonn, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, Libreville, London, Lusaka, Maputo, Ottawa, and Paris. Sent for information Immediate to Pretoria and Cape Town.↩