Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

194. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, March 9, 1978, 0055Z

60166. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Bishop Muzorewa, March 8.

Summary: In conversation with Secretary, Muzorewa appealed for US support for internal settlement. In his presentation and in response to Secretary’s questions on details March 3 Salisbury Agreement, Muzorewa stressed his pragmatic approach toward negotiations, acknowledged that agreement was less than ideal, but defended position that most important consideration is that by end of year desired goal of independent, majority ruled Zimbabwe will have been reached. He asserted that Smith would remain Prime Minister in name only during the transition and that real power, including control of army and police, will pass to Executive Council. Muzorewa reiterated standard line that US and UK place too much emphasis on opinions of Patriotic Front, Front Line Presidents and OAU. He reaffirmed belief that majority of guerrillas will desert to support the internal settlement and that the only threat of civil war is between Mugabe and Nkomo. Muzorewa did not ask for lifting of sanctions, but picking up on idea suggested in his conversation with Owen, urged US support UN humanitarian assistance during transition. He was evasive about meeting with other Nationalists, but said he would consider the possibility. Muzorewa wants to speak at UN and Secretary encouraged him to do so, promising US support for his appearance there. End summary.

1. UANC leader Bishop Abel Muzorewa met with Secretary for one and a half hours morning March 8. Muzorewa was accompanied by UANC officials Bulle, Nyandoro, Joyce Mutasa, and US Rep Nyamuswa. Assistant Secretary Moose, Tony Lake (S/P), Gerald Helman (IO), and Davidow (AF/S notetaker) also attended.

2. Secretary began meeting by thanking Muzorewa for his letter to the President,² and welcoming opportunity for frank exchange of views. Muzorewa’s presentation, which was not well-focused, was explanation of what had led to Salisbury Agreement.³ UANC had accepted Anglo-American plan, but when it became apparent that some parties were trying to “highjack it,” UANC decided to be pragmatic and respond to Smith’s approach to negotiate. Negotiations were undertaken on basis that Smith put into writing a pledge that majority rule would come on the basis of adult universal suffrage, a major new concession on Smith’s part. After agreeing to universal suffrage at age 18, UANC felt that it had achieved its principal goal. It agreed with need for constitutional safeguards to allay white fears and to encourage whites to stay and not leave economy in ruins. Bishop said it was necessary to compromise on question of specially elected seats and other elements of agreement because Smith is the power to reckon with. In relation to the defense forces, it was agreed that guerrillas “in the bush” could return and that they would be merged with acceptable units of Smith’s army. The transitional government will implement this. Bishop stressed he was convinced that majority of Rhodesian blacks accept agreement and appealed to the USG to “take a courageous lead to endorse and accept what we have done.” He said door was open to those outside to return and help in the many tasks to be accomplished by December 31. He said Nkomo’s criticism of the settlement cannot be taken seriously.⁴ He had been willing to accept a lot less from Smith when they negotiated alone.

3. Secretary responded by noting that he would be meeting with Owen that afternoon for further discussion on Rhodesia.⁵ He noted that there is much in the Salisbury Agreement with which US could agree in principle, e.g., universal suffrage, majority rule, bill of rights, independent judiciary. We hope that as each of these principles is spelled out, they would as a package provide for a genuine transfer to majority rule. While the rights of the minority must obviously be protected, this concern should not be distorted into a continuation of white privilege.

4. Secretary noted that those African states most intimately involved have expressed great reservations about the agreement. They do not perceive it as a genuine transfer of power: Smith and his Parliament retain authority during the transitional period, and white control via reserved seats and a blocking mechanism in the new government are seen to be excessive. Moreover, the process is seen not to be irreversible. Also the agreement is criticized as offering little hope for ending hostilities because it contains no provisions for participation by the other Nationalists.

5. Secretary noted that while we understand Muzorewa’s argument that guerrillas will come to his support, in the short run we estimate warfare will escalate and there will exist a greater possibility of Soviet, Cuban, and South African intervention. US continues to believe that the principles embodied in the Anglo-American proposals offer the best prospects for an internationally acceptable Rhodesian settlement. Only when an internationally acceptable settlement evolves, will the US be able to endorse it. The Secretary asked for the Bishop’s comments regarding African criticism of the Salisbury Agreement.

6. Muzorewa stated that he did not feel criticisms were serious, that agreement was superior to what other nations had negotiated regarding transfer of power. He asserted that Smith will remain Prime Minister in name only. Real power will pass to the Executive Council, which will govern. Smith will not be able “to tell the Army what to do or not to do.”

7. In response to Secretary’s question, “what happens if he changes his mind?”, Muzorewa responded that this was “very unlikely, I can almost rule it out.” Smith had burned his hands with UDI and wouldn’t do “such a childish thing again. He won’t go back on things he has agreed with us.” Bishop again stressed that pragmatic approach necessitated recognizing the need to bring about transition within the current framework of the constitution, but that Parliament will be subordinate to the Executive Council, which will order it to do certain things, such as passing the budget, necessary for the transitional government.

8. In response to further question from Secretary about control of the army, Muzorewa said that the army would no longer be under Smith, the Executive Council would exercise power and the Army itself would be under the Ministers of Defense (one white, one black). He repeated that he was not terribly satisfied with everything in the agreement, particularly the composition of the Council of Ministers, but noted that the basic question remains whether the agreement as a whole serves the greater good. He said he is confident that it does.

9. Muzorewa raised issue of civil war and said that it was absolutely wrong to assume that a war would develop between internal and external Nationalists. Majority of guerrillas will desert the external Nationalists. The only danger of civil war is between Mugabe and Nkomo. Muzorewa brushed off the Secretary’s question concerning the likelihood of heavy Soviet and Cuban involvement in continued warfare by noting that, if that happens, “they will be fighting Zimbabwe, not Mr. Smith, and that is a different ballgame.”

10. In series of pointed questions, Moose noted that our reading of agreement does not make it clear that Smith will not control Army during the transition. He noted difficulties of asking guerrillas to lay down arms and place trust in Smith and asked what would be attitude of black majority on Executive Council or black Minister of Defense toward continued cross border operations against Zambia and Mozambique. Muzorewa responded that the first act of the transitional government will be to announce an amnesty. He repeated that Army will be under control of Executive Council and stressed that Smith has indeed changed and that independence will come. Muzorewa did not respond to the question about cross border operation, but in a later, brief conversation, Nyandoro told Lake and Davidow that the Bishop would never permit a recurrence of the recent attack on Zambia. Contradictorily, however, he said that if the Patriotic Front gave them trouble “we could push them back and have lunch in Lusaka.”

11. Muzorewa said that he was sorry it was not clear in the Salisbury Agreement that the transitional government would control the military forces, but he argued it is implicit in the section where the future of the Army is discussed. He then proceeded to read the section outlining the functions of the transitional government. His voice grew fainter as he proceeded down the list, which includes no specific reference to Executive Council control over the Army, and finally trailed off. However, he maintained his assertion that the Executive Council would control. Bulle noted that it was necessary to maintain the current army in place during the transition to maintain white confidence. However, the Army is already 82 percent black and is being built up to be 95 percent African.

12. Nyandoro then entered conversation. He argued that the US has pushed Smith to the wall, bringing about his concession to majority rule, that the agreement reached is much better than other transitional arrangements arrived at (e.g. Algeria and Zambia), and that US must now accept it. He said UANC was not asking for US to approach the UN to lift sanctions, to which Secretary interjected that we could not do so. Picking up on idea, which Owen had planted, but not referring to the UK FornMin, Nyandoro asked that the US use its influence to arrange for humanitarian assistance to rehabilitate the people affected by the war.

13. Noting that the need for free elections impartially conducted is at the heart of the Anglo-American proposals, Lake asked a series of questions about specific details concerning the proposed elections. Would legislation be required? What would be the nature of outside observers? Who would run elections? What sort of provisions would be made for those outside to reinstate themselves as political actors, considering that they would have to do so under the current police and army?

14. Muzorewa responded in general terms noting that the external Nationalists were losing opportunities and that the process was open to them. The police, like the army, will be under the Executive Council and not Smith. He said UANC would prefer the US and UK Governments to provide supervision of elections but would consider alternative sources of observers if US/UK do not wish to do so. Some legislation from the Rhodesian Parliament would be necessary to set up electoral process, but conduct of elections would be responsibility of transitional government. Lake asked if Muzorewa saw a problem in that Smith and his Parliament would therefore have a veto over the electoral and transitional process. The Bishop responded that Smith had assured him that his parliamentary caucus supports his actions and will not back out of the agreement.

15. Secretary noted that Owen had raised with Muzorewa the possibility of the British and Americans calling a conference at which all Nationalists groups would be present to see if their differences can be bridged. He asked for Muzorewa’s views on this. Bishop responded that he had consistently said that all Nationalist groups should be involved and “if you think that something could be gained from a conference, we would be willing to look at it.” The Secretary urged Muzorewa to speak at the UN if the other Nationalists speak. Muzorewa agreed.

16. Moose noted that our questions about nature of Salisbury transitional arrangements stem from our concern, shared by the Front Line Presidents, that the general perception of those arrangements is not one of effective black control. Therefore, there might be mounting violence and it would be difficult to carry out elections. Such a situation might deny realization of precisely what Muzorewa seeks. Moose asserted that we carry no brief for one Nationalist group or another. At Malta we might have reached an agreement with the Patriotic Front if we were willing to compromise our beliefs and to give the Patriotic Front a predominant role or advantage. We rejected to do so because it would have been inconsistent with our desire for a fair and reasonable agreement, and with our commitment to insure that the internal Nationalists had a fair chance in elections. We seek to establish a process that would get all parties involved, leading to a lasting settlement and an end to the war. Moose noted that while there can be agreement on constitutional principles, there can be no real settlement unless there is agreement on a fair transitional process. Therefore, US wants to try again to reach an agreement based on Anglo-American proposals in which Bishop could gain everything he has achieved in Salisbury plus assurances of international acceptability.

17. Bishop noted that Moose’s points were fair, but did not seek to answer them. Instead, he and Nyandoro launched into criticism of the US for allowing Cubans to meddle in Zimbabwe’s future and to call the tune in Southern Africa. Secretary noted that we are indeed concerned by possibility of a major Cuban presence in Zambia and the dangers this would pose for Kaunda. Lake added that it is precisely the free electoral process at the heart of the Anglo-American proposals which, if conducted, would prevent the Cubans from calling the tune. Muzorewa finished the meeting by noting that he continued to look up to the US as a principled nation that would do the right thing. He met briefly with the Secretary privately after the other parties had left the room.

Vance

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent to London, Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Maputo, Lagos, Cape Town, USUN, and Lilongwe. Drafted by Davidow; cleared by Petterson and Moose; approved by Vance.
2. Not found.
3. For the full text of the March 3, Salisbury Agreement, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1978, pp. 28945–28946.
4. Nkomo criticized the agreement on several occasions. Following the initial announcement on February 15, Nkomo pledged that “the war continues.” In a joint statement issued on February 26, he and Mugabe said: “We are resolved in our total condemnation of the sell-out agreement reached in Salisbury between Black puppets and the rebel fascist settler regime.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1978, p. 28946)
5. See Document 196.