Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

163. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 23, 1977, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting with British Foreign Secretary David Owen

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • The President
  • Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
  • Ambassador Kingman Brewster
  • Ambassador Andrew Young
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Henry Richardson, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

• United Kingdom

  • Foreign Secretary David Owen
  • Ambassador Peter Jay
  • Mr. Ewen Fergusson
  • Sir John Moreton, British Embassy

During the press opportunity, the President expressed his pleasure to Foreign Secretary Owen at seeing him and being able to talk about the difficult situation in Southern Africa, and perhaps a little about the Middle East. Owen, in turn, brought the Prime Minister’s best wishes to the President. He noted that sometimes the Prime Minister thought that we might be pressing for too much in Southern Africa, and in any case the House of Commons had to be dealt with on the issue. The President responded that he has been catching flak with regard to Southern Africa by those who say that from our following the British lead we still appear to be a British colony (laughter). Owen said that both leaders in these matters had managed to hoodwink the other’s press. (The press departed and the talks began.)

The President expressed his pleasure with the personal relationship that existed between himself and Owen and between their two governments, and felt that they could talk in a friendly spirit without restraint. He needed to understand the Zimbabwe situation and what next steps should be taken, and was looking to Owen for advice. He believed that majority rule on the basis of one man, one vote should be brought about as quickly as possible, but he doubted the possibility of building a consensus or unanimity in this situation among the Front Line states. If Smith should come forward with a fair (sic) proposition, we might consider agreeing with it. But this has not happened. It is essential to us that our views be compatible with those of the British Government. The results so far of your attempt to construct a Commonwealth peacekeeping force for Rhodesia have been disappointing, but I feel that you have sufficient influence to turn this issue around.

Owen noted the deep-seated resistance on the issue of providing troops for Rhodesia. It has been such in Britain since 1965, and represents a difficult threshold, even under the rubric of a Commonwealth force. For these reasons, constructing a peacekeeping force may be easier under UN auspices. Our efforts to now indicated that Canada was uninterested in a Commonwealth force, and Nigeria showed a lack of enthusiasm compared to what it had previously exhibited at the Commonwealth conference. Nigeria did show somewhat more enthusiasm for the idea of a UN force. The real problem was the Nigerian distrust, and the distrust of Africans generally, of Smith. We must not think that everything (sic) that whites in Rhodesia may do is wrong. We have swept away from the whites certain constitutional safeguards. This raises the question of linkage of such future constitutional safeguards with the Zimbabwe Development Fund. There must be increased linkage between the Fund and concept of one man, one vote, which would be implemented as follows: if Rhodesian blacks get one man, one vote, they would agree to honor all entrenched pension rights and the United Kingdom would then put up 1.2 million pounds to finance this program.

The President asked whether property rights were included as rights to be protected under the Zimbabwe Development Fund.

Owen answered in the affirmative, that some property rights were involved as well as provisions for protection of leasehold rights. The problem is that Rhodesian whites have always insisted on a blocking vote to protect these privileges. But if the concept of linkage were implemented, the Zimbabwe Development Fund would serve a similar purpose.

The President asked whether Smith could accept the idea of one man, one vote.

Owen answered he thought Smith was close to doing so. If everything else in a Rhodesian proposal fell into place, and if there is a solution on the law and order issue, then with South African pressure on Smith, a one-man, one-vote proposal might be accepted.

The President noted that Owen was speaking in the past tense and asked him whether he had given up finding a solution to this problem.

Owen responded that he had not given up but many ticklish problems remain. Included were the problems of the continuation of the fighting, and the rivalry among nationalist leaders. Nkomo wants power for himself.

The President asked whether Nkomo wanted an election.

Owen responded that he does want an election, but he wants to win it, or, you might say, rig it. We have some sympathy for his position; he has fought hard over a number of years and sacrificed much. Nkomo has never said that he wouldn’t accept an election.

The President asked whether he would do so as a first step toward his seizing power.

Owen responded that this was uncertain. Nkomo has never publicly disowned elections, but he has now upped the ante in the transition phase to attempt to rig the elections. It must be kept in mind that only one year ago it was Nkomo and Smith who were negotiating together. On the political spectrum, Nkomo would fall somewhere between Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Hastings Banda of Malawi. If history had taken its normal course, Nkomo would today be a respected member of the Commonwealth. He was in effect driven by a series of exacerbating circumstances into guerrilla warfare.

The President asked whether Nkomo feels obligated to the Soviet Union.

Owen responded, not really. He is paid and receives support from an amazing variety of sources, including the Governments of Britain and South Africa. Further, this issue is linked with the rivalry between the Shona and Matabele tribes in Rhodesia. We will never be able to devise a solution acceptable to all parties. We must get a solution that attracts the greatest support. The internal solution is dangerous because it would lead to a lack of acceptance by Africans, and internationally, and ultimately we would be backing a loser. But it is equally impossible for us to support the Patriotic Front, in part because of the risks that it carries to white Rhodesians. If we could only bring Nkomo into the negotiations, this would go far toward solving the problem. One possibility here is pressure through Kaunda. We might try to convince the Front Line Presidents that in fact the armed struggle has now been won successfully, that Smith is on his way out, and on this basis urge the Front Line Presidents to use their influence to bring the Patriotic Front into negotiations.

Brzezinski asked whether the internal solution proposed by Smith may be seen as a possible transition step, say lasting six months, on the way to a black-majority-ruled Rhodesian Government.

Owen answered that this could quite possibly be the case.

Young stated that one result of giving support to the internal solution, for that reason or any other, would be to push the Patriotic Front into a tighter alliance with the Soviet Union.

Owen agreed. As far as we can tell, Kaunda up to this point has probably rejected offers of Cuban aid. It would present us a very serious problem if Rhodesia should launch a raid into Zambia, more serious than their Mapai raid into Mozambique. We would simply have to do something. The danger of internationalizing the conflict would be greater in that situation than was the case with Mapai.

Vance said that as he saw it, we had four basic options:

1. to continue our attempt to get a negotiated settlement;

2. to support some form of an internal solution;

3. to impose some kind of outside solution;

4. to back off or walk away from the whole problem. Number 4 would seem unacceptable. Number 3 would seem to produce the worst of all possible worlds. We should not rule out number 2, but number 1 is better, and perhaps elements of number 2 could be worked in.

The President said that if the effort to get a constitution can succeed, then he was for it. But none of the parties involved seem to be in favor of it. We should find some position which is right, fair, and acceptable internationally. A solution based on majority rule and one man, one vote is a defensible position. If this happens, through an internal solution, then we can put pressure on Nkomo on this particular basis. We might proceed by announcing that the Patriotic Front indeed has been successful, and we can give public recognition to their efforts in struggling for their people. We might call for an open election on the basis of one man, one vote; we might espouse a peacekeeping force, which would probably be a UN force; we might reconfirm our support for the Zimbabwe Development Fund. This would put the United States in a reasonable position to move off dead center on this problem, and on that basis we would deal with opposition from whatever source it comes. We cannot agree to install Nkomo by fiat, no matter how much African support he might have. There is some hesitation about Nkomo in the United States and in Congress; Muzorewa is probably the most popular black Rhodesian leader in the United States.

Owen responded that we already have basic agreement on the idea of a constitution based on one man, one vote and on the Zimbabwe Development Fund. The key is who supervises the election. The United Kingdom is willing to live up to the proposals that it has already put forward. We might consider a solution to this problem similar to that in the Namibian situation. But the question is whether the fighting will stop, especially if the situation was such that the election would be supervised by the Rhodesian defense forces, and Nkomo was invited to return. There is much risk in this situation. The United Kingdom is very exposed here, with only uncertain possibilities as to the result. The war could well go on. Further, any support that we gave such a proposed solution could easily be sold to the world as support for a rigged election.

The President asked what was the legal status of the United Kingdom in this situation, and what was its legal status as recognized by the United Nations.

Owen answered that the Rhodesian Government is an illegal regime. The United Kingdom is the legal authority in the situation, and under existing UN resolutions can appoint a governor general. In any case, the United Kingdom was obligated to live up to its legal responsibility.

The President added that the question was what would UN response be to a resolution introduced by you which calls for elections on the basis of one man, one vote, and included provisions for a Zimbabwe Development Fund with fair provisions to protect white security. We must move off dead center on this issue.

Owen agreed that if we do not soon state our views publicly we will be trounced. The transition period is the problem; there would seem to be no way presently to remove Smith. If he went, the situation would change. If he is weakened by the forthcoming election, there would also be a change.

The President asked what was the status and the relationship of the present Rhodesian armed forces to the future of Zimbabwe.

Owen answered that under some conditions, the structure of the present Rhodesian forces might be useful to an independent Zimbabwe. This leads to the point that we must convince the Front Line states of the dangers of continuing armed struggle. We must also convince Smith on this point.

The President asked if the Nationalists unite, how would this help solve the problem.

Owen answered that South Africa would probably respond to the promise of stable (sic) black leadership in Rhodesia. South Africa has already responded to the initiative by the United States at Vienna in several ways.

The President said that there was a good chance of South Africa’s giving quiet support here.

Owen said that we basically already have this, except that the law and order issue remains a problem.

The President asked whether Owen was fearful of UN involvement.

Owen responded that it was a slow process.

The President doubted whether it was any slower than the current pace of present events (laughter).

Owen expressed the opinion that the construction of a Commonwealth force under present circumstances was almost impossible.

The President said that there was some indication that the Canadians would cooperate on a UN peacekeeping force in Rhodesia, and also from his contacts with Prime Minister Fraser that Australia would do so.² The UN could serve as an incentive toward a settlement, a way of communicating our position to the world, and a forum in which to resolve the problem. We should aim to get an agreement acceptable to as many of the parties as possible, and then deal with the rest of them.

Owen stated that we must be more explicit in this situation about the linkage between provisions of a negotiated Zimbabwe constitution and the Zimbabwe Development Fund.

The President stated that Congressional support would be much easier to mobilize if he could take a clear position on Rhodesia to Congress, even though there was some fear of the outcome under a Nkomo-dominated solution. We could take a legal proposition to the UN. The United Kingdom could make a proposal on elections, on a UN force, all with US endorsement. We need eight or ten principles clearly stated as a basis of mobilizing support. In any case, I need something to take to Congress by way of a clear position.

Owen said that there were useful parallels to be drawn between the Rhodesian and the Namibian situations, but the law and order problem still remained. He is not convinced that all ought to rest on the United Nations. The UN peacekeeping force will probably have to do actual fighting in Rhodesia, and there is little past UN experience to meet such a situation. Also, a Rhodesian settlement should come out of Rhodesians themselves fighting. There are many good men there who, by circumstances, have been driven to violence.

The President agreed.

Owen continued that what was needed was a path for those good men to be led back to peace. The UN was useful here as a focus and a credible cloak. Moreover, a United Kingdom High Commissioner in Rhodesia could be appointed under a UN arrangement.

Vance said that if the Commonwealth force is impossible, then there would seem to be no choice but a UN peacekeeping force. It may be easier to get African support in the UN.

Owen agreed. We must develop principles and hold to them, even should an internal solution otherwise occur. The danger is our being maneuvered into supporting a white-supported internal solution. This would put the entire US initiative in Southern Africa into question.

The President said that the problem was not with our attitudes in the situation, but with our resolve to take action. More people trust our inclinations and our sentiments than they do our willingness to act. We cannot allow the situation to drift, because that would produce a vacuum into which undesirable consequences would flow. We can put a proposition to the United Nations which is fair to both black and white Rhodesians, including the proposal of a peacekeeping force. We can leave enough flexibility in such a proposal for the Front Line leaders to disagree with in the United Nations. This would form the basis for proceeding toward a multinational solution. The legal role of the United Kingdom would lend authenticity here, and it must play that role. What we need is a proposal that is fair as far as possible to all parties concerned.

Vance said that some of the pieces for such a proposal are already in place, for example, the constitution, the proposal for a British High Commissioner. A solution to the issue of law and order is the primary ingredient lacking.

The President stated that he saw no alternative to carrying a proposal to the United Nations.

Young saw the appointed British High Commissioner as the key to some of these issues. Arnaud de Borchgrave of Newsweek had suggested to him previously that we ought to install Chidzero, who is the number two man at the UN and a Rhodesian, as Rhodesian High Commissioner. He seems to have kept in touch with all Rhodesian parties and is well respected as an international civil servant. But the Front Line Presidents may not be ready to approve a High Commissioner at this time. I have explored possibilities of expatriate Rhodesian administrators being brought into the situation. One question is whether a 50 percent black Rhodesian army would be acceptable to Nkomo. Any such proposals must be sufficiently detailed to attract support from Nyerere as a major Front Line leader, and also from South Africa so they can pressure Smith to accept it. What we may need to look for is a possible administrative solution to the Rhodesian problem, as opposed to a military solution, because there are already enough troops in Rhodesia.

Owen stated that he saw a UN proposal as of equal difficulty to a Commonwealth forces proposal, though this was perhaps because he had just gotten bruised in the British Cabinet on this issue; a formal decision had not been put to the Cabinet on this question. Should a resident commissioner be appointed for Rhodesia, he would be effectively under me. On the Namibian model, a parallel UN person could possibly act in conjunction with such a commissioner. I am openminded on this.

Young said that there were probably several potential Rhodesians in the United Kingdom who had the experience to run fair elections during the transition period.

Vance wished to express a partial difference of view. The Finnish Government is willing to commit troops. The Nigerians are possibly willing. A UN peacekeeping force is possible. In this context, some of the present Rhodesian forces might be retained for the future.

Owen stated that he would be very pleased to show in this situation that the United Nations actually worked. In order for a viable UN proposal to be implemented, strong logistical and other support was needed. Above all, the momentum in the situation toward a settlement must be maintained.

The President said that he did not understand Owen’s feeling about the negative consequences of a UN force. Even if it does fail, there are still advantages in going to the UN. We must get off dead center.

Owen agreed. If in the middle of all of this an internal solution is implemented, so be it.

The President agreed.

Owen asked whether if everyone accepts the UN proposal except the Patrioric Front, we would still go ahead with it. We risk a situation where the Patriotic Front has an effective veto in the UN, and this will lead to criticism by Rhodesian whites and South Africa. This in turn would produce a difficult situation, which is why we must at least examine the possibility that a modified internal solution will emerge.

The President said that if free and fair elections could be devised for Namibia to get a settlement there, we would not need to search the African bush for SWAPO in order to conclude an agreement.

Young responded that the difference was that SWAPO did not have much of a military force in Namibia, but the Patriotic Front did have a military force in Rhodesia.

The President asked whether the Patriotic Front’s military force would in five years’ time be equal to that of white Rhodesia.

Young said he foresaw a long drawn out conflict with the Soviet Union providing weapons to the Patriotic Front.

The President answered that this seems to be close to the present situation. We have no expectations of dramatic action emerging from the UN. Our proposal there must be fair to white settlers so as to gain South African support.

Brzezinski stated that the problem would not seem to be whether the proposal is fair to Rhodesian whites, but whether they believe that such arrangements would endure. We must create enduring arrangements. In this connection, we must support the Patriotic Front in order to get an agreement, but the agreement should produce enduring arrangements that promise continuing protection for Rhodesian whites. Accepting an internal solution would seem to lead to getting short-term arrangements which would then collapse.

The President stated his belief that whites in Rhodesia would yield to strong South African pressure. We will never be able to devise a solution that would please Rhodesian whites. An ultimatum from Vorster is the key to Smith’s accepting a settlement proposal. We could never devise a transition arrangement that Rhodesian whites think will endure that we in turn know will collapse.

Young said that in the past the Front Line states have been romanticizing violence and armed struggle, but there has recently been some softening of their attitude in this regard. The Angolan example has been instructive, as has been the costs of warfare to Mozambique. We must convince the Front Line states of the dangers of war to their own countries.

The President asked whether any of the Front Line states were actually in favor of continuing warfare.

Young answered that all of the Front Line states want a Rhodesian settlement, but their positions are frequently inconsistent from day to day.

The President stated that we need to have a proposal formulated by the time Nyerere arrives, before it is made public. Such a proposal must be fair as much as possible to both whites and blacks.

Owen said that when he was in Africa he stated that there could be no solution if one side had a veto in the situation, and was criticized for saying it, but still believes it. If South Africa agrees to a proposal incorporating one man, one vote, and if Smith goes, and if fair elections are promised, and such a proposal goes to the UN, then South Africa may ask whether Rhodesian forces can remain to safeguard whites.

The President said he thought they could.

Owen agreed. The problem is that in the past we have allowed one party to have a veto in the situation. We must get away from this. If one party proposes to go off on its own toward a separate solution, that should not stop other parties from proceeding as they have planned.

The President said that if we cannot supply a solution agreed to by everybody, we should go ahead with what we have and negotiate with the others on that basis.

Aaron said that up to this time we have been assuming that the Patriotic Front was the barrier to getting an agreement. In reality, it would seem that the Patriotic Front was closer to agreeing with us than was Smith. The problem in the situation may well be Smith.

Owen said that the Patriotic Front has moved toward us to some extent, but that South Africa may even be closer to agreeing with our proposal. Smith responds best to pressure. He is taking the white man’s position as a reflex political option, though he is probably personally not racially prejudiced. We need a credible position to get his agreement. Up to now we have thought that we needed to deliver the Patriotic Front for a settlement. This might be possible. Mugabe, for all of his reputation, does not really seem to be a thorough-going Marxist. If the Front Line states give us strong support, we might scare Nkomo into agreeing with some variety of an internal solution. But this would depend on Front Line support.

Young stated that the President must be able to say that our position cannot be vetoed by the Patriotic Front.

The President said that on his upcoming visit, we can stroke Nyerere and give him the first right of comment on the proposal we will have developed before it goes public.

Owen agreed. Nyerere has legitimate claims to being an African statesman and he could be very helpful. Also, he is very influential with Kaunda, who in turn is close to Nkomo.

The President noted that Owen thought more of Nkomo than Vance did.

Owen said that Nkomo has survived through difficult circumstances; he is a politician. I have the same feeling about Sithole, but not about Muzorewa. You feel you can do a deal with Nkomo.

Vance said that Nkomo may well be the one who must play a key role here.

The President expressed his gratitude for the long and courageous efforts of both the British Government and Owen personally in properly taking the lead in the difficult Rhodesian situation. You have more than gone the second mile on a series of complex questions. The United States will continue to give its strong support. There is no possibility of an open split between our two governments. If we have differences, we will keep it quiet. If we go to Vorster with our proposal which will be fair to both whites and blacks in Rhodesia, then I believe we can get Vorster to put extreme pressure on Smith. Vorster might well want to use such an action to in part redeem his international reputation.

Owen said that South Africa presented very difficult problems, but he believed that Vorster did not want conflict with the British and the United States on Rhodesia and Namibia.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Country Chron File, Box 15, Great Britain, 1–7/77. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting ended at 10:55 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)
2. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Fraser on June 22. (Ibid.)