186. Telegram From the Embassy in Malta to the Department of State1
140. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Rhodesia: Summary of Discussion at Final Session of Malta Meeting.
Summary: At final session of Malta round February 1, Owen reviewed in detail course of previous discussions and suggested, with Amb. Young’s endorsement, that it might now be appropriate to adjourn for reflection with view to meeting again in near future. Nkomo took opportunity to reiterate PF’s views on importance of interim arrangements, stressing PF’s insistence on prominent political role, opposition to UN peace keeping force and concern over retention of existing Rhodesian police structure. Owen offered to provide PF with copies of revised UK papers on the transition (which were given to ZANU, ZAPU and FL observers after the meeting), but Mugabe resisted Owen’s suggestion that papers be published. PF readily accepted idea of subsequent meeting, proposing that it take place in Africa, but indicating they would consider suggestion by Owen and Young that next round take place in New York one day before start of Proximity Talks on Namibia. End summary
1. David Owen opened the final session of the Malta meeting by asking where we might go from here. Ambassador Young suggested that since we now have a clear understanding of each other’s positions it might be the time to consult with those at home and consider our responses.
2. Nkomo agreed but before continuing complained about a BBC report which had suggested that the PF had accepted a greater role for the UN in Zimbabwe than was actually the case. Owen apologized for what might have been an unfortunate interpretation by BBC. He went on to recap for the plenary session the discussion yesterday afternoon. He reviewed extensively the points at issue, and explained some of the thinking behind suggestions for the transitional period which had been put into the Anglo/American proposals (AAP) to meet some of the anxieties of the Patriotic Front. He suggested that through participation in the governing council, the PF could have a genuine role, but one that would not be dominant. He added that the UN role provided a new aspect to the decolonization effort which gave the PF [Page 539] the opportunity to appeal any injustices to the UN Security Council. In closing, he promised to provide position papers on the governing council, the cease-fire committee and the UN Zimbabwe force, as well as the over-all transition paper (a revised version of the present Annex A) to the PF and the Front Line later today.
3. Nkomo in response reviewed the points at issue, focusing on the interim arrangements. Again he argued that the PF as representatives of the people of Zimbabwe had the right to dominant role. The names he said who would be missing from the governing council under the PF’s plan had no right to appear there because they had no forces. Smith was included not because the PF liked him but because he had a fighting force, as did the PF.
4. Nkomo said the PF saw no role for a UN peace keeping force because he believed the military commanders of the two sides should agree on what should be done. The commanders of the Rhodesia Defense Forces would agree to do so to preserve their own interests. He again insisted the PF police should be introduced into the existing police forces in Rhodesia to restrain them from further injury to the population. Foreign UN observers could not do this because they would not know what was going on.
5. Nkomo said the PF wanted to complete the task of decolonization working with the UK, but since they were the senior partners the UK should work with them, since the PF controlled the situation.
6. Owen responding said Nkomo had made a very impressive statement. He agreed that the interim arrangements had become a crucial issue. Discussion, he said, had focused on the comprehensive nature of the settlement procedures. He said in light of the discussions which we had had it would be appropriate now to break off the talks for relections. We should now decide on procedures for further consultations, as well as what we were to say to the press. He asked if the PF objected to the UK publishing an elaborated White Paper.
7. Mugabe responded saying that he agreed with Owen’s point made yesterday that publication entrenches proposals2 and that therefore the UK should not publish its new proposals. Owen agreed and asked if we should meet again, to which Mugabe agreed with alacrity. Owen suggested that a future meeting should be decided upon when they had found a way to narrow the gap between the two sides.
8. Ambassador Young, pointing to the need for a firm press line, reminded the conference that there had been competition in the press between the Malta talks and those in Salisbury. He said that the more hope and trust that could be generated in Malta the greater the pressure [Page 540] on Smith. He said that the participants have an obligation to show some movement as soon as we can, and pointed out that this would help in obtaining South African pressure on Smith. Without South African cooperation, removal of Smith might be a long hard process. He hoped that in addressing the press we could show that the approaches we had taken here in building hope and trust were workable. He ended by saying that he believed that we should be working to replace the military risks being run by many young people fighting in Zimbabwe with political risks for a few political leaders. The future of Zimbabwe, he suggested, was more important than the political ambitions of any one sitting here at the conference table. The British and Americans were prepared to take some part of those political risks.
9. Nkomo then pressed for agreement in principle for a future meeting in Africa. Owen at first resisted but then suggested an early meeting in New York February 10, in conjunction with the Proximity Talks on Namibia. Young suggested that New York would be an excellent location because it was a center for world communications. Nkomo indicated only that PF would consider possibility of meeting in New York. It was agreed to say to the press the future meetings would be planned without specifying time or place.
10. Mugabe then asked if the US and UK could not condemn the Salisbury talks in discussions with the press. Young responded that to condemn the Salisbury talks3 was to encourage them, by encouraging Muzorewa and Sithole to agree they had no where else to go. After some wrangling, during which the Zimbabweans visibly bridled at Owen’s suggestion that the internal Nationalists claim to be operating within the context of the Anglo-American talks, a general press line was agreed on.
11. It was agreed that in general we would say to the press that the meeting had involved serious detailed discussion in which it became clear that a settlement package must be judged as a whole and not on its separate elements. The focus of the talks had been on the transition period, and some differences had emerged. Nonetheless, we planned to have future meeting, after a chance for reflection.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780048–0734. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to USUN, Pretoria, Cape Town, Lagos, Lusaka, London, Gaborone, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, and Mbabane.↩
- See Document 184. ↩
- Reference is presumably to the on-going Salisbury talks between Ian Smith and the “internal” Nationalists, in an effort to reach an internal settlement. ↩