Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

199. Letter From President Carter to Zambian President Kaunda¹

Washington, March 27, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your recent letters detailing Zambia’s position on Rhodesia.² Ambassador Young has also informed me of his frank conversation with you.³ I appreciate your openness and sincerity in discussing this difficult issue, and your support for the proposal for a meeting of the principal parties to the Rhodesian conflict.

The Smith regime’s violation of Zambian territorial integrity has been unanimously condemned in the Security Council.⁴ In addition, we and the British have made it clear to the Rhodesians that such actions intensify the trend towards violence in Southern Africa. The toll in human lives and suffering is measureless and tragic. Please accept my personal condolences and those of the American people for the deaths of Zambian citizens who died in this attack on your nation.

I share your concern over the Salisbury “internal settlement” and I have said publicly⁵ that it is inadequate to the task of achieving a negotiated and peaceful resolution to the Rhodesian crisis. In his statement in the United Nations Security Council on March 14th,⁶ Ambassador Young dwelt at length on the serious deficiencies of these internal arrangements. He pointed out that they do not provide for a genuine transfer of power to the African majority through a fairly conducted and irreversible transitional process.

Ambassador Young also restated the determination of the United States to pursue a Rhodesian settlement based on the principles enunciated in the Anglo-American proposals; I reaffirm that commitment to you now. We have not waivered in our dedication, nor will we abandon our principles. The language in the Front Line-Patriotic Front communique issued at Dar es Salaam on March 26⁷ contains unwarranted distortions of our position. Confrontational rhetoric does nothing to further our common interests and, indeed, makes it more difficult for me to develop the support necessary to pursue them.

The task ahead of us is extraordinarily difficult. Our pressing goal is to obtain the agreement of all the nationalist leaders. While we have set no preconditions for the meeting we have suggested, such a meeting would be based on the principles of the Anglo-American proposals. The participation of the Salisbury conferees would in no way legitimize the arrangements they have entered into in Salisbury.

We must find a formula that will encourage Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole to recognize that the way to achieve a genuinely enduring settlement is not through the inadequate arrangements they have now. Simple condemnation of these two men, however, will force them further into isolation. They must be made to see that there is an alternative to the arrangement they are caught up in with Smith.

While Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe have publicly stated their support for the Anglo-American proposals as a basis of negotiation, they continue to maintain positions that are inconsistent with the impartiality and built-in checks and balances of the proposals themselves. We cannot accept any one group’s predominant position during the transitional period and beyond. At the heart of the Anglo-American proposals is the need for an impartial, transitional mechanism, which will not favor one group over another. The Salisbury agreement does not provide for this, nor regrettably, does the current position of the Patriotic Front.

I hope that you and your Front Line colleagues will encourage the Patriotic Front to participate in the type of meeting we have suggested. We are prepared to examine interim steps that might facilitate their participation.

I deeply regret that I will not be able to accept your kind offer to travel to Zambia while I am visiting Africa, but I know you will understand how important it is for me to get back for the resumed session of Congress. I await with great anticipation the opportunity that I will have for a full discussion of these issues with you during your visit here in mid-May.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Zambia: President Kenneth D. Kaunda, 1–10/78. No classification marking.
2. In telegram 74712 to Lusaka, March 23, the Department transmitted the text of Kaunda’s March 8 letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780127–0924) In telegram 67150 to Lusaka, March 16, the Department transmitted the text of Kaunda’s letter, which was received on March 14 in a diplomatic note from the Zambian Embassy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1476)
3. In telegram 970 from Lusaka, March 23, the Embassy reported on the March 22 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780128–0145)
4. Reference is to UNSC Resolution 423 (1978).
5. For text of the remarks, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, p. 495.
6. See Department of State Bulletin, April 1978, pp. 56–58.
7. In telegram 1295 from Dar es Salaam, March 26, the Embassy transmitted the text of the communiqué. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780132–0475)