Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

329. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, January 18, 1981, 0015Z

255. Subj: (S) Nicarguan support for Salvadoran guerrillas. Ref A. State 12957² B. Managua 221 [112].³

1. S-Entire text

2. I met with GRN/FSLN group at noon today on their invitation. In attendance were Sergio Ramirez, Arturo Cruz and Humberto Ortega. Ramirez began as spokesman and made the following points:

—The Govt of Nicaragua reiterates its adhesion to the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of other countries.

—It never has been the policy of this govt to permit its territory to be used to transit arms to third countries.

—We will make use of all our material and human resources to surveil our territory and our frontiers to assure that no actions or operations occur here which would violate the principles mentioned above.

—We initiated yesterday an operation to try to locate a clandestine radio station, drawing on the info provided by the American Embassy. We have not been successful but we will continue the search and would appreciate any further info which can be provided.

—We have instructed all national radio stations not rpt not to transmit any inflammatory info about the situation in Salvador.

3. Ramirez then indicated their concern that, in the midst of our bilateral dialogue on this sensitive issue, Amb White and the Dept Spokesman had gone public and compromised the confidentiality of the discussion.⁴ He closed by noting that the Govt of Nicaragua reiterates its desire that the US and Nicaragua maintain a climate of “mutual respect and objective comprehension”. They were hopeful that nothing would occur to alter what has become an increasingly cordial relationship.

4. I thanked them for their comments and said I could not emphasize strongly enough the importance and the urgency of the matter. Violence in Salvador, which was fed recently by the introduction of sophisticated arms to the guerrillas, had inflamed the environment. They should understand that only their full cooperation in terminating all support operations and in putting an end to the use of their territory would offer some basis for salvaging our bilateral relationship. I said no President of the US could support assistance to a country if there was conclusive evidence that it had supported, and continued to support after warnings, subversive activities in a neighboring country. And I repeated that we had evidence of such support from several sources, adding that this included photographic evidence.

5. Ortega said they had limited capability, both human and technical, and asked if we could provide equipment to detect the exact location of the clandestine Radio Liberacion. I said these were highly mobile operations and that the info I gave them yesterday was as accurate as I could provide. I suggested that he go to his “contacts within the Farabundo Marti” organization and insist that they close up shop here and respect Nicaraguan sovereignty. He then reiterated the position he had taken before (Managua 112) that they were so occupied with preventing incursions from across the Honduran border and defending themselves against attacks that it was difficult to move against elements using their territories for clandestine operations without precise info. I responded that I had more faith than he in their capacity to exercise control over their territory. I said we would be carefully monitoring land, sea and air activities for evidence that any supply to Salvadoran guerrillas was continuing. I also informed them that investigations were going on in Salvador to determine the origin of some items of equipment and whether or not they had been transshipped through Nicaragua.

6. Ortega stated that GRN/FSLN was very sensitive to our concerns that the already difficult situation in Salvador not be further aggravated by outside supply or forces. He tried to draw a distinction between the natural Nicaraguan sympathy for the revolutionaries and official support to them. I said that while I could understand their explanation, it only complicated the situation now. I added that a shooting war is going on in El Salvador in which a guerrilla force, using highly sophisticated equipment provided from external sources, is trying to overthrow the gov’t of that country. Sandinista rhetoric supporting the leftist guerrillas and attacking the gov’t in itself was interventionist. Ortega admitted that there had been excesses and said that changes would be made. He said they would continue to criticize the “murder of nuns,”⁵ but recognized that a line had to be drawn between that kind of statement of moral outrage and one of official support for the forces of the left. Ortega professed to understand the dilemma the situation in Salvador posed for the US and hoped that USG actions would be measured and restrained.

7. Ortega said that seventeen armed Nicaraguans heading for El Salvador had been stopped at the Honduran border yesterday (Jan 16). He also stated that twenty Honduras-based ex-Guardias killed another Nicaraguan solder near the border the day before, bringing total Nicaraguan deaths in the border area to over 100.

8. I said the decision to provide the two helicopters and non-lethal equipment was taken to give the Salvadoran military some greater capability to deal with better-armed insurgents. And now we had decided to supply some limited lethal weapons as well because of the urgent need to support a military institution under attack.⁶

9. I then recapitulated our points of concern and emphasized the importance of them making every effort to avoid becoming further embroiled in an adventure which suits Cuban designs but not their own. All Central American nations would be affected should the Salvador fighting continue and worsen. Nicaragua would suffer if it allowed itself to be further drawn into a conflict which could only have negative effects on its relationship with the US. If Nicaragua feared that its security would be adversely affected by a rightist victory in Salvador, its best insurance would be to strengthen its ties with the United States. I closed by emphasizing that we were dealing with a very serious matter and asked that our discussion be shared with other members of the gov’t (which they promised to do).⁷

10. Comment: Ever since my demarche on Jan 14, I have been struck by the seriousness with which they have dealt this subject.⁸ Amb White’s comments were handled far more maturely and cautiously than is usual for this gov’t. The off-handedness and bravado often characteristic of FSLN leaders has been entirely absent. I have no doubt they have gotten our message and understand the seriousness of the consequences. How deeply they are compromised with the Cubans is unknown. But the real question is whether they have the will to interrupt the operations. If this jolt weakens the position of those engaged in operational activities with the Cubans and results in the cut-off of supplies, it will be an achievement.

11. Para 5 ref A will be handled in a separate message.⁹

12. Dept please pass to San Salvador.

Pezzullo

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis. For information about Carter’s January 16 decision to make specific demands on Nicaragua to stop supporting the insurgency in El Salvador, see Document 495. For information about the January 16 mini-SCC on Nicaraguan aid to the Salvadoran insurgents, see Document 496.
2. In telegram 12957 to Managua, January 17, the Department informed Pezzullo that the “intelligence community is redoubling efforts to monitor support operation from Nicaragua to El Salvador,” and instructed him to “continue to press your interlocutors hard to stop allowing Nicaragua to serve as staging area.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
3. See Document 327.
4. See footnote 5, Document 328.
5. See footnote 4, Document 447.
6. See Document 495.
7. Pezzullo reported on his conversations with Cruz and Borge regarding his démarche on GRN/FSLN support for Salvadoran guerrillas in telegram 257 from Managua, January 18. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 22, El Salvador: 1/16–19/81) O’Donnell covered the same subject in his conversation with Arce, reported in telegram 258 from Managua, January 18. (Ibid.)
8. See Document 328.
9. Pezzullo reported about the emergency Embassy staff reduction plan in telegram 256 from Managua, January 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])