Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

447. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 4, 1980

SUBJECT

• El Salvador at the Foreign Policy Breakfast—December 5, 1980 (C)

First, let me suggest that the many and complex issues which relate to El Salvador would best be addressed at an SCC, where those of us who have been following developments there closely can ensure that decisions are not made on erroneous information. For example, in a cable on November 30, Ambassador White said that Duarte “reluctantly admitted that security forces participated in the assassination of FDR leaders.”² Based on this cable, our Ambassador to Mexico City made a statement to the press that he believes the killings were done at the direct order of the Junta. It turns out that after serious questioning by the State Department, White admitted that Duarte had not said what he reported, but rather just acquiesced in White’s assertion that security forces were involved. That is an important datum. (S)

Nonetheless, expecting that you will discuss the issues at the breakfast, let me summarize. The central issues for U.S. policy to El Salvador at this time are who should we support, what do we want to gain from the military high command, and what are we prepared to give? The right-wing, with the acquiescence of the high command, is trying to squeeze out what remains of the middle (the Christian Democrats, Majano) and exterminate the left. They are encouraged by Reagan’s election and believe that even though Reagan might not like the killings, he will still support them. The right have already been able to put a stop to the land reform; the Junta has been unable to give title to the farmers, and the farmers and their organization may soon leap to the left. This doesn’t bother the right who feel that they can win by a military solution like they did in 1932. I think they’re wrong—morally and practically. (S)

The Christian Democrats (PDC) are pressing the military to punish the perpetrators of the Thanksgiving assassinations. Bob White’s current strategy is to suspend all assistance until we see a desirable outcome emerge from this debate.³ I would recommend that we not only allow the PDC to use our implicit “stick,” but that we also give them some new “carrots” to use with the military.

I would recommend we tell the PDC that if they can get three items from the military, then they can assure the military of an immediate delivery of helicopters, a start-up of economic and military aid, and the signing of FY 81 FMS agreement. What do we want? Three items: (1) arrest and punishment of all the officers involved in the killings, including Major D’Aubisson; (2) the sending of Caranza, Moran, or one of the other of the High Command identified with the repression abroad as an Ambassador or whatever, and (3) the implementation of the agrarian reform (phases I and III) by giving title to the farmers. These three steps are in the interest of the Junta; with them, the Junta could prevail. In addition, we need to get Reagan to make a statement which makes just two points: he favors the long-needed reforms in the area, and he opposes right-wing as well as left-wing terrorism. If he could also say something positive about the Christian Democrats and their importance to the Junta, that’s gravy, but doubtful. At this moment, the opposite is happening: an ex-CIA agent who has been writing for the Heritage Foundation on how bad we have been is in El Salvador, ostensibly delivering a message from Reagan that his policy to El Salvador has not yet been formulated (a powerful message in itself).

An SCC is essential, but I would also try to strengthen the PDC’s hand as soon as possible.⁴

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Subject Files, Box 22, El Salvador: 1/1–10/80. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum was stamped: “ZB has seen.” An unknown hand wrote “12/05/80” next to the stamped notation.
2. See Document 446.
3. Under a December 4 note, Denend sent Pastor a portion of Muskie’s December 3 Evening Report for Pastor’s information. The report noted that White had met with the JRG and officials at the Ministry of Defense to inform them that the United States was reviewing policy toward El Salvador “as a result of the killing of the leftist leaders.” In addition, the United States was “holding up on new assistance to the JRG (signing the pending $20 million ESF and $5 million FMS agreements, proceeding with PL 480 and CCC credits and expediting a decision on the helicopters).” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 22, El Salvador: 12/1–10/80)
4. In telegram 8480 from San Salvador, December 4, the Embassy reported that three U.S. citizen nuns and one U.S. citizen lay missionary had been murdered. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800580–0282) In a December 5 statement to the press, Department Spokesman Carter noted the killings and stated that “pending clarification of the circumstances of the killings we are putting a hold on all economic and military assistance commitments.” (Telegram 322499 to San Salvador, December 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800581–0874; also see Juan de Onis, “U.S. Suspends New Aid to Salvador Till American Deaths are Clarified,” New York Times, December 6, 1980, p. 1) In a December 5 memorandum for the record, Brzezinski recorded the decisions taken at the December 5 foreign policy breakfast meeting attended by Carter, Mondale, Brown, Christopher, Watson, Powell, and himself. He noted: “El Salvador: Hold on aid flow and withdraw MTT; send emissary to assess situation immediately; announce foregoing and denounce killings of U.S. missionaries.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 93, Foreign Affairs Breakfast, 1977–1981) No other substantive record of the meeting has been found. In a December 5 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, Pastor noted that Bowdler and Rogers were going to El Salvador “on a mission which will be wide open to misinterpretation.” He commented: “I pray that the public announcement will not inadvertently precipitate that which we are trying to avoid—the break-up of the Junta.” (Carter Library, Vertical File, El Salvador)